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ABSTRACT
Buckingham, Steven C. M. A. The University of Memphis. May 2012. Saints,
―Savages,‖ and Smallpox: Epidemic Disease and the Colonization of New England,
1616-1637. Major Professor: Scott P. Marler.
This thesis argues that native epidemics of European infections were crucial to the
English colonization of New England. In the early seventeenth century, this region was
densely populated with natives who were happy to trade with Europeans but prevented
them from establishing permanent settlements there. But in 1616, an epidemic, probably
of smallpox, killed thousands of natives along the New England coast, creating
conditions that helped ensure the survival of the Pilgrims‘ settlement at Plymouth and
facilitating subsequent English expansion in New England. Then in 1633, in the midst of
the Puritan ―Great Migration,‖ another smallpox outbreak caused extensive native
mortality and social disruption from Massachusetts Bay to the Connecticut Valley,
initiating a series of events that culminated in the Pequot War. By fundamentally
transforming the natives‘ demographic, social, and political worlds, these epidemics
created room for English settlement in the region and critically shaped interactions
between Europeans and natives.
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Introduction
Through scenes of gloom and misery, the Pilgrims showed the way to an asylum
for those who would go to the wilderness for the purity of religion or the liberty of
conscience. . . . Enduring every hardship themselves, they were the servants of
posterity, the benefactors of succeeding generations. . . . [These were] the men
who, as they first trod the soil of the New World, scattered the seminal principles
of republican freedom and national independence.
–George Bancroft1
Wherever the European has trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal.
–Charles Darwin2
At the heart of the beliefs and values of most every nation‘s people lies an origin
myth—a story, often entailing a sense of divine purpose, of how it came into existence.
For citizens of the United States, the tale of the Pilgrims‘ arrival and subsequent travail at
Plymouth in 1620 serves as our national origin myth. The broad outlines of this saga are
well-known by every American schoolchild: the Pilgrims left England seeking religious
freedom, first in Holland and then in America. They survived a grueling transatlantic
journey on the Mayflower, then half of them died during their first winter in New
England. In dire straits, they received assistance from ―friendly Indians,‖ including
Squanto, who taught them how to plant corn. After their first harvest in 1621, the
Pilgrims proclaimed their thankfulness with a grand feast, where colonists and natives
ate, played games, and celebrated together. From there, according to nationalist historians
like George Bancroft, the Pilgrims, and their fellow ―servants of prosperity,‖ the soon-tofollow Puritans in Massachusetts Bay, ―scattered the seminal principles of republican

1

George Bancroft, History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the
Continent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1876), 1:252.
2

Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle, ed. Millicent E. Selsam (1845; repr. New
York: Harper and Row, 1959), 282.
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freedom and national independence.‖ Our modern republic, of course, is the seemingly
inevitable result.
The settlement of Plymouth does make a compelling story, one that emphasizes
such vital themes as religious freedom, generosity toward others, triumph over adversity,
and thankfulness for good fortune. Like any good national myth, the Pilgrims‘ tale
resonates with most modern Americans‘ sense of how they would like to see themselves.
Thus it is understandable that citizens of the United States recognize Plymouth as the true
birthplace of their nation. Moreover, it is hardly surprising that Americans continue to
celebrate this story with an annual Thanksgiving holiday marked by food, football, and
family. But while the Pilgrim myth contains a core of truth, it does not tell the full tale of
the English colonization of New England. Indeed, that story begins not with the arrival of
the Mayflower in 1620, but with a native holocaust that started four years earlier.
*
Long before the Plymouth colonists set sail for America, European vessels plied
the waters of the northwestern Atlantic. As far back as the late Middle Ages, British,
French, Basque, and Portuguese fishermen and traders were frequent visitors to coastal
regions of northeastern North America. But despite repeated attempts, Europeans had
failed to establish any permanent colonies in this region before the seventeenth century.
The reason for this was simple: the land was occupied. Native Americans were densely
settled throughout northeastern North America—and while they were usually happy to
trade with their European visitors, they showed no proclivity toward allowing them to
tarry too long on the mainland. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the region now
called New England, where two well-organized expeditions, backed by some of the most

2

influential persons in England, attempted to found permanent settlements in the first
decade of the seventeenth century. Both of these colonial ventures failed miserably:
Bartholomew Gosnold‘s settlement on Cuttyhunk was abandoned after less than a month,
and George Popham‘s colony at Sagadahoc lasted less than a year. In both cases, native
resistance appears to have been a determining factor in the prospective colonists‘
decisions to leave their settlements.
Compared to the Gosnold and Popham expeditions, the Mayflower expedition
must have seemed hopelessly disorganized. The Pilgrims were not seasoned adventurers,
but rather, as one scholar has described them, ―weavers, wool carders, tailors,
shoemakers, and printers, with almost no relevant experience when it came to carving a
settlement out of the American wilderness.‖ Their stocks of provisions were wholly
inadequate, and they brought no cows or draft animals with them. And they sailed late in
the year, arriving just in time for the frigid New England winter. Indeed, the remarkable
fact is not that half of them died in the winter of 1620-21, but that half of them managed
to stay alive. Yet seemingly against all odds, their colony endured where other, betterplanned ventures had failed. 3 How could this be?
As it turns out, the Plymouth colony only survived because the English received
assistance from an unseen source. Beginning in 1616, a devastating epidemic of a
European infectious disease swept through coastal New England with ―such a mortall
stroake,‖ in the words of the English merchant Thomas Morton, that the natives ―died on

3

Nathaniel Philbrick, Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War (New York:
Viking, 2006), 6; Charles C. Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus
(New York: Knopf, 2005), 55-56.

3

heapes, as they lay in their houses.‖ 4 Although medical historians still debate the precise
cause of the epidemic, documentary and epidemiological evidence suggests that it was
probably an outbreak of smallpox. But whatever its cause, the epidemic decimated the
coastal natives, killing as many as 90 percent of them in some areas and leaving the
survivors to face a series of daunting spiritual crises and political challenges. In the wake
of the epidemic, the region was fundamentally transformed. Where previous European
explorers found populous nations of native inhabitants determined to exclude foreign
settlers, the Plymouth colonists arrived in an area beset by demographic collapse,
economic and social disruption, and political turmoil.
The plague left entire native villages deserted—in many cases, to be subsequently
inhabited by English settlers. Plymouth itself was erected on the site of Squanto‘s
forsaken village of Patuxet. Even for those natives that survived the epidemic, life would
never be the same. Kinship networks collapsed, and the deaths of community leaders led
to crises of authority. A spiritual crisis ensued among the surviving natives, who found
that their gods and their medicine men were powerless against the devastating sickness.
They abandoned traditional burial practices, in some cases neglecting to bury their dead
altogether. Not enough natives were left to tend to their fields or to burn the underbrush
in the surrounding forest, as was their custom. As the forest reverted to its natural state, it
eventually could no longer support the large populations of deer and other game animals
that the natives‘ husbandry had fostered. This change in the landscape, combined with the
expanding influence of English settlers, fundamentally changed the surviving natives‘

4

Thomas Morton, New English Canaan (1637; repr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis
Terrarum, 1969), 23.

4

ways of life in the years following the epidemic, as they were progressively integrated
into the larger economy of the Atlantic world.
Perhaps most importantly, the 1616 epidemic also transformed the regional
balance of power among Native American tribes, as it severely affected the coastal
Pokanoket and Massachusett natives while leaving their inland adversaries, the
Narragansett, unscathed. Faced with the specter of subjugation by the Narragansett, the
Pokanokets‘ principal leader, Massasoit, entered into an alliance with the Plymouth
colonists—a decision that would have been all but inconceivable just a few years earlier.
Both sides benefited from this partnership. The Pokanoket, knowing that they would have
the colonists‘ firepower on their side in the event of war with the Narragansett, provided
food for the starving colonists and helped them establish their farms in 1621. By assisting
the colonists instead of driving them away, Massasoit helped to ensure that the Plymouth
colony, unlike previous English settlements, would not only endure, but prosper.
Unfortunately for the natives, Plymouth was just the beginning.
During the 1620s, while Plymouth gradually expanded its zone of influence along
the coast of what is now Massachusetts, a slow but steady trickle of migrants bolstered
the English population of the region. Then in the subsequent decade, this trickle became a
flood. Thousands of Puritans—religious dissenters who wished to remain nominally
affiliated with the Church of England—inundated the land surrounding Massachusetts
Bay in the ―Great Migration‖ of the 1630s. The Puritans hoped to create a godly
community of ―visible saints‖ in the New World, ―a City on a hill,‖ in the words of their
leader, John Winthrop. But in addition to their Calvinist faith, they brought smallpox and
other European diseases to the region. For New England‘s natives, who were still reeling

5

from the effects of the 1616 epidemic, the ―City on a hill‖ turned into a charnel house. In
1633, a devastating smallpox epidemic ripped through the natives, killing thousands with
such gruesome effectiveness that, as one colonist described it, they would ―die like rotten
sheep.‖ Unlike the situation in 1616, the 1633 epidemic extended westward to involve the
Narragansett, as well as their neighbors to the south, the Pequot. Indeed, smallpox
weakened the once-powerful Pequot so thoroughly that they were unable to maintain
their hold on the region now called Connecticut. Unable to fend off rival natives, or to
reach a negotiated agreement with the English, the Pequot ultimately resorted to a
strategy of launching small-scale assaults on English colonists who sought to settle in
their territory. The English responded, in 1637, by bringing total war to the Pequot. Their
conquest was so complete that the Pequot were virtually eradicated from existence. Other
regional natives, learning from this experience, quickly submitted to English authority. 5
The first half of the seventeenth century was disastrous for New England‘s
natives, as epidemic disease and English war combined to reduce the total regional native
population by about 90 percent. The English, for their part, saw this as evidence that God
approved of their occupation of New England and would lend assistance, when
necessary, by sending plagues among the natives. Writing many decades later, Cotton
Mather nicely summarized the colonists‘ providential view of the natives‘ demise: ―the

John Winthrop, ―A Model of Christian Charity‖ (1630), quoted in The Life and Letters
of John Winthrop, 1630-1649, ed. Robert Charles Winthrop (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867),
18-19; William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647 (1650), ed. Samuel Eliot Morison
(New York: Knopf, 1952), 270-71.
5
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woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for a better
growth.‖6
*
The New England natives‘ experience in the early seventeenth century was a
microcosm of a much larger process that occurred throughout the Americas in the
centuries following Columbus‘s landing in the West Indies: the wholesale destruction of
Native American populations by European infectious diseases. While many natives were
killed in military confrontations with Europeans, and many more native deaths resulted
from the harsh conditions of their enslavement, neither warfare nor bondage adequately
accounts for the scale of Native American population losses after 1492. As it happened,
the infectious pathogens that European explorers unwittingly carried to the New World
turned out to be far more deadly to Native Americans than were the Europeans‘ vaunted
steel weapons and guns. Modern scholars dispute the absolute magnitude of the postColumbian Native American population loss, but most concur that it was a demographic
catastrophe of unparalleled scope in world history. In Mexico and Central America,
recurring epidemics reduced a population numbering between 8 million and 15 million in
1520 to just 1.5 million by 1650, and the Andean population suffered a similar mortality
rate in the century after 1540. On Hispaniola, a precontact population of at least 60,000
(and possibly far larger) declined to fewer than 2,000 in 1542.7 Indeed, in a pattern that

6

Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana: Or, The Ecclesiastical History of NewEngland From Its First Planting in the Year 1620, Unto the Year of Our Lord, 1698, in Seven
Books (1702; repr., Hartford, Conn.: Silas Andrus, 1855), 1:51.
7

Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern,
1492-1800 (London: Verso, 1998), 132; Noble David Cook, Born to Die: Disease and New
World Conquest, 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22-24. Estimates
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recurred throughout the New World, initial contacts between Native Americans and
Europeans were soon followed by devastating outbreaks of epidemic diseases among the
former. According to one count, thirteen pandemics (large-scale epidemics) of various
infections engulfed the Americas during the sixteenth century, with airborne viruses—
particularly smallpox, measles, and influenza—leading the assault. 8 Together, these Old
World microbes reaped a grim harvest in the New World.
Several hypotheses, none of which is entirely adequate, have been posited to
explain the Native Americans‘ catastrophic mortality from Old World diseases. The
consequences of these epidemics, however, are clear: by removing indigenous
inhabitants, they allowed Portuguese, Spanish, and other European colonists to establish
themselves in the Americas. Absent these waves of epidemic disease, it would have been
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for European invaders to subjugate the core regions
of the Americas in less than a century. A comparison of conditions on either side of the
Atlantic illustrates this point, as the Europeans‘ rapid conquest of the Americas stands in
stark contrast to their marginal presence in Africa during the early modern period.9
*
Over half a century ago, Colonel P. M. Ashburn mused that scholars, with the
notable exception of Hans Zinsser, had ―largely neglected the subject of the influence of
of Hispaniola‘s native population in 1492 range from less than 100,000 to more than seven
million.
8

Cook, Born to Die, 132-133, 206. Yellow fever, malaria, and cholera were imported to
the Americas in subsequent centuries.
9

Unlike Native Americans, African natives did not suffer devastating epidemics of
European diseases. Indeed, in Africa the pattern was reversed: European explorers rapidly died of
malaria and other tropical African diseases. See, for example, Philip D. Morgan, ―Africa and the
Atlantic, c. 1450 to c. 1820,‖ in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Jack P. Greene and
Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 225.

8

disease upon history.‖ Thankfully, this is no longer the case. In recent decades, scholars
from various disciplines have built a rich literature on the historical significance of
infectious diseases, much of which deals with the decimation of Native American
populations by European microbes. Within this genre, early works by Ashburn and by
John Duffy offer disease-by-disease accounts of the impact of smallpox, measles, yellow
fever, and sundry other maladies. During the 1970s, Alfred Crosby and William McNeill
presented the European conquest of the Americas within broader historical frameworks.
Crosby viewed the importation of Old World microbes as one facet of a transatlantic
exchange of biological entities—people, plants, and pathogens. McNeill, in turn, saw this
―Columbian exchange‖ of pathogens as part of an even larger process whereby ―varying
patterns of disease circulation have affected human affairs in ancient as well as modern
times.‖ More recently, a similarly macrohistorical approach is evident in the work of
Jared Diamond, who invokes epidemic disease, along with technological innovations,
political organization, and literacy, as ―proximate factors‖—themselves subordinate to
geographic and ecological ―ultimate explanations‖—that have determined the fates of
human societies in the Americas and on other continents. Also in recent years, Noble
David Cook, David E. Stannard, and Suzanne Alchon have offered concise and readable
syntheses describing the importance of Old World diseases in the European conquest of
the Americas. While Cook‘s work is largely free from overarching metanarratives,
Stannard and Alchon both seek to situate the natives‘ disease experience within a wider
context emphasizing the brutality of the European conquest. Stannard, uncompromising
in his castigation of the colonizers, claims that ―[t]he destruction of the Indians of the
Americas was, far and away, the most massive act of genocide in the history of the

9

world.‖ In comparison, Alchon adopts a less polemical tone, though she, too, asserts that
―during the past thirty years the pendulum has swung too far‖—and, consequently, that
recent scholarship tends to ―overemphasize the long-term impact of disease and minimize
the impact of other aspects of European colonialism.‖ 10
The foregoing books are noteworthy, and not only for their literary merit or the
historical importance of their arguments (both of which are substantial). Such
considerations notwithstanding, these works share another common attribute: they all
offer only cursory discussions, if any at all, of the European conquest of northeastern
North America. From their covers to their contents, these works clearly are more
concerned with the Spaniards‘ subjugation of the Aztec and Inca empires than with the
English displacement of the New England Algonquians. Alchon, for example, deals with
―The Northeastern U.S. and Canada‖ in four pages—which provide a cogent summary, if
no original arguments or interpretations. Yet, of the books listed above, her treatment of
the epidemics that ravaged New England in 1616 and 1633 is the most extensive. 11 This
is not to say that scholars have ignored the influence of epidemic disease in early colonial
New England. Indeed, much has been written on this subject, but it exists scattered
among a range of monographs and journal articles, written by scholars from such varied

10

P. M. Ashburn, The Ranks of Death: A Medical History of the Conquest of America
(New York: Coward-McCann, 1947), 2; Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice, and History (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1935); John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (1953; repr., Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1971); Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and
Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972); William McNeill, Plagues
and Peoples (1976; repr., New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 4; Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and
Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (1997; repr., New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Cook, Born
to Die; David E. Stannard, American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), x; Suzanne Alchon, A Pest in the Land: New World Epidemics in
a Global Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 5.
11

Alchon, Pest in the Land, 96-99.
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disciplines as ethnohistory, historical demography, anthropology, archaeology, and
medical history. Some of this literature is several decades old, although a number of
important works have appeared within the last twenty years. The time has come for
someone to synthesize this extant scholarship.
Evidence of the importance of infectious diseases in the English colonization of
New England also exists in a wealth of primary-source documents, including journals,
letters, reports, and promotional narratives by European explorers, colonists, and colonial
advocates, and in the secondhand accounts of later chroniclers, many of whom had
opportunities to interview witnesses to the epidemics and their aftermath. This thesis will
analyze these documents and review the pertinent secondary literature to show how
European infectious diseases critically affected the New England natives during the first
half of the seventeenth century. Chapter 1 examines the European ―discovery‖ of
northeastern North America from the time of the Vikings through the Elizabethan era,
including early colonial ventures and the first introduction of an Old World epidemic
disease into the region. The focus turns to New England in Chapter 2, which discusses
the early abortive attempts by Englishmen to settle in the region and reviews the natives‘
situation before the disaster of 1616. Chapter 3 examines the cause and consequences of
the 1616 epidemic, with particular attention on how it altered the demographic, socioeconomic, and political landscape for New England‘s natives and thereby facilitated the
survival of the Plymouth colonists. Looking beyond Plymouth, Chapter 4 looks at how
epidemic disease accompanied English migration to and expansion within New England
from 1621 through the 1630s, focusing especially on the devastation wrought by
smallpox upon the natives in 1633-34. Chapter 5 reviews the particularly severe
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consequences of this epidemic for the Pequot, for whom it proved not only a
demographic but also a political catastrophe. As we will see, the epidemic initiated a
series of events that culminated in the nearly complete extermination of this onceformidable nation.
This thesis argues that epidemics of European infectious diseases among the New
England natives were pivotal to the English conquest of this region. By fundamentally
transforming the natives‘ demographic, social, and political worlds, these epidemics not
only created room for English settlement in the region, but also critically shaped the
nature of interactions between invaders and natives in the early colonial period. Alchon‘s
assertion that ―the pendulum has swung too far‖ notwithstanding, it is difficult to
overstate the importance of infectious diseases to the conquest of New England. Plagues
of European diseases were not the only factors determining the fate of New England‘s
natives, to be sure. But without their effects, the English conquest of the region could not
have been so rapid or so complete, if indeed it could have occurred at all.

12

Chapter 1
From Eiriksson to Elizabeth: Europeans in Northeastern North America to 1600
There is fat around my belly! We have won a fine and fruitful country, but will
hardly be allowed to enjoy it.
—Thorvald Eiriksson1
By 1620, when the Plymouth colonists sailed for America, Europeans had been
active in northeastern North America for centuries. The identity of the first Old World
explorer to set foot on American soil, and the date when he (or perhaps she) did so,
remain shrouded in the mists of history. Tales of transatlantic voyages by Phoenicians
and Greeks in antiquity can safely be dismissed as apocryphal, as can the story of the
discovery of America by the Irish saint Brendan of Ardfert in the sixth century. Similarly,
legends which place either King Arthur or the Welsh prince Madoc ap Gwynedd in
America during the Middle Ages are not supported by any documentary or archaeological
evidence.2
On the other hand, considerable evidence indicates that the Norse explorer Leif
Eiriksson walked on American soil early in the eleventh century. Venturing across the
Davis Strait from the Vikings‘ recently-established colony in western Greenland,
―Eirik the Red‘s Saga,‖ in Gwyn Jones, The Norse Atlantic Saga: Being the Norse
Voyages of Discovery and Settlement to Iceland, Greenland, and North America. (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), 185.
1

John L. Allen, ―From Cabot to Cartier: The Early Exploration of Eastern North
America, 1497-1543,‖ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82 (September 1992):
502-4; John C. Appleby, ―War, Politics, and Colonization, 1558-1625,‖ in The Origins of
Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Nicholas
Canny, vol. 1 of The Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford:
University Press, 1998), 62. There really was an Abbott Brendan in Ireland, but no evidence
indicates that he ever set foot on American soil. Their lack of basis in historical fact
notwithstanding, the Brendan and Madoc legends contributed significantly to European
geographic lore in the early modern period. Moreover, John Dee, an advisor to Queen Elizabeth,
readily invoked these legends to justify England‘s claims to North America in the late sixteenth
century.
2
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Eiriksson sailed southward along the coasts of Baffin Island and Labrador before landing
on Newfoundland (which he called ―Vinland,‖ for obscure reasons), where he spent a
winter before returning to Greenland. Over the next few years, Eiriksson‘s brothers also
led exploratory voyages to the northeastern coast of North America. Then Thorfinn
Karlsefni led an expedition of three ships, 160 people, and ―all sorts of livestock‖ from
Greenland to L‘Anse aux Meadows on the northern tip of Newfoundland, where he
sought to establish a permanent colony. The prospects for the Vikings‘ New World
settlement must have appeared promising. As historian Gwyn Jones describes it:
The prospect here would be one to charm a stock-farmer‘s eye: after long sailing
off rock-bound barren coasts he could put his animals ashore amidst miles of fair
grazing . . . with genial forest and wind-breaks. The soil was comparable with
anything known in Iceland or Greenland, the rivers teemed with salmon and the
ocean‘s harvest was inexhaustible. And there were sea-beasts and caribou to fill a
hunter‘s dreams. . . . Indeed, their prospect was all too good—they banked on an
easy winter and were hard hit when the cold came . . . . But with spring a good
country once more. And empty. Or seeming so. 3
Alas, the land was not empty. The native inhabitants, whom the Greenlanders
called Skrælings, were Algonquin-speaking ancestors of the Beothuk natives that later
Europeans would encounter on Newfoundland. 4 According to Norse oral tradition,
relations with the Skrælings began peacefully, as the natives wished to trade ―dark
unblemished skins‖ for the Greenlanders‘ red cloth. The natives ―also wanted to buy
swords and spears,‖ but the Vikings‘ leaders refused these requests. At some point,
relations between the two peoples deteriorated and the Skrælings launched a massive

3

Jones, Norse Atlantic Saga, 77-97.

Robert McGhee, ―Contact between Native North Americans and the Medieval Norse: A
Review of the Evidence,‖ American Antiquity 49 (January 1984): 8-9. Archaeological evidence
indicates that Dorset Paleoeskimos inhabited Newfoundland until c. 500 CE, when they were
displaced by ancestors of the Beothuk.
4
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assault against the Norse settlement. The colonists saw ―a great multitude of Skræling
boats coming up from the south like a streaming torrent‖ and prepared for battle. Then, as
the Saga of Eirik the Red recounts:
They [the Skrælings and the Norsemen] clashed together and fought. There was a
heavy shower of missiles . . . . Great fear now struck into Karlsefni and all his
following, so that there was no other thought in their heads than to run away up
along the river to some steep rocks, and there they put up a strong resistance.
Their ―strong resistance‖ notwithstanding, the results of this pitched battle were
apparently disastrous for the Greenlanders. Surveying their colony‘s prospects in the
battle‘s aftermath, the Vikings concluded that ―though the quality of the land was
admirable, there would always be fear and strife dogging them there on account of those
who already inhabited it. So they made ready to leave, setting their hearts on their own
country.‖ The Norse Greenlanders would not be the last prospective colonists in North
America to express such thoughts. Indeed, this pattern of Native Americans driving away
European interlopers would repeat itself many times before any permanent European
settlement was successfully established in northeastern North America. 5
*
Despite the failure of their Vinland colony, the Greenlanders continued to make
voyages across the Davis Strait to gather lumber, and presumably to hunt and fish, in
North America for at least the next few centuries. In fact, documentary and archeological
evidence suggests that such journeys continued up until shortly before the Norse
Greenlanders mysteriously disappeared in the early sixteenth century. Throughout this
time, Norse adventurers must have occasionally encountered North American natives, but
―Eirik the Red‘s Saga,‖ 180-84; McGhee, ―Contact,‖ 22-23; Allen, ―From Cabot to
Cartier,‖ 503; Kirsten A. Seaver, The Frozen Echo: Greenland and the Exploration of North
America, ca. A.D. 1000-1500 (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1996), 22-27.
5
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archeological evidence does not suggest that the two groups engaged in regular trade,
exchanged any diseases, or influenced each other‘s way of life in any measurable sense.
As prehistorian Robert McGhee notes, ―The fact that neither group appears to have
adopted any major cultural or technological elements of the other suggests that contempt
probably outweighed respect in relations between the two populations.‖6
Probably owing to their relative isolation in the northwestern Atlantic, the
Greenlanders‘ knowledge of northeastern North America did not readily diffuse
throughout Europe. Nonetheless, it seems likely that they told at least a few Europeans
traders and fishermen of what lay across the Davis Strait. British traders, particularly
those sailing from Bristol, frequently visited the Greenland colonies throughout the late
medieval period, despite the Norwegian crown‘s efforts to prevent such foreign trade. In
fact, the Greenlanders increasingly came to rely on this illicit trade, especially as
Norwegian officials gradually lost interest in their colonies during the late fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Archeological and documentary evidence, including analysis of
clothes found in the colonists‘ graves, indicate that British trade with Greenland
continued through the late fifteenth century, or just before the colonies suddenly ceased
to exist.7 Thus it is tempting to speculate that at least a few Bristol traders might have
crossed the Davis Strait to from Greenland to North America. Indeed, fragments of

6

Seaver, Frozen Echo, 27-43; McGhee, ―Contact,‖ 14, 21.

Allen, ―From Cabot to Cartier,‖ 503; Arthur Davies, ―Prince Madoc and the Discovery
of America in 1477,‖ Geographical Journal 150 (November 1984): 364-66; Seaver, Frozen
Echo, 95, 122-38, 139-40, 170-75.
7
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documentary evidence of such voyages do exist, although they are not supported by
extant archeological data.8
In addition to the Greenland trade, the search for new fishing grounds also
provided a strong lure for Bristolmen to venture ever farther into the northwestern
Atlantic. By the late Middle Ages, cod had come to serve as crucial source of protein for
people throughout northern Europe. English fishermen were visiting the cod-rich fishing
grounds around Iceland and eastern Greenland by the early fifteenth century, but
increasingly violent competition among them drove at least some of them further west.
Taking advantage of recent advances in shipbuilding, Bristol fishermen discovered the
Grand Banks, off the coast of Newfoundland, perhaps as early as 1430. These
Bristolmen, who had good reasons to keep their discovery secret, increasingly exploited
the Newfoundland fishery as international competition for the Iceland Banks intensified
in the second half of the fifteenth century. Eventually, some of these fishermen must have
drifted westward, whether intentionally or not, and seen the North American shore.
Indeed, these fishermen probably visited the Newfoundland coast on a regular basis, if
only for the rather prosaic purpose of drying their fish before transporting them back to
Europe. This would explain, for example, why two ships, commissioned in 1481 by
Bristol merchants ostensibly to search the northern Atlantic for the mythical island of
Brasil, each carried forty bushels of salt. As Arthur Davies notes, ―Salt was needed to
Davies, ―Prince Madoc,‖ 371-72. Davies asserts that Welsh sailors transported a group
of Greenland Norsemen to hunting grounds on Baffin Island in 1475 but were unable to resupply
them the following year. In 1477, the Welsh navigator John Scolvus (apparently a pseudonym for
John Lloyd, ―the greatest mariner in all England‖) found the hunting party frozen to death.
According to Davies, Lloyd then proceeded to explore Hudson Strait and the American coast as
far south as Chesapeake Bay. Because he felt ―a deep sense of tragedy and guilt at the fate of the
hunting expedition‖—and, perhaps more importantly, because he traveled illegally and wished to
avoid paying customs fees—Lloyd did not publicize his voyage.
8
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treat dried stockfish or cod, and this implies a fishing centre on land.‖ For obvious
reasons, the Bristolmen did not publicize their discovery of rich fishing grounds in the
northwestern Atlantic; but such a source of wealth could not remain secret for long. 9
By the time of John Cabot‘s celebrated landfall on Newfoundland on June 24,
1497, fishermen and traders from Bristol had plied the waters off the North American
shore for decades. Cabot was an intrepid and skilled navigator, but he was almost surely
not the first Englishman to set foot on American soil. In 1498, the English wine merchant
John Day wrote, in a letter to Christopher Columbus, that the land found by Cabot ―was
found and discovered in the past by the men from Bristol who found ‗Brasil‘ as your
Lordship knows.‖ 10 Moreover, Arthur Davies argues that Cabot‘s route to North America
followed that of a previous Bristolman, John Lloyd, who had explored the American
coast from Hudson Bay to the Chesapeake as early as 1477.11
Nonetheless, Cabot‘s journey marked a turning point in European exploration of
the northwestern Atlantic. Before 1497, voyagers into this region travelled in secret and
did not publicize the findings of their unlicensed commercial ventures. Cabot‘s 1497
voyage was different, for he sailed with a license from Henry VII granting him and his
sons
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full and free authoritie, leave, and power, to sayle to all partes, countreys, and
seas, of the East, of the West, and of the North, under our banners and ensigns . . .
upon their owne proper costes and charges, to seeke out, discover, and finde,
whatsoever iles, countreyes, regions or provinces, of the heathen and infidelles,
whatsoever they bee, and in what part of the worlde soever they be, whiche before
this time have been unknown to all Christians.
Furthermore, this royal license laid bare that the English intended to conquer and
colonize territories in the New World, or at least that they believed that it was within their
rights to do so. As King Henry stipulated:
the foresaid John and his sonnes, or their heires and assignes, may subdue,
occupie, and possesse, all such townes, cities, castles, and iles, of them founde,
the kings which they can subdue, occupie, and possesse, as our vassailes and
lieutenantes, getting unto us the rule, title, and jurisdiction of the same villages,
townes, castles, and firme lande so founde.
Cabot‘s journey thus marked the beginning of official, state-sponsored English
exploration in the northwestern Atlantic, the Crown‘s disinclination to actually pay for it
notwithstanding. 12
This expedition further differed from earlier transatlantic voyages in its objective,
for Cabot was not principally interested in such mundane pursuits as trading with
Norsemen or locating fishing grounds. Of course, Cabot did find fish, in such abundance
that his men reported that ―this kingdom will no longer have need of Iceland.‖ But as
Raimondo di Soncino, an agent of the Duke of Milan in England, reported, Cabot had
―set his mind on higher things,‖ for he proposed to
keep on still further towards the east, where he will be opposite to an island called
Cipango, situated in the equinoctial region, where he believes that all the spices of
the world, as well as the jewels, are found.
―A Latine Copie of the Letters Patentes of King Henrie the Seventh, Graunted unto
John Cabote and his three Sonnes, Lewes, Sebastian, and Santius, for the Discovering of Newe
and Unknown Landes‖ (1496), in Richard Hakluyt, Divers Voyages Touching the Discovery of
America and the Islands Adjacent (1582), ed. John Winter Jones (London: Hakluyt Society,
1850), 19-22.
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By finding such a direct aquatic route to Asia, Cabot hoped ―to establish a greater depot
of spices in London than there is in Alexandria‖—which would have been quite an
accomplishment, had it been feasible. 13 As it turned out, Cabot was unsuccessful in this
quest, for an entire continent stood in his way, though he could hardly have realized this
at the time. Indeed, the search for an unobstructed water route to Asia—the so-called
―Northwest Passage‖—would occupy and frustrate European mariners and their
descendants for the next four centuries. 14
In 1498, Cabot led another voyage to North America, but his ship was lost at sea
and he was never seen again. In his wake, European activity in the northwestern Atlantic
only intensified. During the first decade of the sixteenth century, Bristol merchants
commissioned several exploratory voyages to Newfoundland and adjacent regions, while
Cabot‘s son Sebastian conducted a thorough exploration of the Atlantic coast from
Canada to the Caribbean. Moreover, interest in North America spread beyond Bristol to
other parts of Europe. The Portuguese navigator Gaspar Corte Real reached
Newfoundland in 1501, but after a series of failed voyages, official Portuguese
exploration in the northwestern Atlantic ceased in 1503. News of the rich fishery off

Raimondo di Soncino to the Duke of Milan, December 18, 1497, in ―John Cabot
(c.1450-1499): Voyage to North America, 1497,‖ Internet Modern History SourceBook,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1497cabot-3docs.html (accessed February 23, 2012).
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Newfoundland also spread, so that by the early 1500s the Bristol fishermen were forced
to share the grounds with Portuguese, Breton, and Basque fishermen and whalers. 15
It was during these early years of the sixteenth century that documented contacts
between Europeans and Native Americans began—although earlier, unrecorded contacts
doubtless occurred. Early evidence of trade between Europeans and natives appears in the
form of ―a brasell bow and [two] Rede arowez‖ that were presented to Henry VII after a
1503 voyage. By this time, historian James Axtell asserts, natives and Europeans had
already established routines for trading with one another, suggesting that cross-cultural
interactions had been occurring for a number of years. Much of this early trade was
conducted by European fishermen and whalers who sought to maximize the profits of
their North American journeys by putting ―into shore long enough to bargain for Indian
furs.‖16
Ominously for the natives, it was also in this period that Europeans first
demonstrated their proclivity toward kidnapping Native Americans and spiriting them
away to Europe. In 1501 Corte Real‘s men ―forcibly kidnapped about fifty men and
women‖ from the Newfoundland coast and ―brought them to the king,‖ and in 1502 a
Allen, ―Cabot to Cartier,‖ 508-9, 519n9; Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence:
Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 51. Limited evidence suggests that Corte Real might have landed on Newfoundland
on an earlier voyage, even before 1500. Of three ships that Corte Real led to North America in
1501, two returned; Corte Real‘s ship disappeared and was presumably lost to the sea.
15
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group of English and Portuguese adventurers presented ―three men taken in the new
found Ilands‖ to Henry VII. French explorers also engaged in this practice: in 1504, a
Breton ship returned from ―Terre-Nueve‖ with ―seven savage men,‖ and in 1509 Thomas
Aubert of Rouen brought another seven native men to Normandy. And this was just the
beginning. During this early period, explorers kidnapped natives chiefly for their value as
novelties to be displayed, along with other marvels of the New World, in European
courts. Some later captives, however, were taught European languages so that they could
serve as interpreters on subsequent voyages aimed at trading or settlement. Most captives
were Beothuk from Newfoundland or Micmac from further south, though at least a few
Inuit natives were also paraded around Europe. These kidnappings continued well into
the seventeenth century, fueling ongoing resentment, suspicion, and hostility on the part
of natives toward Europeans.17
*
After the first decade of the sixteenth century, official English exploration in
North America slowed, as Henry VIII and his courtiers found themselves increasingly
occupied with issues of dynastic, ecclesiastical, and marital politics. After commerciallyfunded voyages by John Rut in 1527 and Richard Hore in 1536 failed to locate a water
passage to Asia, English activity in the northwestern Atlantic, other than fishing,
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effectively ceased until the 1560s. In the meantime, explorers from France assumed a
preeminent role in northeastern North America. 18
In January 1524, the Florentine navigator Giovanni da Verrazzano, sailing in the
service of Francis I, took a single vessel, the Dauphine, ―to explore new lands‖ and to
search for a direct water route to Asia. But after searching the American seaboard from
the coast of what is now North Carolina to as far north as present-day Maine, Verrazzano
could find no such passage. As he later explained in a letter to the French monarch,
My intention on this voyage was to reach Cathay and the extreme eastern coast of
Asia, but I did not expect to find such an obstacle of new land as I have found;
and if for some reason I did expect to find it, I estimated there would be some
strait to get through to the Eastern Ocean. This was the opinion of all the ancients,
who certainly believed that our Western Ocean was joined to the Eastern Ocean
of India without any land in between. . . . Nevertheless, land has been found by
modern man which was unknown to the ancients, another world with respect to
the one they knew, which appears to be larger than our Europe, than Africa, and
almost larger than Asia, if we estimate its size correctly.
Verrazzano may have been unable to locate the elusive Northwest Passage, but his letter
to Francis I did provide a vivid account of North America and its inhabitants. Moreover,
Verrazzano and his crew were the first Europeans known to have visited the region now
called New England. 19
*
After Verrazzano, French explorers directed their search for the Northwest
Passage further to the north, in the region that eventually became New France. In this
regard, the three North American voyages of Jacques Cartier are particularly noteworthy.
18
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In 1534, Cartier sailed from St. Malo, taking two ships with sixty-one men, and explored
the Gulf of St. Lawrence. At Chaleur Bay, Cartier‘s men initiated a brisk trade with the
Micmac, Algonquian hunter-gatherers who Cartier perceived ―are people who would be
easy to convert.‖ Then, at Gaspé Harbor, Cartier encountered a group of Iroquoian
natives from Stadacona (near modern-day Quebec City) who ―only come down to the sea
in the fishing-season.‖ Relations with the Stadacona natives were friendly at first, but
when Cartier had his men erect a ―cross made thirty feet high‖ at the harbor‘s entrance,
the Stadacona chief, Donnacona, voiced his displeasure with ―a long harangue . . . as if
he wished to say that all this region belonged to him, and that we ought not to have set up
this cross without his permission.‖ Cartier‘s response to this tirade was quintessentially
that of the sixteenth-century European adventurer in North America: He kidnapped
Donnacona‘s two sons and took them back to France.20
The next year, Cartier returned to North America with three ships and, guided by
his captives, ascended the St. Lawrence River to Stadacona, where Donnacona‘s sons
were reunited with their people. Against Donnacona‘s expressed wishes, Cartier then
traveled up the St. Lawrence as far as present-day Montreal, where he traded with a rival
group of natives before returning to spend the winter of 1535-36 at a makeshift fort near
Stadacona. The Frenchmen spent that miserable winter suffering from disease—by April,
twenty-five of them had died, apparently from scurvy—and ―fearing lest [the natives]
should attempt some treasonable design and come against us with a host of people.‖ On
May 3, Cartier ended his stay at Stadacona. Before leaving, however, he ordered his men
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to erect a cross ―some thirty-five feet high‖ and to kidnap ten Stadacona natives,
including Donnacona, his sons (again!) and seven others ―whose capture had been
decided upon.‖ The captives were taken to France, where all but one died before Cartier‘s
third voyage. None of them ever saw his homeland again.21
On his third North American voyage, in 1541, Cartier returned to Stadacona, this
time as part of a colonizing expedition of five ships under the leadership of Jean Francois
de la Roque, seigneur de Roberval. The French colonists, who intended to establish a
permanent settlement at Stadacona, had much in common with the Norse Greenlanders
who had attempted to colonize Newfoundland some five hundred years earlier. Like the
Vikings, the French brought livestock with them, including ―cattel, as well [as] Goates,
Hogges, [and] other beastes which we caried for breede in the Countrey.‖ And like
Thorstein Karlsefni before him, Cartier extolled the agricultural potential of his
prospective colony, which he found ―as good a Countrey to plow and mannure as a man
should find or desire.‖ But also like the Vikings‘ fledgling settlement at L‘Anse Aux
Meadows, the French outpost at Stadacona was ultimately doomed by the hostility of the
surrounding natives. In the spring of 1542, Cartier learned that several native leaders,
including Donnacona‘s successor, were meeting to decide ―what they should do against
us.‖ Faced with the natives‘ burgeoning antagonism and running short on supplies,
Cartier abandoned Stadacona in 1542. When Roberval and his men, who only arrived just
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as Cartier was leaving, departed Canada under similar circumstances a year later, it was
clear that the first official French colonial venture in North America had failed. 22
Although Cartier did not establish a permanent French presence in the New
World, the significance of his voyages should not be understated. Aside from increasing
European geographical knowledge of North America in general, and of the St. Lawrence
River in particular, Cartier‘s explorations prefigured the course of future French
exploration, which would predominantly focus on the discovery and exploitation of the
continent‘s interior rivers and lakes for the next two centuries. Furthermore, Cartier is
important to the epidemiological history of North America, for the narrative of his second
voyage documents the first known disease epidemic among the northeastern natives. In
December 1535, Cartier ―received warning that the pestilence had broken out among the
people of Stadacona,‖ and that ―more than fifty persons were dead‖—some 10 percent of
the village‘s population. Just what this ―pestilence‖ was remains unclear, but, as
anthropologist Gary Warrick notes, the ―mortality rate, epidemic behaviour, and timing
of the disease outbreak suggest a European contagion‖—possibly influenza or another
respiratory virus, which might in turn have predisposed its victims to developing bacterial
pneumonia. 23 Of course, this may not have been the first time that a European infection
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penetrated the Northeast—previous, unrecorded epidemics could have spread to the
natives from Verrazzano‘s crew, or from other fishermen or traders—but it was the first
such documented episode. Doubtless many Europeans embarked on transatlantic voyages
carrying the seeds of contagion. Indeed, in March 1535, Cartier commented on the
presence of ―epidemic and plague‖ at St. Malo, which delayed the departure of his
voyage. 24
The ―epidemic and plague‖ at St. Malo in March must have been unrelated to the
Stadacona epidemic in December, given the lack of temporal proximity between the
episodes. But viewed in a broader context, European diseases likely played a role in the
ultimate fate of natives throughout the St. Lawrence River valley, including those at
Stadacona. In 1542 and 1543, the St. Lawrence Iroquoians were numerous and powerful
enough to repel the settlement efforts of Cartier and Roberval. But after the French
departed, something went terribly wrong for these natives; by 1603 they had vanished
altogether. The reasons for their demise are unclear. Their position on northeastern North
America‘s main water highway ensured frequent contact with European traders; thus
rival tribes seeking advantage in the burgeoning European fur trade, such as the Huron or
Mohawk, might have eradicated the St. Lawrence Iroquoians through intertribal warfare.
Alternatively, the Stadacona and their neighbors may have fallen victim to
a catastrophic epidemic, or a series of epidemics, of infectious diseases brought to the
valley by European traders. It is also possible that some combination of disease, warfare,
―European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First
Epidemics,‖ Ethnohistory 35 (Winter 1988): 18; J. V. Hirschmann and Gregory J. Raugi, ―Adult
Scurvy,‖ Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology 41 (December 1999): 895-906.
Jacques Cartier, ―Choice of Vessels for the Second Voyage,‖ in Cook, Voyages of
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and absorption of survivors by neighboring tribes account for their disappearance.25 In
any event, the winter of 1535 represented a watershed moment not only for the St.
Lawrence Iroquoians, but for Native Americans throughout the Northeast. For the
―pestilence‖ that Cartier noted among the Stadacona marked the first documented
intrusion into the Northeast of a process that had been underway for decades further to
the south—the decimation of the New World‘s native population by European infectious
diseases.
*
When Verrazano visited New England in 1524, he noted that the natives ―live a
long time, and rarely fall sick; if they are wounded, they cure themselves with fire
without medicine; their end comes with old age.‖ In this appraisal, Verrazano anticipated
the arguments of twentieth-century scholars, such as T. D. Stewart and P. M. Ashburn,
that infectious diseases were almost unknown to Native Americans before European
contact. As it happens, such assessments were a bit too sanguine, for archaeological
evidence indicates that the precontact New World was not exactly a disease-free paradise.
Besides the sundry injuries attendant to normal life and various nutritional deficiencies,
Native Americans had experience with a diverse array of parasitic, viral, and bacterial
infections, including roundworms, tapeworms, pinworms, dysentery, tuberculosis, and
syphilis, among others.26 What the natives lacked—crucially, as it turns out—was
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experience with numerous ―crowd-type‖ epidemic diseases, such as smallpox, measles,
diphtheria, and pertussis (to name just a few), that had evolved in the Old World in the
millennia following their migration from Asia. These infections routinely circulated in
the densely-populated cities of early modern Europe. Thus most (but not all) Europeans
experienced these diseases in childhood—and those that survived developed lifelong
immunity. But they were completely unknown in the Americas before 1492. 27
Circumstances changed once the peoples of Europe and the Americas came into
regular and sustained contact with one another. Beginning with Columbus‘s second
voyage to the New World, European explorers unwittingly and repeatedly introduced Old
World epidemic diseases to the Americas. The first epidemic—possibly caused by
influenza—caused substantial morbidity among both Spaniards and natives on Hispaniola
from 1493 to 1496. Over the next several decades, repeated waves of European diseases
washed over the New World‘s ―virgin soil‖ populations in large-scale epidemics, called
pandemics, which left untold millions of Native Americans dead in their collective wake.
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The first pandemic of smallpox, that unparalleled grim reaper of Native American souls,
began in 1518 on Hispaniola, from where it spread throughout the Caribbean, across
Mexico, and into South America, immeasurably helping the Spanish in their conquest of
the Aztec and Inca empires. In subsequent decades, localized epidemics and continental
pandemics of measles, mumps, influenza, and diphtheria combined with repeated attacks
of smallpox to winnow the Americas of native inhabitants. The combined effect of these
various maladies was a catastrophic population decline in the areas conquered by the
Spanish: as Dobyns notes, ―Ninety percent of the population of civilized Mesoamerica
and Andean America perished by 1568.‖ Even more poignant is historian Noble David
Cook‘s assessment: ―The century and a half after 1492 witnessed, in terms of the number
of people who died, the greatest human catastrophe in history, far exceeding even the
disaster of the Black Death of medieval Europe.‖28
Considered alongside the unfathomable mortality that smallpox and other
European maladies claimed in sixteenth-century Spanish America, the deaths of fifty or
so Stadacona natives during the winter of 1535-36 pales by comparison. But this episode
may well have represented the beginning of the end for the St. Lawrence Iroquoians—
and it ominously prefigured the future for millions of natives elsewhere in North
America.
*
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Aside from fishing and trading, English activity in the Atlantic had subsided
during the reign of Henry VIII. When it resumed under Elizabeth I, it did so primarily in
the form of state-sanctioned piracy. During the second half of the sixteenth century,
privateers such as Francis Drake and John Hawkins regularly attacked French and
Spanish ships returning from the Americas, enriching England‘s treasury at the expense
of its Catholic rivals on the continent. In fact, piracy formed the basis for England‘s first
New World colonial venture in 1585; Walter Raleigh selected Roanoke as the colony‘s
location because that site could serve as a suitable base from which to attack Spanish
ships returning from the West Indies. That colony did not long survive, owing in part to
Elizabeth‘s decision to deploy troops in northern Europe, rather than risk vital resources
in faraway Virginia. 29
Roanoke‘s failure notwithstanding, the English privateering war against Spain in
the 1580s and 1590s laid the basis for English colonial settlement in the Americas. The
war inspired a shipbuilding boom, as hundreds of vessels set sail seeking to relieve
Spanish galleons of their American treasures. The English captains and sailors who
manned these ships gained valuable knowledge of the Atlantic coast of North America
and the Caribbean during the 1580s and 1590s. The war tended to concentrate capital in
the possession of a group of wealthy merchants, particularly in Bristol and London, who
would subsequently assume prominent roles in financing English colonial enterprises in
the early seventeenth century. Perhaps most importantly, English privateering slowly but
steadily weakened the Spanish empire in America throughout the later decades of the
sixteenth century. Spain was gradually drained of resources and forced to concentrate its
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defenses on the empire‘s central regions, leaving peripheral areas such as the Lesser
Antilles and the coast of North America vulnerable. These, of course, were precisely the
regions where English colonists ultimately settled. 30
Thus by the late sixteenth century, the English were well-poised to launch
colonial ventures in the Americas—and they did so earnestly. From 1597 through 1610,
prospective settlers set forth from England to establish colonies in far-flung corners of the
Americas: on the Magdalen Islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, along the Wiampoco
River in Guiana, on St. Lucia and Grenada in the Caribbean, and on Newfoundland. All
these efforts failed spectacularly, owing to such factors as inadequate supplies,
environmental difficulties, foreign intervention, and native resistance. The English did
plant one colony, at Jamestown in 1607, that managed to survive; but its prospects could
only have appeared tenuous, at best, for its first decade of existence. 31
England‘s inability to establish successful colonies in the New World contrasted
sharply with Spain‘s legacy of American conquest in the sixteenth century. By 1600,
Spain had conquered most of the New World south of the Rio Grande and was extracting
a fortune from its American colonies annually—losses to English privateering
notwithstanding. Native populations from Mexico southward had been decimated by
smallpox and other European diseases, and the once-mighty Aztec and Inca empires had
been destroyed. The situation in northeastern North America could scarcely have been
Appleby, ―War, Politics, and Colonization,‖ 67-71. Privateering was not the only factor
stimulating shipbuilding during this period; responding to increasing demand for fish in southern
Europe, English fishermen ―were sending as many as 150 ships a year to the [Newfoundland]
fishery‖ by 1604.
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more different. There, Native Americans still controlled their own societies, as European
attempts at colonization, outside the fledgling settlements at Jamestown and Quebec, had
all failed. After over a century of exploration, fishing, and trading, Europeans had gained
extensive knowledge of North America‘s geography, wildlife, and peoples. But, with the
notable exception of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians, European epidemic diseases had not
yet infiltrated this region, and the northeastern natives consequently remained populous
and powerful enough to repel foreign settlers. In the long run, of course, this situation
would change. But before it did, the region now called New England would emerge as a
focus of England‘s colonization efforts.
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Chapter 2
―The Paradise of all those parts‖: New England before 1616
European explorers and invaders discovered an inhabited land. . . . They did not
settle a virgin land. They invaded and replaced a resident population.
—Francis Jennings1
Though he was probably not the first European to make landfall in the region now
called New England, Giovanni da Verrazzano did provide the first known account of the
region and its inhabitants. In April 1524, Verrazzano led the Dauphine into ―a very
excellent harbor‖ in what is now Narragansett Bay, whereupon a host of natives—―about
XX [twenty] boats full of people‖—rushed out to greet him and his crew. Verrazzano
praised these natives, calling them the ―most beautiful‖ people, with ―the most civil
customs that we have found on this voyage.‖ Remarking on the natives‘ semi-sedentary
lifestyle, Verrazzano noted that
They move these houses from one place to another according to the richness of
the site and the season. They need only carry the straw mats, and so they have
new houses made in no time at all. . . . They live on the same food as the other
people—pulse (which they produce with more systematic cultivation than the
other tribes, and when sowing they observe the influence of the moon, the rising
of the Pleiades, and many other customs derived from the ancients), and otherwise
on game and fish.
The Dauphine’s crew stayed among the natives at Narragansett Bay for fifteen days,
during which time they ―made great friends with them.‖ Affable as they might have been,
however, the natives were cagey enough to keep their women away from Verrazano‘s
crew, for ―however many entreaties we made or offers of various gifts, we could not
persuade them to let the women come on board ship.‖ Verrazzano complimented the
natives for their generosity, noting that they ―give away all they have,‖ and found them to
1
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be ―very compassionate and charitable toward their relatives.‖ Moreover, the natives
placed high value on baubles but were unimpressed with European technology:
The things we gave them that they prized the most were little bells, blue crystals,
and other trinkets to put in the ear or around the necks. They did not appreciate
cloth of silk and gold, nor even of any other kind, nor did they care to have them;
the same was true for metals like steel and iron, for many times when we showed
them our arms, they did not admire them, nor ask for them, but merely examined
the workmanship. They did the same with mirrors; they would look at them
quickly, and then refuse them, laughing.
During his time in Narragansett Bay, Verrazzano explored the surrounding country,
which he found ―as pleasant as I can possibly describe, and suitable for every kind of
cultivation—grain, wine, or oil. For there the fields extend for XXV [twenty-five] to
XXX [thirty] leagues; they are open and free of any obstacles or trees, and so fertile that
any kind of seed would produce excellent crops.‖2
Further north, in what is now southern Maine, Verrazzano found a different sort
of country, ―full of very dense forests, composed of pines, cypresses, and similar trees
which grow in cold regions.‖ In this land, ―we saw no sign of cultivation, nor would the
land be suitable for any fruit or grain on account of its sterility.‖ The local natives were
also different from those they had encountered in Narragansett Bay, ―for while the
previous ones had been courteous in manner, these were full of crudity and vices, and
were so barbarous that we could never make any communication with them.‖ These were
Abenaki natives, Algonquian-speaking hunter-gatherers whose behavior toward
Verrazzano‘s crew contrasted sharply with that of the southern New England natives.
Doubtless reflecting previous experience with European visitors, the Abenaki exercised
both caution and pragmatism in trading with their visitors:
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If we wanted to trade with them for some of their things, they would come to the
seashore on some rocks where the breakers were the most violent, while we
remained in the little boat, and they sent us what they wanted to give on a rope,
continually shouting to us not to approach the land; they gave us the barter
quickly, and would take in exchange only knives, hooks for fishing, and sharp
metal. We found no courtesy in them, and when we had nothing more to exchange
and left them, the men made all the signs of scorn and shame that any brute
creature would make.
Eventually, the Abenakis‘ hostility erupted into violence. Ignoring the natives‘
objections, Verrazzano ―penetrated two or three leagues inland with XXV [twenty-five]
armed men, and when we disembarked on the shore, they shot at us with their bows and
uttered loud cries before fleeing into the woods.‖ The disparity was thus obvious: unlike
Narragansett Bay, northern New England was a land of cold climate and barren soil,
populated by hostile natives. Summarizing his attitude toward this northern region,
Verrazzano put it simply: ―We did not find anything of great value in this land.‖ 3
Verrazzano‘s negative impression of the region notwithstanding, French traders
and fishermen continued to visit northern New England throughout the sixteenth century.
Moreover, during this time the French came to exert far-reaching influence over the
Micmac, who lived on Acadia and on the mainland just north of New England. As
demand for beaver pelts increased in Europe, French traders realized that the Micmac
were only too happy to exchange these pelts for such items as tools, weapons, clothing,
and trinkets. The Micmac profited handsomely from this trade; and, armed with European
steel weapons, they expanded their hunting territory at the expense of other northeastern
native groups. But for the Micmac, the French trade also extracted a price. Over time, as
the acquisition of beaver pelts became their principal economic activity, they came to
depend on this trade. The natives stopped producing items that they could acquire from
3
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the French, such as tools and utensils; by the end of the century, their knowledge of how
to make these items was lost. Eventually, their devotion to beaver-hunting undermined
even their procurement of food. As historian Neal Salisbury has noted, by the end of the
sixteenth century the Micmac ―were leading a precarious existence every winter, relying
on the French and other outside sources of food for survival.‖ 4
While the French busied themselves in North America in the mid-sixteenth
century, English involvement overseas was essentially limited to privateering. Indeed,
more than a half-century after 1524, Verrazzano‘s discoveries remained largely unknown
in England. But that situation would change, thanks in no small part to the work of an
ardent proponent of English colonization in the New World, the Reverend Richard
Hakluyt.
*
In 1582, Hakluyt published a translation of Verrazano‘s letter to Francis I in his
landmark work, Divers voyages touching the discoverie of America. In so doing, Hakluyt
introduced a generation of Englishmen to Verrazzano‘s description of what was then
called Norumbega—the region now known as New England. Prospective colonizers
quickly recognized the potential benefits of a colony in the region around Narragansett
Bay, with its fertile soil and friendly, generous native inhabitants, who were so naïve that
they treasured ―little bells, blue crystals, and other trinkets‖ but were uninterested in silk
cloth, gold, or armaments. In 1583, Sir Humphrey Gilbert led an expedition of five ships
to Norumbega, carrying a patent from Elizabeth I granting him and his heirs ―full power
and free libertie . . . to enjoye to his and their owne use‖ what was then called the Dee
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River—today‘s Taunton River, in Narragansett Bay. Gilbert‘s voyage was a fiasco. Two
ships were forced to turn back before reaching North America; then the 120-ton Delight
ran aground near Nova Scotia, losing ninety-six men and most of the expedition‘s
supplies. At this point, Gilbert and Edward Hayes—the captains of the two remaining
ships—decided to abandon the project and head back to England. On the return trip,
Gilbert‘s vessel disappeared during a storm off the Azores; only Hayes‘s Golden Hind
returned home safely. Hakluyt, ever the colonial publicist, published Hayes‘s account of
the fateful voyage in 1589 in his Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the
English Nation.5
Hakluyt‘s works stirred the imaginations of young Englishmen, such as
Bartholomew Gosnold, who longed for adventure on the high seas and in America. In
fact, Gosnold probably knew both Hakluyt and Hayes personally, and it is likely that he
heard Hakluyt extol the virtues of Norumbega as a place for English colonization
firsthand. By 1602 Gosnold, financially backed by the Earl of Southampton, was ready to
lead his own colonizing expedition. On March 26, he and a crew of thirty-two men sailed
from Falmouth with one ship, the Concord, intending to establish a permanent English
settlement in the region secured by Gilbert‘s patent. Travelling directly westward from
the Azores—a transatlantic route not used by previous British explorers—Gosnold
―Relation of John Varrazanus, a Florentine, of the lande by him discovered in the name
of his Majestie . . .‖ (1524), in Hakluyt, Divers Voyages, 55-71; Warner Foote Gookin,
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Humphrey Gilbert, Sir George Peckham and George Peckham, 28 February 1583,‖ in Voyages
and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, ed. David Beers Quinn (London: Hakluyt
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arrived off the coast of Maine on May 14. The Englishmen were immediately met by a
boat ―having eight persons in it, whom we supposed at first to bee Christians distressed.
But approaching us neare, wee perceived them to bee Savages.‖ Clearly, these natives
had encountered Europeans before—they came out to greet the Concord in a ―Biscay
shallop with saile and Oares‖ and ―spake divers Christian words, and seemed to
understand much more than we, for want of Language could comprehend.‖ Gosnold did
not linger off the Maine coast, but headed south in search of the ―excellent harbor‖
Verrazano had described. In so doing, he discovered and named Cape Cod, then sailed
around the dangerous shoals off the coasts of Massachusetts and Nantucket before
exploring Martha‘s Vineyard and Nantucket Sound. 6
After reconnoitering Buzzards Bay—which he apparently mistook for
Narragansett Bay—Gosnold decided to erect the English ―Fort and place of abode‖ on
―Elizabeths Iland‖ (modern Cuttyhunk) at the bay‘s entrance. In his account of the
voyage (later published by Hakluyt), John Brereton acclaimed the island‘s agricultural
potential, calling its soil ―fat and lustie‖ and noting that ―in comparison whereof, the most
fertile part of all England is (of it selfe) but barren.‖ Brereton also praised the local
natives: ―These people, as they are exceeding courteous, gentle of disposition, and well
conditioned, excelling all others that we have seene; so for shape of bodie and lovely
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favour, I think they excel all the people of America.‖ The English traded with the natives
for furs, including ―Beavers . . . Otters, Wild-cat skinnes very large and deep Furre,
blacke Foxes . . . Deere skinnes very large, Seale skinnes, and other beasts skinnes, to us
unknowen.‖ Indeed, of the natives, Brereton even claimed ―we became very great
friends.‖ This friendship notwithstanding, the Englishmen were not taking any chances:
They ―spent three weeks and more‖ building their stronghold, all the while ―being loth
[the natives] should discover our fortification.‖7
In addition to fertile soil and friendly natives, Brereton commented on the health
benefits of life in New England. These accrued both to natives, who were ―of a perfect
constitution of body, active, strong, healthfull, and very wittie,‖ and for Englishmen:
we found our health & strength all the while we remained there, so to renew and
increase, as notwithstanding our diet and lodging was none of the best, yet not one
of our company (God be thanked) felt the least grudging or inclination to any
disease or sicknesse, but were much fatter and in better health than when we went
out of England.‖
Thus, Brereton‘s narrative—a promotional account, designed to encourage investment in
future North American colonizing schemes—portrayed Elizabeth Island as a productive,
nourishing utopia inhabited by affable natives. Yet the English settlement was abandoned
after less than a month. Gosnold‘s plan had been for twenty men, himself included, to
remain in New England as colonists. On June 18, 1602, however, the Concord departed
for England, loaded with ―so much Sassafras, Cedar, Furres, Skinnes, and other
commodities, as were thought convenient‖—and with all thirty-two seamen on board. As
Brereton explained,
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some of our company that had promised captaine Gosnold to stay, having nothing
but a saving voyage in their minds, made our company of inhabitants (which was
small enough before) much smaller; so as captaine Gosnold seeing his whole
strength to consist but of twelve men, and they but meanly provided, determined
to return for England.
Just why so many intrepid men would suddenly desire nothing more than a ―saving
voyage‖ back to England, Brereton did not say. 8 But another account of the voyage
exists.
Like Brereton, Gabriel Archer was a member of Gosnold‘s crew who wrote a
relation of the voyage in 1602. Unlike Brereton‘s account, however, Archer‘s manuscript
was kept secret until 1625, when it was finally published by Samuel Purchas. Archer
claimed that the English quit their colonial project because they were insufficiently
supplied with ―victuals,‖ owing to the (perhaps deliberate) faulty planning of Captain
Bartholomew Gilbert, the expedition‘s commissary officer. Similarly, Gosnold, in a letter
to his father, also mentioned that having ―taken view of our victual, we judged it then
needful to use expedition.‖ But inadequacy of foodstuffs seems an unlikely explanation
for the colonists‘ precipitous departure, given the bountiful supplies of game, fish, clams,
berries, and nuts that would have been available on Cuttyhunk. Moreover, the colonists
quite possibly could have obtained corn from local natives, as would future generations
of English settlers in New England. In all, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion of
historian Phillip Barbour: ―Something besides food surely took Gosnold back to
England.‖9
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Archer tied the discovery of the food shortage on June 8 to the colonists‘ decision
to return to England on June 13. But something else happened between June 8 and June
13, and it probably had everything to do with the colonists‘ decision to leave. On June 10,
Gosnold sailed to a neighboring islet ―to take in Cedar wood, leaving [Archer] and nine
more in the Fort, onely with three meales meate, upon promise to return the next day.‖
When Gosnold did not return as scheduled, Archer ―commanded foure of my companie
to seeke out for Crabs, Lobsters, Turtles, &c. for sustayning us till the ships returne.‖ The
four men split into two groups of two, and then ―One of these petie companies was
assaulted by foure Indians, who with Arrowes did shoot and hurt one of the two in his
side, the other, a lusty and nimble fellow, leapt in and cut their Bow-strings, whereupon
they fled.‖ The two Englishmen spent that miserable night ―driven to lie all night in the
Woods, not knowing the way home thorow the thick rubbish, as also the weather
somewhat stormie,‖ while those in the fort despaired for their colleagues, ―not able to
conjecture anything of them unless very evill.‖ Thankfully, Archer‘s two companions
returned to the fort on June 12, as did Gosnold. But the very next day ―beganne some of
our companie that before vowed to stay, to make revolt: whereupon the planters
diminishing, all was given over.‖10
Thus Archer‘s manuscript makes clear what was not mentioned in Brereton‘s
narrative or Gosnold‘s letter: the decision to abandon the settlement on Cuttyhunk
occurred in the immediate aftermath of an attack by the local natives. Moreover, the fact
that the Englishmen were assaulted while trying to obtain food underscores the
significance of their inadequate stores of ―victuals.‖ As abundant as the island‘s wild
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food sources might have been, attacks like this one would surely make the colonists think
twice about venturing forth to collect them again. The omission of such a critical event
from Brereton‘s manuscript was surely no accident. Hakluyt, who edited Brereton‘s
manuscript before its publication, was a passionate advocate of English colonization in
North America. Because he did not wish to advertise the fact that American natives were
capable of disrupting a colonial endeavor, he excluded the story of the native attack from
Brereton‘s published narrative. Moreover, he made certain that Archer‘s manuscript,
which was prepared for publication in 1602, remained unpublished for more than two
decades. Not until 1625 would Samuel Purchas publish Archer‘s Relation of Captaine
Gosnol’s Voyage—by which time Plymouth Colony was thriving, and Hakluyt was long
since dead.11
*
Gosnold‘s experience on Cuttyhunk did not dissuade colonial advocates, such as
Hakluyt and Sir Walter Raleigh, or the Bristol merchants who financed their enterprises,
from their commitment to planting a colony in New England. In April 1603, Raleigh and
Hakluyt sent Martin Pring forth with two ships and about forty men to explore Cape Cod
Bay, ―that great Gulfe which Captaine Gosnold over-shot the yeere before.‖ Whether this
voyage was aimed at establishing a colony or simply gathering reconnaissance is unclear;
indeed, Pring‘s account suggests that his primary objective was to obtain sassafras, ―a
plant of sovereigne vertue for the French Poxe [syphilis], and . . . against the Plague and
many other Maladies.‖ Pring dropped anchor ―in a certain Bay, which we called Whitson
Bay,‖ where ―sufficient quantitie of Sassafras‖ could be found on shore. During their stay
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in New England, the English also ―sowed Wheate, Barley, Oates, Pease, and sundry sorts
of Garden Seeds,‖ which ―came up very well, giving certaine testimonie of the goodnesse
of the Climate and of the Soyle.‖12
Whatever their purpose, the presence of Englishmen on Cape Cod did not pass
unnoticed by the local natives. According to Pring, ―the people of the Countrey came to
our men sometimes ten, twentie, fortie or three-score, and at one time one hundred and
twentie at once.‖ Pring described relations with the natives as friendly, noting that the
English ―used them kindly, and gave them divers sorts of our meanest Merchandize.
They did eat Pease and Beanes with our men.‖ English actions, however, revealed that
they regarded the natives warily. For one thing, Pring ―thought it convenient to make a
small baricado to keep diligent watch and ward in‖ while the men gathered sassafras in
the woods. Moreover, the English brought with them two large mastiffs, ―of whom the
Indians were more afraid then of twentie of our men.‖ Revealing something of his
attitude toward the natives, Pring stated that ―when we would be rid of the Savages
company wee would let loose the Mastives, and suddenly with out-cryes they would flee
away.‖13
Within two months of their arrival, the local natives had apparently tired of the
English presence on Cape Cod. One July afternoon, while most of the men were
gathering sassafras, ―about seven score Savages armed with Bowes and Arrowes‖
surrounded the English fort. In response, Pring ―caused a piece of great Ordnance to bee
Martin Pring, ―A Voyage Set out from the Citie of Bristoll . . . in the Yeere 1603 under
the Command of Me Martin Pring,‖ in Levermore, Forerunners and Competitors, 1:60-65. On
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shot off, to give terrour to the Indians, and warning to our men . . . in the Woods.‖ After a
second shot, the Englishmen ―betooke them to their weapons‖ and called for their
mastiffs, at which point the natives ―in dissembling manner . . . turned all to a jest and
sport, and departed away in friendly manner.‖ But the natives were not finished, for in
early August ―they set fire on the Woods where wee wrought, which wee did behold to
burne for a mile space.‖ The next day, the English weighed anchor and headed for home.
Seeing the English depart, the natives ―came downe to the shoare in greater number, to
wit, very neere two hundred by our estimation, and some of them came in their Boates to
our ship, and would have had us come in againe: but we sent them backe, and would
none of their entertainment.‖14
*
As Pring sailed for America in 1603, news of the death of Elizabeth I was just
spreading across England. By the time he returned, the reign of James I had begun. This
was a time of ascendant fortune for Sir Ferdinando Gorges, a wealthy Englishman who,
just a few years earlier, had been imprisoned as a suspected co-conspirator in the Earl of
Essex‘s plot to overthrow Queen Elizabeth. But he had since obtained a pardon and, with
James‘s accession, had been restored to his position as commander of the fort in
Plymouth. Gorges was an ardent proponent of English colonization in North America,
and he actively employed his considerable financial resources to fund transatlantic
ventures toward that end.15
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In 1605, Gorges dispatched George Waymouth with a single vessel, the
Archangel, and twenty-nine seamen to explore northern New England. They arrived on
present-day Monhegan island, off the coast of Maine, in late May, and then proceeded to
explore what they called the Sagadahoc River—today‘s Kennebec River. James Rosier,
who wrote the only known account of the voyage, was duly impressed by the Sagadahoc,
which featured ―more good harbours for ships of all burthens, than England can affoord
and far more secure from all winds and weathers than any in England, Scotland, France
or Spaine.‖ He also praised the ―very good ground, pleasant and fertile‖ of the
surrounding countryside, ―which might in small time with few men be cleansed and made
good arable land: but as it now is will feed cattell of all kindes with fodder enough for
Summer and Winter.‖16
Inevitably, Waymouth‘s crew came into contact with the local Abenaki natives.
At first, relations between the two groups were harmonious; Rosier even noted ―the kinde
civility we found in a people, where we little expected any sparke of humanity.‖ And the
trading was profitable: at one exchange, ―for knives, glasses, combes and other trifles to
the valew of foure or five shillings, we had 40 good Beavers skins, Otters skins, Sables,
and other small skins, which we knewe not how to call.‖ Nevertheless, as their sojourn
continued into June, Waymouth‘s crew began to suspect that the natives were setting a
trap for them. Acting preemptively, the Englishmen ―determined so soone as we could to
take some of them, least (being suspitious we had discovered their plots) they should
absent themselves from us.‖ They enticed three natives aboard their ship, then ―five or
James Rosier, ―A True Relation of the most prosperous voyage made this present yeere
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sixe of us‖ forcibly abducted two more natives from the shore—an act Rosier described
as ―a matter of great importance for the full accomplement of our voyage.‖ Rosier
justified the seizure of these ―savages‖ by noting that they belonged to a ―purblind
generation, whose understanding it hath pleased God so to darken, as they can neither
discerne, use, or rightly esteeme the valuable riches in middest whereof they live . . . nor
acknowledging the Deity of the Almighty giver.‖17
Even if the natives could not appreciate the ―pleasant fertility‖ of their land, they
certainly could serve some useful purposes for the English. Specifically, Rosier noted that
the captives could provide ―further instruction, concerning all the premised particulars, as
also of their governours, and government, situation of townes, and what else shall be
convenient, which by no meanes otherwise we could by any observation of our selves
learne in a long time.‖ Thus it was that, once back in England, Waymouth handed his
captives over to his sponsor, Sir Ferdinando Gorges. The knowledge Gorges gained from
Waymouth‘s captives added fuel to his desire to plant a colony in New England. In fact,
Gorges‘s machinations would take two of the kidnapped natives, Tahenedo (in 1606) and
Skidwarres (in 1607), back to New England, in the role of guides and emissaries for
subsequent English voyages.18
On April 10, 1606, James I certified two charters granting the Plymouth Company
and the London Company rights to establish colonies in North America. Gorges, a
leading figure in the Plymouth Company, acted quickly, dispatching two ships to New
England just four months later. It is not clear whether this expedition was supposed to
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establish a colony or simply to gather reconnaissance. In any event, the Richard, under
the command of Henry Challons, was driven off course by storms and then was captured
by a Spanish fleet in November, effectively scuttling any intended colonial endeavors for
the time being. The other ship, under the command of Thomas Hanham and Martin Pring,
managed to reach the Maine coast and, following up on Waymouth‘s discoveries of the
previous year, explored the Sagadahoc River. Deprived of the resources and colonists
stored on the Richard, however, Hanham and Pring could do little more than write a
detailed narrative of their findings and return to England. 19
*
Fortified with the knowledge gained from the Waymouth and Hanham/Pring
voyages, Gorges sent two more ships, the Gift of God and the Mary and John, to New
England in 1607, this time with the unmistakable purpose of establishing a permanent
settlement near the mouth of the Sagadahoc River. Most of what is known about this
voyage comes from the journal of one of its participants, James Davies, whose narrative
also provided the basis for accounts of the journey written by Samuel Purchas in 1614
and William Strachey in 1618.20 The expedition consisted of between 100 and 120 men
and was led by two particularly well-connected individuals: George Popham, nephew of
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Sir Francis Popham, Chief Justice of the Realm; and Raleigh Gilbert, son of Sir
Humphrey Gilbert. After an eight-week Atlantic crossing, the colonists dropped anchor in
the Sagadahoc River in mid-August, selected a site on Sabino Point for their settlement
and ―began to fortefye‖ their position. By early October, they had ―fully finished the fort,
trencht and fortefied it with twelve pieces of ordinaunce, and built fifty howses, therein,
besides a church and a storehowse.‖ But the colonists were not prepared for the unusually
cold winter of 1607-08, which Purchas described as ―fit to freeze the heart of a
Plantation.‖ George Popham, the colony‘s first president, died in February 1608, leaving
Raleigh Gilbert in command of the fledgling settlement. During the summer of 1608,
Gilbert received word ―that his brother was newly dead, and a faire portion of land fallen
unto his share, which required his repaier home [to England].‖ At this point, the colony‘s
fate was sealed, as ―the company by no means would stay any longer in the country.‖
Strachey lists Gilbert‘s departure for England, along with Popham‘s death, the colonists‘
inability to find any ―mynes . . . nor hope thereof,‖ and ―the feare that all other wynters
would prove like the first,‖ as key factors in the colonists‘ decision to abandon their fort
on the Sagadahoc.21
The aforementioned factors notwithstanding, the local Abenaki natives also
appear to have played a crucial role in forcing the colonists to leave Sagadahoc. Davies
portrayed relations between the colonists and natives as friendly during the settlers‘ first
James Davies, ―The Relation of a Voyage unto New England. Began from the Lizard,
ye first of June 1607, By Captn. Popham‖ (1607), in Thayer, Sagadahoc Colony, 35-76; Samuel
Purchas, Purchas, His Pilgrimes (1614), quoted in Thayer, Sagadahoc Colony, 89-90; William
Strachey, The Historie of Travaile into Virginia Brittania: Expressing the Cosmographie and
Commodities of the Country, Together with the Manners and Customes of the People (c. 1618),
ed. R. H. Major (London: Hakluyt Society, 1849), 179-80. The exceptionally cold winter of 160708 was a global phenomenon, apparently related to unusually strong El Niño conditions in the
southern Pacific Ocean. See Kupperman, Jamestown Project, 167-69.
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two months at Sagadahoc. In September, for example, the colonists entertained and
traded with a visiting troupe of ―near fortye persons men women & Children . . . we
aggain ussed them in all frindly manner We Could & gave them vyttails for to eatt.‖ But
relations were probably strained after several colonists, led by Gilbert, missed their
planned rendezvous with local natives who were to lead them up the Penobscot River to
trade with Bashaba, ―the Cheefe Comander of those parts.‖ At this point, the Abenaki
may well have decided that the French were more reliable trading partners than these
English interlopers and that the benefits of allowing the English to stay in New England
were not worth the risks. In his private correspondence, Gorges expressed his worry that
―the french ar in hande with the natives, to practise upon us, promisinge them, if they will
put us out of the Contry, and not trade with none of oures, they will come unto them and
give the succors agaynst theyr Enemyes.‖ In fact, this concern was entirely justified. By
this time, French traders had not only transformed the lives of the Micmac, but had also
made substantial inroads with their neighbors to the south, the hunting-gathering Abenaki
of northern New England. Like the Micmac, the Abenaki traded furs for European goods,
which they in turn traded to the farming natives of southern New England in exchange
for corn.22
Samuel Purchas, for his part, ascribed native resistance not to French influence,
but rather to the sway of an ―evil spirit‖ that ―commanded them not to dwell near or come
among the English, threatening to kill some and inflict sickness on others . . . saying he
had power and would do like to the English the next moon, to wit, in December.‖
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But whether they were encouraged by French traders, evil spirits, or their own perceived
self-interests (or perhaps some combination of these), it seems clear that the Abenaki
conspired to make the English feel unwelcome in Maine. One incident, described in
Strachey‘s narrative, demonstrated that while relations between the English and Abenaki
seemed amicable on the surface, this appearance masked a deeper tension undergirding
these relationships. In late September, Gilbert led a party of twenty colonists on an
exploratory trip up the Sagadahoc, where they met ―Sebenoa . . . lord of the river
Sachadadoc,‖ who led them to his village. There the English saw ―neere fifty able men
very strong and tall . . . all newly painted and armed with their bowes and arrowes.‖ The
visit was ostensibly friendly, and the natives ―made shew that they would come downe to
the boat and there bring such things as they had to exchange them for ours.‖ But after the
colonists returned to the boat, sixteen natives arrived ―and brought with them some
tobacco and certayne small skynes, which were of no value.‖ Suspecting duplicity on the
natives‘ part, Gilbert ordered his men into their shallop and prepared to depart. In
response, Sabenoa‘s men ―subtilely devised how they might put out the fier in the
shallop, by which meanes they sawe they should be free from the danger of our men‘s
pieces.‖ One particularly bold native ―came into the shallop and taking the fier brand
which one of our company held in his hand . . . he presently threw it into the water and
leapt out of the shallop.‖ With their cannon thus disabled, the English were in a
precarious situation. Gilbert sent one man ―to stepp on the shore for more fier,‖ but ―the
salvadges resisted him and would not suffer him to take any, and some others holding fast
the boat roap that the shallop could not putt off.‖ At this point, ―Captain Gilbert caused
the musquettiers to present their peeces.‖ The natives, in turn, ―presently lett goe the
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boatroap and betooke them to their bowes and arrowes, and ran into the bushes, nocking
their arrowes, but did not shoot, neither did ours at them. So the shallop departed from
them to the further side of the river.‖ With the standoff over, another group of natives
approached the colonists in a canoe ―and would have excused the fault of the others.
Captain Gilbert made shew as if he were still friends, and entertayned them kindlye and
soe left them.‖23
Apart from this incident, Strachey‘s narrative offers no further evidence of
difficulties between natives and Englishmen at Sagadahoc. But Strachey‘s manuscript,
like Brereton‘s relation of the Gosnold journey five years earlier, was a promotional
account, designed to encourage future investment in North American colonizing
schemes; as such, it was not likely to feature stories of hostile natives disrupting a
European settlement. Other sources, however, indicate that as relations between the
colonists and the Abenaki deteriorated, the natives carried out violent attacks against the
colonists. Purchas, for example, noted that one colonist, ―Mr. Patterson was slain by the
savages of Nahoc.‖24 Surely the death of even a single Englishman at the hands of the
natives would have caused some trepidation among the remaining settlers, and might
have even inspired some to leave. But the situation may have been even worse than
Purchas acknowledged.
In a 1612 letter, the French Jesuit missionary Pierre Biard reported the local
natives‘ version of what had transpired at Sagadahoc. The natives told Biard that Popham
23
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was ―a very honest man, who got along remarkably well with the natives of the country.‖
Nonetheless, the Abenaki ―were afraid of such neighbors, and so put the captain to
death.‖ Then, under Gilbert, the English ―changed their tactics. They drove the Savages
away without ceremony; they beat, maltreated and misused them outrageously and
without restraint.‖ Accordingly, the natives, ―anxious about the present, and dreading still
greater evils in the future, determined, as the saying is, to kill the whelp ere its teeth and
claws became stronger.‖ When the Abenaki saw a chance to do just this, they seized the
moment:
The opportunity came one day when three boat-loads of [colonists] went away off
to the fisheries. My [native] conspirators followed in their boat, and approaching
with a great show of friendliness (for they always make the greatest show of
affection when they are the most treacherous), they go among them, and at a
given signal each one seizes his man and stabs him to death. Thus were eleven
Englishmen dispatched. The others were intimidated and abandoned their
enterprise the same year; they have not resumed it since, being satisfied to come
in the summer to fish.
Thus, according to Biard‘s report, the natives killed not one, but eleven Englishmen,
including the colony‘s president. Furthermore, the natives were convinced that their
actions—not the cold winter, or the death of Gilbert‘s brother in England—had driven the
English away from Sagadahoc. Writing in 1616, Biard reiterated this belief and
contrasted the English treatment of the natives with that of the French:
These people [the Abenaki] do not seem to be bad, although they drove away the
English who wished to settle among them in 1608 and 1609 [sic]. They made
excuses to us for this act, and recounted the outrages that they had experienced
from these English; and they flattered us, saying they loved us very much,
because they knew we would not close our doors to the Savages as the English
did, and that we would not drive them from our table with blows from a club, nor
set our dogs upon them. 25
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Of course, French informants might be expected to portray English colonists in
the worst possible light; but other sources have also attributed the abandonment of
Sagadahoc to native hostility. In 1677, the Puritan chronicler William Hubbard published
this story:
It is reported by an Ancient Mariner yet living in these parts, a person of good
Credit . . . he heard an old Indian tell this story; that when he was a youth, there
was a Fort built about Saga-de-hock . . . and possessed for some time by the
English: But afterward upon some Quarrel that fell out betwixt the Indians and
them, the English were some of them killed by the said Indians and the rest all
driven out of the fort.
The natives‘ victory came at a high price, however. As Hubbard reported, after the
colonists fled,
there was much left of their Provisions and Ammunition; amongst which there
was some barrels of Powder; but after [the natives] had opened them not knowing
what to do therewith, they left the barrels carelessly open, and scattered the
Powder about, so as accidentally it took Fire; and they blew up all that was in the
Fort, burnt and destroyed many of the Indians, upon which they conceived their
God was angry with them for doing hurt to the English.
Finally, in 1792, James Sullivan related the following account of a remarkable event that
reportedly occurred at Sagadahoc:
There was a tradition amongst the Norridgewalk Indians, that these [Sagadahoc]
planters invited a number of the natives, who had come to trade with them, to
draw a small cannon by a rope, and that when they were arranged on a line in this
process, the white people discharged the piece, and thereby killed and wounded
several of them. . . . The story is, that the resentment of the natives, consequent to
this treacherous murder, obliged the Europeans to re-embark the next summer.
As historian Henry O. Thayer noted in 1892, this story‘s ―origin, and continuance for
more than a century, is a fact to be accounted for.‖ 26 That said, it is certainly consistent
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with the general pattern of other narratives describing the deterioration of relations
between English and natives at Sagadahoc. Considering the accumulated evidence in the
narratives of Davies, Strachey, Purchas, Biard, Hubbard, and Sullivan, it difficult not to
conclude that English-native relations at Sagadahoc quickly soured, and that native
hostility was a major factor—indeed, the principal reason—behind the colonists‘ decision
to abandon their fledgling settlement in 1608.
The Sagadahoc colonists, of course, were hardly unique in this regard. As we
have seen, native hostility disrupted all attempts by Europeans to settle in northeastern
North America form the time of the Vikings through the early seventeenth century. As
Popham‘s colony foundered, the seeds of the first successful European colonies in North
America were just taking root to the south, at Jamestown, and to the north, at Quebec.
But despite the efforts of colonial advocates, such as Hakluyt and Gorges, and of intrepid
explorers, such as Gosnold, Pring, Waymouth, and Popham, Norumbega remained firmly
under the control of the local natives. Though French and English fishers and traders
continued to visit the region, the Sagadahoc venture was the last serious attempt at
establishing a colony there for over a decade. Then, in 1621, a group of English religious
dissenters arrived in southern New England and established the first permanent European
colony in the region, at a place they called Plymouth. By the time these colonists landed
in New England, the natives‘ situation had drastically deteriorated from what it had been
two decades earlier, thanks to the intervention of a European epidemic disease. But
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before telling that story, it will be useful to review the situation of the natives of southern
New England before 1616, when things went so horribly awry.
*
Before the arrival of Europeans, southern New England was anything but an
empty wilderness; on the contrary, as Verrazzano noted in 1524, it was densely settled
with human inhabitants. While staying among the natives at Narragansett Bay,
Verrazzano commented, ―In each house there lives a father with a very large family, for
in some we saw XXV[twenty-five] to XXX [thirty] people.‖ In later decades, other
European explorers also remarked on the large numbers of people they saw in southern
New England. In 1605, the French explorer Samuel de Champlain surveyed the
Massachusetts coast, where he observed ―a great many little houses‖ and ―a great deal of
land cleared up and planted with Indian corn.‖ Upon reaching modern-day Boston
Harbor, Champlain was greeted by a host of ―fifteen or sixteen canoes of savages,‖ some
of which contained as many as ―fifteen or sixteen‖ men. At what is now Stage Harbor in
Chatham, Massachusetts, Champlain observed ―some five to six hundred savages‖ who
were, he duly noted, ―all naked except their sexual parts.‖ And on a 1614 voyage to New
England, Captain John Smith found that in ―the Countrie of the Massachusets, which is
the Paradise of all those parts. . . . The Sea Coast as you passe, shewes you all along large
corne fields, and great troupes of well proportioned people.‖27
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Despite the observations of Verrazzano, Champlain, and Smith, scholars have
long debated the question of just how many natives lived in New England before 1616. In
1674, the Puritan chronicler Daniel Gookin published a report, based on interviews with
older natives, claiming that the five ―principal nations‖ of southern New England
natives—the Pawtucket, Massachusett, Pokanoket, Narragansett, and Pequot—together
comprised about 18,000 adult male warriors before European contact. If one
conservatively assumes a ratio of three to four dependents per warrior, then Gookin‘s
figures imply that the total native population of southern New England numbered
between 72,000 and 90,000 in the early seventeenth century. Gookin‘s numbers,
however, were dismissed by nineteenth-century historians, such as Albert Gallatin and
John Gorham Palfrey, who blithely asserted that the total population of southern New
England could not have exceeded 30,000 to 50,000 souls. Then, in 1928, the
ethnographer James Mooney‘s ―provisional detailed estimates‖ of North American native
population were posthumously published. Mooney estimated the total native population
for all of North America north of Mexico to be about one million, of whom merely
25,000 lived in New England. Although his report cited only scant evidence to support
such low population estimates, Mooney‘s numbers went unchallenged for nearly half a
century, influencing the work of respected scholars such as Alfred Louis Kroeber and
Alden T. Vaughan.28 Over the past several decades, however, anthropologists and
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historians following the lead of Henry F. Dobyns have argued that precontact native
populations throughout the Americas were considerably larger than previously thought;
thus Mooney‘s estimate has been supplanted by the substantially higher calculations of
modern scholars. 29 Sherburne F. Cook‘s 1976 analysis of documentary and
archaeological evidence yields an estimate, similar to that implied by Gookin, of between
60,000 and 80,000 inhabitants in southern New England and southeastern New York in
1610. Subsequently, archaeologist Dean Snow and historian Neal Salisbury have argued
for even higher population estimates of between 126,000 and 144,000. Quibbles over the
precise number of inhabitants notwithstanding, modern scholars concur that before 1616,
New England was a populous region. 30
*
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Although the natives‘ principal economic and social unit was the village, their
villages were themselves subordinate (albeit loosely, at times) to larger confederacies,
which Gookin termed ―principal nations.‖ Five such nations dominated southern New
England in the early seventeenth century, three of which occupied coastal regions of
present-day Massachusetts. According to Salisbury, each of these coastal nations had a
total population of between 21,000 and 24,000 inhabitants before 1616. Furthest north
were the Pawtucket (also called the Penacook), a confederacy of bands that extended
from southern Maine to just north of Massachusetts Bay. To their south were the
Massachusett, an ethnically homogeneous tribe that occupied the region from just below
Salem to just north of Plymouth, centered on the eponymous bay. Furthest south were the
Pokanoket (descendants of whom are also called Wampanoag), whose territory extended
from the eastern shore of Narragansett Bay to Cape Cod and whose tributaries included
the Nauset on Cape Cod and the natives of Martha‘s Vineyard and Nantucket. Further
inland, the Narragansett dominated the western shore of their eponymous bay and
surrounding regions with an estimated population of between 35,000 and 40,000. Finally,
the Pequot (including, for purposes of this estimate, the closely related Mohegan), with a
population of 28,000 to 32,000, controlled most of the region now known as
Connecticut.31
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Though they grouped themselves into these five principal nations, the southern
New England natives were similar enough to be regarded as a single linguistic and
cultural unit. Unlike the hunting-gathering Abenaki and Micmac to their north, the
southern New England natives were semi-sedentary farmers whose subsistence was
primarily derived from the cultivation of maize, beans, squash, and other plants,
supplemented by protein from fish and game. Native villages generally comprised up to a
few hundred inhabitants who were bound together largely by ties of kinship. Each village
was ruled by a sachem, who derived power through hereditary succession and was
responsible for coordinating hunting, conducting diplomacy, and dispensing justice. The
natives were deeply spiritual people whose animistic religion focused on the ―manitou‖
inherent in every plant, animal, and object. They actively modified their environment by
clearing fields for planting and stripping forests for firewood. Moreover, they burned
large sections of the woods surrounding their villages once or twice annually, producing
forests of large, widely spaced trees with minimal shrubby undergrowth. The abundance
of grass in these modified forests attracted large populations of various game animals,
such as elk, deer, beaver, and hare, which provided the natives with meat for their diet
and skins for their moccasins and clothing. 32

Pequot War, 41-42, 66-68; and Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 48, 210, 289n11. On the
defection of the Mohegan from the Pequot, see Chapter 5.
32

Snow, Archaeology of New England, 27-31; Bragdon, Columbia Guide, 28-30;
William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England
(1983; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 34-53; Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 3049. In northern New England, village leaders were called sagamores, rather than sachems. The
Puritan theologian (and iconoclast) Roger Williams interpreted ―manitou‖ to mean ―god;‖ but, as
Salisbury explains, it ―actually referred to the manifestation of spiritual power, a manifestation
that could occur in almost any form.‖

60

Internecine warfare was an integral part of the New England natives‘ experience
before 1616. Micmac warriors frequently raided the Pawtucket and Massachusett villages
to their south, and Mohawk attacks on villages in the Connecticut and Merrimac valleys
were commonplace. Moreover, conflict among the five southern New England nations
was not unknown. As Gookin noted, the coastal Pawtucket, Massachusett, and Pokanoket
confederacies generally ―held amity‖ with one another, while the Pokanoket ―held war
with the Narragansitts; and often joined with the Massachusetts, as friends and
confederates against the Narragansitts.‖ Still, while internecine confrontations must have
been attended by some loss of life, they do not seem to have caused widespread social or
economic disruption. Indeed, as archaeologist Dean Snow notes, ―the last six centuries of
prehistory appear to have been a period of peaceful growth and prosperity‖ for the
southern New England natives.‖33
Alas, that was about to change.
*
During the sixteenth century, smallpox and other Old World epidemic diseases
afflicted native populations in what is now the southern United States, from California to
Florida. In contrast, the extent to which such diseases affected northeastern regions of
North America before 1600 is less certain. Given that European traders and fishermen
regularly visited the northeastern coast throughout the sixteenth century, it seems likely
that localized epidemics, such as that documented among the Stadacona in 1535,
occurred repeatedly. Because such epidemics may have occurred far from any European
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eyewitnesses, their absence from written records is not surprising. The first welldocumented effects of European disease in the northeast were noted among the Micmac,
in the regions north of New England, in the early seventeenth century. In 1611, Samuel
de Champlain noted that the number of Micmac who came to trade was sharply reduced
from previous years, because ―one of their chiefs and many of their tribe had died of a
fever which had broken out amongst them.‖ Indeed, according to Dean Snow‘s estimate,
by then the total Micmac population was only 25 percent of what it had been a century
earlier. As one native leader reported to the Jesuit missionary Pierre Biard, the Micmac in
Acadia had once been ―as thickly planted there as the hairs upon his head.‖ However,
their population had ―diminished since the French have begun to frequent their country,‖
owing to ―pleurisy, quinsy and dysentery, which kill them off.‖ During 1611 alone, Biard
reported, ―sixty have died at Cape de la Heve, which is the greater part of those who lived
there.‖ Despite the massive native losses, no Frenchmen became ill, a fact which Biard
noted ―has caused the Savages to apprehend that God protects and defends us as his
favorite and well-beloved people.‖34
Whether epidemic disease appeared in New England in the sixteenth century is a
subject of debate. For one thing, present-day scholars disagree over whether to accept
Roger Williams‘s assertion that four separate epidemics afflicted the Narragansett in the
second half of the sixteenth century. In a 1638 letter to John Winthrop, Williams
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mentioned that Narragansett elders drew a connection between earthquakes and
epidemics:
The younger natives are ignorant of the like: but the elder inform me that this is
the fifth [earthquake] within these four score years in the land: the first about
three score and ten years since: the second some three score and four years since,
the third some fifty-four years since, the fourth some forty-six since: and they
always observed either plague or pox or some other epidemical disease followed;
three, four or five years after the Earthquake.
As anthropologists Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear note, this chronology ―would
imply that the Narragansett suffered epidemics in about 1568, 1574, 1584, and 1592.‖
Snow and Lanphear discount this possibility, arguing that ―Williams‘s earthquake
epidemics do not stand up under rigorous testing,‖ but other scholars have been reluctant
to dismiss Williams‘s account entirely. As Catherine C. Carlson, George J. Armelagos,
and Ann L. Magennis assert, ―The association with earthquakes as disease causation may
be questionable, but not the epidemics themselves. It seems reasonable that numerous
localized epidemics probably occurred during this century due to contact with traders and
fishermen.‖ Dobyns, for his part, has argued that American pandemics of louse-borne
typhus in 1586 and smallpox in 1592, both of which originated in Mexico, extended as
far northward as southern New England. However, Snow and Lanphear vigorously
dispute these claims, as they question both Dobyns‘s reading of primary and secondary
sources and his interpretation of archaeological evidence. Instead, Snow and Lanphear
assert that areas of relatively sparse native settlement created ―large buffer zones‖ that
impeded the spread of pandemics from southern portions of North America to the
northeastern woodlands. Moreover, the archaeological evidence assembled by Ann
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Ramenofsky does not support Dobyns‘s hypothesis that sixteenth-century epidemics
extended to New England.35
The only documentary evidence supporting a New England epidemic prior to
1616 comes from Gookin‘s manuscript, which reported that ―a very great number of
[natives] were swept away by an epidemical and unwanted sickness, [about] 16121613.‖36 Because Gookin wrote this in 1674, it is unclear to which epidemic he actually
referred. Possibly it was the 1611 scourge among the Micmac, which might have
extended into the northern portion of coastal New England; or perhaps it was an
otherwise undocumented New England epidemic that began around 1612. Then again, it
is possible that Gookin was simply confused about his dates. In that case, this
―epidemical and unwanted sickness‖ might have started not in 1612, but in 1616.
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Chapter 3
―Doubtless it was Some Pestilential Disease‖:
Plague, Pilgrims, and Pokanoket, 1616-1621
The good hand of God now brought them to a country wonderfully prepared for
their entertainment, by a sweeping mortality that had lately been among the
natives.
—Cotton Mather1
The extent to which Old World epidemic diseases penetrated the Northeast in the
sixteenth century is, as we have seen, a subject of continuing scholarly debate. But in
contrast to the disputes concerning possible earlier epidemics, there is little question that
something cataclysmic happened in New England in the second decade of the
seventeenth century. In just a few years, an epidemic disease decimated the natives along
the coast from Maine to Massachusetts, killing as many as 95 percent of the population in
some areas. Precisely when the epidemic began, and who was responsible for bringing it
to New England, are impossible to determine with certainty. Still, one story concerning
its origin bears repeating.
After Sagadahoc was abandoned in 1608, English interest in Norumbega was
largely confined to trading and fishing for the next several years. But one Englishman
who remained fascinated with the region‘s colonial potential was Captain John Smith, a
man better remembered for his role in preventing the collapse of the Jamestown colony.
Smith was the first person to use the term ―New England‖ to describe the region formerly
called Norumbega, and he published numerous tracts extolling its virtues. For example,
in A Description of New England, Smith wrote:
And surely by reason of those sandy cliffes and cliffes of rocks, both which we
saw so planted with Gardens and Corne fields, and so well inhabited with a
1
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goodly, strong and well proportioned people, besides the greatnesse of the Timber
growing on them, the greatnesse of the fish and the moderate temper of the ayre
. . . who can but approove this a most excellent place, both for health and fertility?
Above all, Smith viewed New England as ripe for English colonization. Indeed, he
continued, ―of all the foure parts of the world that I have yet seene not inhabited, could I
have but meanes to transport a Colonie, I would rather live here then any where.‖2
In 1614, Smith led an expedition of two ships, with 45 men, to explore the coasts
of present-day Maine and Massachusetts. Their mission, Smith reported, was ―to take
Whales and make tryalls of a Myne of Gold and Copper. If those failed, Fish and Furres
was then our refuge.‖ After mapping the coast and writing a description of the region and
its inhabitants, Smith departed, leaving his lieutenant Thomas Hunt to transport their
fishing catch to Malaga. Not content to take just fish, Hunt also kidnapped about twenty
natives from the mainland, in the areas around Patuxet and Cape Cod. The local Nauset
natives were understandably incensed by Hunt‘s treachery; as Smith later wrote, this
kidnapping only encouraged them ―to moove their hate against our Nation.‖ 3
The Nauset found an opportunity to vent their fury when a French ship wrecked
on Cape Cod about two years later. According to an account left by the English merchant
Thomas Morton, the natives ―set upon the men, at such advantage, that they killed manie
of them [and] burned their shipp.‖ The five sailors who survived the assault were
captured and distributed ―unto five Sachems which were Lords of the severall territories
adjoyninge, [who] did keepe them so longe as they lived.‖ Morover, they ―made these
Appleby, ―War, Politics, and Colonization,‖ 75; Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 97100; Smith, Description of New England, 28.
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five Frenchmen fetch them wood and water, which is the generall worke that they require
of a servant.‖ Eventually, one of the captives, ―out livinge the rest had learned so much of
their language, as to rebuke [the natives] for their bloudy deede, saying that God would
be angry with them for it; and that hee would in his displeasure destroy them.‖
Unimpressed, ―the Salvages (it seemes boasting of their strength,) replyed and sayd, that
they were so many, that God could not kill them.‖ As subsequent events would
demonstrate, however, the natives‘ complacency was ill-founded. Morton described what
happened next:
in short time after, the hand of God fell heavily upon them, with such a mortall
stroake, that they died on heapes, as they lay in their houses[;] and the living, that
were able to shift for themselves would runne away, & let them dy, and let there
Carkasas ly above the ground without buriall. 4
Morton was certainly typical of his Puritan contemporaries in attributing the
natives‘ calamity to ―the hand of God.‖ Modern scholars offer a more prosaic
explanation: the coastal natives of southern New England were wiped out by a
devastating epidemic of a European infection. It is tempting to speculate that one of the
five French captives unwittingly initiated the epidemic by transmitting a pathogenic
microbe to his Nauset captors. The disease could then have spread, first through the
Nauset village and then through the Pokanoket confederacy, before extending to the
allied Massachusett and Pawtucket nations. Of course, the true source of the epidemic
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will probably never be known for certain, and it is even possible that more than one
European brought infection to coastal New England around the same time. Moreover, the
precise disease responsible for the epidemic remains a subject of ongoing debate, though
the available evidence favors smallpox as the most likely etiology. But whatever its
cause, the epidemic of 1616-19 completely transformed the demographic, social, and
political landscape of New England, devastating the coastal natives and preparing the
way for English colonization of the region.
*
The first European known to have directly witnessed the epidemic was Richard
Vines, an agent of the Plymouth Company who was sent to New England by Sir
Ferdinando Gorges. Vines and his men stayed among the natives near the mouth of the
Saco River, in what is now southern Maine, during the winter of 1616-17. Although
Vines‘s original notes have apparently been lost, a record of his observations appears in a
later narrative by Gorges. According to this account, the local natives ―were sore afflicted
with the plague, so that the country was in a manner left void of inhabitants.‖
Nonetheless, Gorges noted, ―Vines and the rest with him‖ remained unaffected. Indeed,
even though they ―lay in the cabins with those people that died . . . (blessed be God for
it), not one of them ever felt their heads to ache while they stayed there.‖ The next
original description of the epidemic comes from Thomas Dermer, another English captain
sent to New England by Gorges. Describing the New England coast in 1619, Dermer
portrayed a scene of desolation:
I passed alongst the Coast where I found some antient plantations, not long since
populous now utterly void; in other places a remnant remaines, but not free of
sicknesse. Their disease the Plague, for wee might perceive the sores of some that
escaped, who describe the spots of such as usually die.
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One of Dermer‘s passengers was a Pokanoket native named Squanto, who had been
among those kidnapped by Hunt in 1614. Upon returning to his home village of Patuxet,
Squanto found that it had been wiped out by the epidemic. What must have been a
devastating realization for him merited only a parenthetical mention in Dermer‘s letter to
Samuel Purchas: ―When I arrived at my savage‘s native Country (finding all dead) I
travelled alongst a daies journey Westward, to a place called Nummastaquyt.‖ 5
As it turned out, however, Patuxet would not remain uninhabited for long.
*
While the natives in New England suffered and died, on the other side of the
Atlantic a group of religious dissidents resolved to emigrate to North America. These
were a congregation of English Separatists who have become known to American
folklore and popular culture as the Pilgrims. 6 In England, as their leader William
Bradford explained, they had ―laboured to have the right worship of God and discipline
of Christ established in the church, according to the simplicity of the gospel, without the
mixture of men‘s inventions.‖ But their efforts only invited harassment from an English
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government that, given the acrimonious ecclesiastical climate of the early seventeenth
century, increasingly strove to enforce religious conformity (or at least the outward
appearance thereof). Summarizing their predicament, Bradford wrote: ―Religion hath
been disgraced, the godly grieved, afflicted persecuted, and many exiled; sundry have
lost their lives in prisons and other ways.‖ Frustrated in England, in 1608 ―they resolved
to go into the Low Countries, where they heard was freedom of religion for all men.‖ But
while they did find a religious refuge in the Netherlands, after ―some eleven or twelve
years‖ there they ―began to incline to this conclusion: of removal to some other place.‖
Bradford cited ―sundry weighty and solid reasons‖ for their emigration, including
concerns over their limited employment opportunities in the overpopulated Netherlands
and their fear that that ―their posterity would be in danger to degenerate and be
corrupted‖ by amalgamation into the general Dutch population. At length they
determined to head for ―those vast and unpeopled countries of America, which are
fruitful and fit for habitation, being devoid of all civil inhabitants, where there are only
savage and brutish men which range up and down, little otherwise than the wild beasts of
the same.‖7
In leaving Holland for the distant American shore, the Pilgrims knew they were
taking an enormous risk. In reply to those who questioned the wisdom of this move,
Bradford later wrote:
It was granted the dangers were great, but not desperate. The difficulties were
many, but not invincible. . . . True it was that such attempts were not to be made
and undertaken without good ground and reason; not rashly or lightly as many
have done for curiosity or hope of gain, etc. But [the Pilgrims‘] condition was not
ordinary, their ends were good and honourable; their calling lawful, and urgent;
and therefore they might expect the blessing of God in their proceeding. Yea,
7
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though they should lose their lives in this action, yet might they have comfort in
the same, and their endeavors would be honourable.
Indeed, it was entirely plausible that the Pilgrims might lose their lives in this venture—
not only because of the risks inherent in such an undertaking, but also owing to a
combination of bad luck and poor planning that plagued them from the outset. The first
leg of their adventure brought them to Southampton, where it became clear that both their
financial backing and their stocks of provisions were wholly inadequate. In one letter
―subscribed with many names of the chiefest of the company‖ the Pilgrims complained:
We are in such a strait at present, as we are forced to sell away ₤60 worth of our
provisions to clear the haven, and withal put ourselves upon great extremities,
scarce having any butter, no oil, not a sole to mend a shoe, nor every man a sword
to his side, wanting many muskets, much armour, etc. And yet we are willing to
expose ourselves to such eminent dangers as are like to ensue, and trust to the
good providence of God, rather than his name and truth should be evil spoken of
for us.
In an August 1620 letter, Robert Cushman offered an even more somber assessment of
his fellow Pilgrims‘ prospects in America:
Friend, if ever we make a plantation, God works a miracle; especially considering
how scant we shall be of victuals, and most of all ununited amongst ourselves,
and devoid of good tutors and regiment. Violence will break all. . . . If I should
write to you of all things which promiscuously forerun our ruin, I should over
charge my weak head and grieve your tender heart; only this, I pray you prepare
for evil tidings of us every day. . . . I see not in reason how we shall escape even
the gasping of hunger starved persons; but God can do much, and his will be
done.8
Insufficiently supplied though they were, and completely lacking cows or draft
animals, the Pilgrims departed for America in early August 1620 in two ships, the 60-ton
Speedwell and the 180-ton Mayflower. They were forced to turn back, not once, but
twice, because the Speedwell’s master ―complained that his ship was so leaky that he
8
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must bear up or sink at sea.‖ To their great disappointment, they found that the Speedwell
―would not prove sufficient for the voyage,‖ and thus ―resolved to dismiss her and part of
the company, and proceed with the other ship.‖ Finally the remaining 102 passengers left
England in the Mayflower on September 6, far later than they had originally planned.
During their transatlantic passage, they ―they were encountered many times with cross
winds, and met with many fierce storms,‖ but only one passenger had died by the time
they arrived off Cape Cod on November 9. From there they tacked southward, hoping ―to
find some place about Hudson‘s River for their habitation.‖ This plan further revealed
the Pilgrim‘s poor planning, for they were apparently unaware of the navigational
hazards which lay off the southern coast of Massachusetts, even though Gosnold had
described these nearly two decades earlier. Predictably, the colonists ―fell amongst
dangerous shoals and roaring breakers, and they were so far entangled therewith as they
conceived themselves in great danger; and the wind shrinking upon them withal, they
resolved to bear up again for the Cape.‖9
After beating a hasty retreat from the shoals off southern Massachusetts, the
Mayflower dropped anchor just inside the tip of Cape Cod, in what is now Provincetown
Harbor, on November 11, 1620. Then the colonists ―fell upon their knees and blessed the
God of heaven, who had brought them over the vast and furious ocean, and delivered
them from all the perils and miseries thereof.‖ Still, Bradford recognized just how
precarious their situation was. In America, the Pilgrims ―had now no friends to welcome
them, nor inns to entertain or refresh their weatherbeaten bodies, no houses or much less
towns to repair too, to seek for succour.‖ Instead, they were surrounded by ―savage
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barbarians‖ who, in all probability, ―were readier to fill their sides full of arrows then
otherwise.‖ Moreover, ―it was winter, and they that know the winters of that country
know them to be sharp and violent, and subject to cruel and fierce storms, dangerous to
travel to known places, much more to search an unknown coast.‖ As Bradford bleakly
concluded, ―which way soever [the Pilgrims] turned their eyes (save upward to the
heavens) they could have little solace or content in respect of any outward objects.‖10
In this grim summary, Bradford did not exaggerate. By all accounts, the colonists
endured a horrific first winter in New England—one marked by disease, starvation, and
hostile encounters with the Nauset natives. But even in this ―hideous and desolate
wilderness,‖ the Pilgrims found evidence of ―a special providence of God, and a great
mercy to this poor people.‖ For a few days after their arrival, on an exploratory mission
to the shore of Cape Cod, they found
a good quantity of clear ground where the Indians had formerly set corn . . . . and
heaps of sand newly paddled with their hands. Which they, digging up, found in
them divers fair Indian baskets filled with corn, and some in ears, fair and good,
of divers colours, which seemed to them a very goodly sight . . . . So, their time
limited them being expired, they returned to the ship lest they should be in fear of
their safety; and took with them part of the corn and buried up the rest.
And on a second expedition, three weeks later, they found
two of [the natives‘] houses covered with mats, and sundry of their implements in
them, but the people were run away and could not be seen; also there was found
more of their corn, and of their beans of various colours. The corn and beans [the
colonists] brought away, purposing to give [the natives] full satisfaction when
they should meet with any of them as, about some six months afterward they did,
to their good content.
Considering the inadequacy of their supplies of foodstuffs, the discovery of these native
stores of corn and beans likely made the difference between survival and death for many
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of the colonists in their first year in New England. As Bradford noted, ―here they got seed
to plant them corn the next year, or else they might have starved, for they had none, nor
any likelihood to get any till the season had been past.‖ Bradford saw this as evidence of
God‘s providence: ―the Lord is never wanting unto his in their greatest needs; let his holy
name have all the praise.‖ 11
The colonists continued to reconnoiter the region, searching for a place to build
their homes. On December 8, an exploring party arrived at a bay that seemed ―fit for
situation.‖ The colonists described it as ―a most hopeful place,‖ noting the bay‘s
―innumerable store of fowl; and excellent good: and cannot but be [full] of fish in their
seasons.‖ In the surrounding countryside, they found ―a very sweet brook [that] runs
under the hill side; and many delicate springs of as good water as can be drunk,‖ and ―a
great deal of land cleared, and [that] hath been planted with corn three or four years ago.‖
But the area seemed to be devoid of native inhabitants: ―We marched along the coast, in
the woods, some seven or eight miles; but saw not an Indian, nor an Indian house: only
we found where formerly had been some inhabitants; and where they had planted their
corn.‖ Whether the colonists paused to consider what had become of the area‘s original
inhabitants, surviving records do not say. At the time, practical considerations must have
been paramount. As Bradford put it, this location ―was the best they could find, and the
season, and their present necessity, made them glad to accept of it.‖ Thus the colonists
decided to establish their plantation, which they called Plymouth, here on the shore of its
eponymous bay.12
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*
As the colonists started building their little settlement, their lack of preparation
and the harshness of the New England winter began to take their toll. As Bradford
reported, ―in two or three months‘ time half of [the] company died, especially in January
and February, being the depth of winter, and wanting houses and other comforts; being
infected with the scurvy and other diseases which this long voyage and their
inaccommodate condition had brought upon them.‖ At the mortality‘s peak, ―there died
some times two or three of a day,‖ so that ―in the time of most distress, there was but six
or seven sound persons‖ available to care for everyone else. Finally, as spring approached
―it pleased God the mortality began to cease amongst them, and the sick and lame
recovered apace.‖ By this point, the colonists had been devastated. Of the 102 Mayflower
passengers who had embarked for America, 50 had died by the summer of 1621.
According to one historian‘s analysis, by this time ―[o]nly 12 of the original 26 heads of
families and 4 of the original 12 unattached men or boys were left; and of the women
who reached Plymouth, all but a few [had] died.‖13
The colonists‘ presence at Plymouth did not pass unnoticed by the local natives.
Throughout the winter ―the Indians came skulking around them, and would sometimes
show themselves aloof off, but when any approached near them, they would run away.‖
Then in March 1621, ―a certain Indian came boldly amongst them and spoke to them in
broken English, which they could well understand but marveled at it.‖ This was Samoset,
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a native from Maine who had been living among the Pokanoket for several months. The
colonists ―questioned him of many things,‖ and in reply ―he discoursed of the whole
country, and of every province, and of their sagamores [sachems], and their number of
men, and strength.‖ Samoset also explained that the colonists were building their
settlement on the site of what had once been a native village:
He told us the place where we now live is called Patuxet, and that about four
years ago all the inhabitants died of an extraordinary plague, and there is neither
man, woman, nor child remaining, as indeed we have found none, so as there is
none to hinder our possession, or to lay claim unto it.
Whether the colonists knew, or even suspected, that such a calamity had cleared the way
for them before meeting Samoset is uncertain, for this was their first known
documentation of the epidemic of 1616.14
Several days after this initial meeting, Samoset came back to Plymouth with
Squanto, ―a native of this place, who had been in England and could speak better English
than himself.‖ This was the same Squanto who had been kidnapped by Hunt in 1614 and
returned to New England with Captain Dermer in 1619. Having been in England when
the epidemic struck his home village, Squanto was ―the only surviving native of Patuxet.‖
Squanto arranged for a meeting between the colonists‘ leaders and the Pokanoket
principal sachem, Massasoit, who arrived with ―chief of his friends and other attendance‖
shortly thereafter. This meeting resulted in a diplomatic alliance between the colonists
and the Pokanoket, which was codified in a mutual defense treaty signed by both sides.
After Massasoit and his entourage left, Squanto remained with the colonists; indeed, until
his death in November 1622, he never left them. He not only served as their interpreter,
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but also ―directed them how to set their corn, where to take fish, and to procure other
commodities, and was also their pilot to bring them to unknown places.‖ Indeed, without
Squanto‘s assistance, it seems quite likely that the Plymouth colony would not have
survived. Recognizing his importance, Bradford called Squanto ―a special instrument sent
of God for [the colonists‘] good beyond their expectation.‖15
In July 1621, Squanto accompanied two colonists, Edward Winslow and Stephen
Hopkins, on a diplomatic mission ―to see their new friend Massasoit‖ in his village of
Sowams, some forty miles from Plymouth. It was on this journey that the colonists began
to fully appreciate the scale of the calamity that had befallen the natives before their
arrival. As Bradford later described it, Winslow and Hopkins found
the soil good and the people not many, being dead and abundantly wasted in the
late great mortality, which fell in all these parts about three years before the
coming of the English, wherein thousands of them died. They not being able to
bury one another; their skulls and bones were found in many places lying still
above ground where their houses and dwellings had been, a very sad spectacle to
behold.
In another account of this journey, the colonists described the devastation along the banks
of the Taunton River:
The ground is very good on both sides; it being for the most part cleared.
Thousands of men have lived there; which died in a great plague not long since:
and pity it was, and is, to see so many goodly fields, and so well seated, without
men to dress and manure the same.
Such grisly evidence of the epidemic‘s aftermath was still apparent when the merchant
Thomas Morton first arrived to New England in 1622. As Morton described it, native
carcasses
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were left for crows, kites, and vermin to prey upon. And the bones and skulls
upon the several places of their habitations, made such a spectacle after my
coming into those parts, that as I traveled in that forrest, near the Massachusetts, it
seemed to me a new found Golgotha.16
*
The skulls and bones littering the ground, like the untended fields dotting the
countryside, gave silent testimony to the scale of the demographic disaster that had
befallen New England‘s coastal natives. While it is impossible to precisely determine just
how many natives died, the writings of early European explorers and settlers convey
some impression of its impact. Before 1616, Samuel de Champlain and John Smith
described coastal New England as a densely settled region. But within a few years, most
of the villages they had seen no longer existed, their residents having either died or fled
elsewhere. Smith reported that the ―exceeding great plague‖ had reduced the native
population such that ―in some places there scarce remained five of a hundred,‖ and that
―where I have seene two or three hundred, within three yeares after remained scarce
thirty.‖ Smith also related an account that ―such a sicknesse came, that of five or six
hundred about the Massachusets there remained but thirty‖ (though he qualified this last
assertion by stating ―if this be not true in every particular, excuse me, I pray you, for I am
not the Author‖). Another numerical estimate of the natives‘ loss comes from Robert
Cushman, who came to visit Plymouth Colony in November 1621. In a sermon, Cushman
related that the epidemic ―hath so wasted [the natives], as I think the twentieth person is
scarce left alive.‖ Other reports on the epidemic‘s demographic impact came from
Puritan chroniclers, such as John White, who never personally visited New England, and
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Edward Johnson, who emigrated from England with John Winthrop‘s fleet in 1630.
According to White, the plague
swept away most of the Inhabitants all along the Sea coast, and in some
places utterly consumed man, woman, and childe, so that there is no
person left to lay claime to the soyle which they possessed; in most of the
rest, the Contagion hath scarce left alive one person of a hundred.
Johnson did not provide a numerical estimate of the natives‘ population loss, but his
account nonetheless painted a bleak demographic picture:
a little before the removeall of that Church of Christ from Holland
to Plimoth in New England, as the ancient Indians report, there befell a
great mortality among them, the greatest that ever the memory of Father to
Sonne tooke notice of, chiefly desolating those places, where the English
afterward planted.
Johnson went on to explain that ―[t]he Country of Pockanoky [Pokanoket] . . . was almost
wholly deserted, insomuch that the Neighbour Indians did abandon those places for feare
of death,‖ while the ―Abarginny-men‖ to their north, the Massachusett and Pawtucket,
―were greatly weakened.‖ Finally, Cotton Mather, writing several decades after the fact,
said this of the 1616 epidemic: ―The Indians in these parts had . . . been visited with such
a prodigious pestilence, as carried away not a tenth, but nine parts of ten (yea, ‗tis said,
nineteen of twenty) among them.‖17
For their part, modern scholars generally concur with these contemporary
estimates of the epidemic‘s demographic impact. Sherburne F. Cook, for example, has
determined that, after allowing for ―a certain degree of exaggeration‖ in the primary
17
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sources, about 75 percent of the Massachusett and Pokanoket populations died in the
epidemic. For those who are disinclined to believe such catastrophic mortality rates,
Cook points to Zaccheus Macy‘s account of Nantucket to illustrate the potential impact
of an epidemic disease on a previously unexposed population. Between August 16, 1763,
and February 16, 1764, ―an uncommon mortal distemper‖ led to the deaths of 222 of the
island‘s 358 natives—an overall mortality rate of 62 percent.18 This is not an extreme
example. In fact, the Nantucket experience represents a milder-than-average case,
considering that Dobyns has postulated a ―depopulation ratio of 20 to 1‖ throughout the
Americas following European contact.19 When viewed in this context, the 90 percent
depopulation rate that Smith and Mather suggest for the 1616 epidemic seems reasonable.
As in other Native American epidemics, various factors—including increased
mortality, decreased fertility, and migration—contributed to New England‘s calamitous
population loss in and after 1616. Certainly, many natives, lacking immunologic
experience with this Old World infection, died directly from the disease itself. In
addition, countless others must have died not of disease, but of starvation, in places
where not enough healthy people remained to procure food. In this regard, the ―antient
plantations, not long since populous now utterly void,‖ noted by Dermer, and the ―many
Sherburne F. Cook, ―The Significance of Disease in the Extinction of the New England
Indians,‖ Human Biology 45 (September 1973): 497-501; Zaccheus Macy, ―A Short Journal of
the First Settlement of the Island of Nantucket, with Some of the Most Remarkable Things That
Have Happened Since, to the Present Time,‖ Massachusetts Historical Society Collections 1st
ser., 3 (1792): 158-59. Because some Nantucket natives were not exposed to the disease, the
overall mortality rate of 62 percent understates the epidemic‘s true virulence. Of the island‘s 358
native inhabitants, sixty-six were not exposed. Of the 292 natives who were exposed, 256 (88
percent) became ill, and of these, 222 (87 percent) died.
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goodly fields, and so well seated, without men to dress and manure the same,‖ observed
by Hopkins and Winslow, represent both cause and consequence of the epidemic‘s
mortality. Even where food was available, many among the very old and very young
probably died of neglect if no healthy adults were left to care for them. Furthermore,
beyond increasing mortality, it is likely that the epidemic also induced population loss by
causing the native birth rate to decrease. Commenting on the ―general experience among
the native races of America,‖ Sherburne F. Cook notes, ―Not only disease but physical
dislocation and unrest . . . caused the Indian women throughout the hemisphere to resent
giving birth to more children. This reaction expressed itself frequently in abortion and
infanticide.‖ Of course, a dearth of healthy male adults could also adversely affect the
native birth rate. As Edward Johnson noted, the epidemic (which he called a ―sore
Consumption‖) was responsible for ―sweeping away whole Families, but chiefly yong
Men and Children, the very seeds of increase.‖ Finally, the epidemic was catastrophic
even for those who survived, and some population loss can be ascribed to the flight of
surviving natives from the region. According to anthropologist William Starna, epidemic
mortality was ―ramified into the post contact experiences of Indian people‖ throughout
the Americas:
The socialization process along with political organization became
disordered as high rates of death led to the loss of important community
leaders and knowledgeable and influential people. Routine tasks
associated with subsistence and the maintenance of settlements could not
be completed. Health care systems were strained, genealogical ties
severed, and technological knowledge lost.
In the most severely affected villages, kinship networks would have collapsed, and the
deaths of community leaders would have led to crises of authority. In many cases,
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survivors had little choice but to abandon their devastated communities and move
elsewhere.20
*
The question of what disease caused the New England epidemic of 1616 has
occupied scholars for nearly four centuries. Lacking definitive proof of its etiology,
researchers have suggested various infections as possible explanations for the epidemic.
Diseases that have received historiographical attention include five caused by viruses:
chickenpox, measles, hepatitis, smallpox, and yellow fever; and six caused by bacteria:
bubonic plague, epidemic relapsing fever, epidemic typhus, leptospirosis, meningococcal
infection (―epidemic meningitis‖), and typhoid fever. Most of these possibilities can be
summarily excluded because they could not have possibly caused the exceedingly high
mortality rates associated with the 1616 pestilence. Measles, chickenpox, and some types
of viral hepatitis are highly contagious, but none of these has been associated with
mortality rates exceeding 30 percent, even in previously unexposed (i.e., ―virgin soil‖)
populations. On the other hand, meningococcal infections result in death for most
infected persons (in the absence of antibiotic therapy), but even during epidemics these
do not affect more than 1 percent of a population. An epidemic of either typhoid fever or
leptospirosis might have killed roughly 10 percent of its victims, at most; moreover, such
extensive disease from either of these bacteria would have required widespread
contamination of water sources throughout coastal New England. The louse-borne
bacteria that cause typhus and relapsing fever have been responsible for epidemics with
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mortality rates of up to 40 percent, but such highly fatal epidemics have only occurred in
populations recently suffering from war or famine. As we have seen, the New England
natives were under no significant demographic stress before 1616, and thus it is difficult
to imagine that either typhus or relapsing fever could have killed enough natives to
account for the 90 percent depopulation observed in this epidemic. Indeed, of the
suggested possible etiologies of the 1616 epidemic, only three—bubonic plague, yellow
fever, and smallpox—could conceivably have caused such catastrophic population loss. 21
In the earliest accounts of the epidemic, Vines, Dermer, Winslow, and Morton all
described the disease as ―the plague.‖ Some modern scholars have interpreted these
references to ―plague‖ as evidence that the epidemic was caused by the disease now
called bubonic plague, a frequently fatal infection caused by the flea-borne bacterium
Yersinia pestis. It should be noted, however, that seventeenth-century writers also used
the term ―plague,‖ rather generically, to refer to any widespread epidemic disease with
21
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high mortality, and it seems likely that these early chroniclers intended this more general
definition when they wrote of the ―plague‖ of 1616. Semantics aside, the colonists were
presumably familiar with bubonic plague, which caused repeated epidemics in London
throughout the seventeenth century, including one that lasted from 1603 through 1611.
Thus it would seem likely that these Englishmen could recognize the signs and symptoms
of this disease and could correctly diagnose its victims. 22
Bubonic plague was certainly capable of causing widespread disease with
catastrophic mortality. Other epidemiological considerations, however, cast doubt on the
hypothesis that bubonic plague caused the 1616 New England epidemic. Various species
of burrowing rodents serve as the natural reservoir for Yersinia pestis, and these animals
show no ill effects from infection with the bacterium. Another rodent is closely
associated with human outbreaks of disease: the black rat, Rattus rattus. This ―so-called
‗domestic‘ rat,‖ which thrives on garbage and stored food in urban human communities,
is not a natural reservoir of the disease but plays a central role in its spread to humans.
Fleas, which are the principal vectors of Yersinia pestis, become infected by feeding on
infected rodents and can then transmit infection to other mammals, including humans.
Thus when plague spreads among the black rats in an urban community, human disease
quickly follows. Once bubonic plague has been established in a human population, the
infection can spread from person to person via infected respiratory droplets, causing the
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highly fatal form of the disease known as pneumonic plague. But black rats and fleas
must be present to introduce the disease into the community. 23
Rats and fleas were widely present in North America by the early seventeenth
century, but prevailing conditions in New England were hardly conducive to a bubonic
plague outbreak. According to Snow and Lanphear, ―the black rat was . . . unable to
compete with the now widespread brown rat when both were introduced to the
Americas.‖ And as Timothy Bratton notes, plague outbreaks required ―heavy
concentrations of rats, fleas, and people, preferably in garbage-strewn urban settings;
these conditions simply did not exist in precolonial New England.‖ Moreover, any black
rats that did successfully emigrate to the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries were almost certainly free from infection with Yersinia pestis, for they, like
humans, are susceptible to the ravages of plague. In the days of sail-based travel, only a
grim fate could have awaited any ship that embarked on a transatlantic crossing with
plague-infected black rats on board. Any infected rats would have sickened and died
within a matter of days; and their infected fleas would have abandoned their dying hosts,
transmitting disease to other rats and humans until no susceptible hosts remained aboard.
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As P. M. Ashburn notes, ―If plague broke out among the people on shipboard, it probably
resulted in the loss of the ship.‖ 24
Two final arguments may be leveled against the hypothesis that bubonic plague
caused the 1616 epidemic. If this disease had actually penetrated into New England in
precolonial times, we might reasonably expect that Yersinia pestis would have
established itself in local communities of burrowing rodents, as it has done elsewhere in
the world. This did not occur. Indeed, even today bubonic plague is unknown in eastern
North America. In contrast, plague has remained endemic among rodents of the western
United States ever since its introduction on the Pacific coast in the nineteenth century.
Finally, and perhaps most conclusively, bubonic plague was never a normal childhood
disease in Europe, and thus it remained highly fatal to Europeans and natives alike.
Before the advent of antibiotic therapy, Yersinia pestis killed about two-thirds of its
victims. Had Vines‘s men slept among the natives, and their rats and fleas, during a
bubonic plague epidemic, not only would their heads have ached, but several of them
would certainly have died. Thus bubonic plague is an unlikely cause of the 1616
epidemic. 25
Like bubonic plague, yellow fever is an insect-borne disease that can cause
epidemics capable of depopulating a region. The etiologic case for yellow fever as a
Snow and Lanphear, ―European Contact and Indian Depopulation,‖ 19; Bratton,
―Identity,‖ 369; McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 164-70; Ashburn, Ranks of Death, 227; Dobyns,
Their Number, 20. It was not until the advent of much faster, steam-powered oceanic
transportation in the late nineteenth century that plague-infected shipboard black rats could
survive long enough to disembark and transmit disease in distant seaports, allowing Yersinia
pestis to achieve a truly global distribution. Although Dobyns has postulated that a pandemic of
bubonic plague stretched from Mexico to New England from 1612 to 1619, it is rather difficult to
reconcile this claim with what is known about the disease‘s epidemiology.
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possible cause of the 1616 epidemic hinges principally on a single statement in Daniel
Gookin‘s chronicle. Writing of the epidemic some six decades after the fact, Gookin
claimed that he had ―discoursed with some old Indians, that were then youths; who say,
that the bodies all over were exceedingly yellow, describing it by a yellow garment they
showed me.‖ Several historians have assumed that in this statement, the natives were
describing jaundice, which is a yellowish coloration of the skin that indicates either liver
disease or a massive destruction of red blood cells. Noah Webster, for one, was
persuaded enough by Gookin‘s account to declare flatly that ―the pestilence was the true
American plague, called yellow fever.‖ 26
Epidemiological considerations, however, mitigate against Webster‘s hypothesis.
To be sure, jaundice and widespread mortality were hallmarks of yellow fever, which
caused terrifying summertime epidemics in New World port cities from the seventeenth
through twentieth centuries. But outside its evolutionary homeland in West Africa,
yellow fever only appeared in regions where the African slave trade had been established.
African slaves were first brought to the North American mainland in 1619, in the
Chesapeake region; none would arrive in New England until much later. Indeed, there is
no evidence of any American yellow fever epidemic until 1647, when the disease first
appeared on Barbados. The first recorded yellow fever epidemic in New England did not
occur until 1693. Moreover, when yellow fever did strike New England, it did so during
the warm months of the year. The Aedes aegypti mosquitoes that transmit this virus could
not have been active during the winter of 1616-17, when Vines observed that the natives
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―were sore afflicted with the plague.‖ Finally, it should be noted that Europeans were as
susceptible to yellow fever as were Native Americans. Had Vines‘s men visited New
England during a yellow fever epidemic, many of them certainly would have become ill
and some quite possibly would have died. Thus yellow fever could not have been
responsible for the 1616 epidemic. 27
With bubonic plague and yellow fever excluded, only smallpox remains a
plausible etiology for the 1616 epidemic. As it happens, this dreaded malady fits the
epidemiological requirements for causation nicely. Smallpox was caused by Variola
major, a highly contagious airborne virus that readily spread from person to person.
Unlike yellow fever or bubonic plague, smallpox was a strictly human disease and thus
did not require the presence of a suitable animal reservoir or insect vector. Variola was
ideally suited to cause disease following a transatlantic voyage, owing to the long
contagious period of its sufferers and its prolonged viability on environmental surfaces. If
smallpox broke out in a single individual on a transatlantic voyage, the virus could
remain alive and infectious in the affected person‘s scabs for several weeks, and on
clothing or blankets he or she had used for several months. Thus, unlike measles, which
faced death unless it could find a new susceptible host before its victim recovered or died,
Variola could board a ship in a single person in Europe and remain alive to cause disease
in the Americas.28
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When smallpox arrived in the New World, it flourished in the previously
unexposed aboriginal population. For even as it was a leading cause of death in
seventeenth-century Europe, smallpox was far more devastating in populations that had
not been previously exposed to the disease. In such ―virgin soil‖ populations, Variola
infection typically produced mortality rates ranging from 55 to 90 percent; in contrast, the
death rate among Europeans was about 15 percent. Moreover, smallpox not only killed
untold millions of Native Americans, but it often did so in spectacular fashion. Some
natives became ill very rapidly and died within a few hours of the onset of symptoms,
even before any rash had a chance to appear. Others suffered a universally lethal form of
the disease, malignant confluent smallpox, in which the characteristic fluid-filled blisters
merged into one another, with subsequent pus formation under the disrupted skin. This,
according to Oliver Wendell Holmes, is another potential explanation for Gookin‘s
comment about the affected natives‘ yellow skin: ―As for the yellowness like a garment,
that is too familiar to the eyes of all who have ever looked on the hideous mask of
confluent variola.‖29
During the seventeenth century most Europeans experienced smallpox as
children, and those that survived were henceforth immune to the disease. Thus it is not
surprising that early English explorers and migrants to New England, such as Vines and
his men, could visit the natives during a smallpox epidemic and emerge unscathed. The
natives, of course, were not so fortunate. After disseminating among the individuals in a
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village, smallpox could then spread, along trade networks, from village to village within,
and then between nations. Such a pattern of transmission is consistent with what was
observed in the 1616 epidemic, which decimated the Abenaki, Pawtucket, Massachusett,
and Pokanoket nations, which formed a regional trading network, but did not affect the
inland Narragansett or Pequot nations, whose inhabitants did not interact regularly with
the coastal natives. Clearly, trade between peoples offered myriad opportunities for the
propagation of a highly infectious virus, especially an airborne virus with a long
contagious period. Variola, of course, was just such a virus. 30
In 1674, Gookin summarized his musings on the causative agent of the 1616
plague thusly: ―What this disease was, that so generally and mortally swept away [the
natives] . . . I cannot well learn. Doubtless it was some pestilential disease.‖ Gookin‘s
comment remains cogent, for modern scholars are no more able to offer definitive proof
of the epidemic‘s etiology than he was. Nevertheless, the arguments favoring smallpox
are far more robust than are those for any other potential pathogen. Compared to the other
contenders, smallpox was better equipped to cross the Atlantic to New England, and once
there, to cause widespread disease with stunningly high mortality. It could spread in the
winter and would not cause significant disease among the English adventurers of this
early period. Considering smallpox as the most likely cause of the 1616 plague hardly
requires an intellectual leap of faith, for this virus was the leading killer of aboriginal
inhabitants across the Americas throughout the era of colonization. Gookin‘s description

Bratton, ―Identity,‖ 382. On the tendency of smallpox to follow trade routes, see, for
example, McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 130-31; and Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The
Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), chap. 5-8.
30

90

was apt, for smallpox indeed was a ―pestilential disease.‖ 31 And it was almost certainly
the cause of the 1616 New England epidemic.
*
Smallpox or otherwise, the 1616 epidemic triggered a variety of social, economic,
and political consequences for New England‘s native population. For one thing, the
widespread mortality and social disruption provoked a spiritual crisis among the
surviving natives, who found themselves utterly powerless in the face of a devastating
sickness that they could not comprehend. As Edward Johnson noted, neither their
medicine men nor their gods seemingly offered any relief:
Their Powwowes, which are their Doctors, working partly by Charmes,
and partly by Medicine, were much amazed to see their Wigwams lie full
of dead Corpes, and that now neither Squantam nor Abbamocho could
helpe, which are their good and bad God and also their Powwows
themselves were oft smitten with deaths stroke.
Understandably, fear was the dominant emotion among the natives. In 1621, Robert
Cushman noted that the Massachusett natives ―have their courage much abated, and their
countenance is dejected, and they seem a people affrighted.‖ According to Johnson,
―Howling and much lamentation was heard among the living [natives],‖ due to their
―being possest with great feare.‖ The epidemic‘s spiritual impact is perhaps best
illustrated in its effects on native burial rituals. Archaeological evidence indicates that
sometime in the early seventeenth century, natives around Massachusetts Bay ceased
burying goods with their deceased. Moreover, Bradford‘s and Morton‘s observations of
skulls and bones littering the ground suggest that, at least in some cases, natives had
neglected to bury their dead altogether. Morton knew that this was unusual, for
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―otherwise it is the custome of those Indian people, to bury their dead ceremoniously, and
carefully.‖ This abandonment of burial rituals could indicate that the epidemic had
destabilized native religious practices, lending support to Charles C. Mann‘s assertion
that the epidemic ―shattered the Wampanoag‘s sense that they lived in balance with an
intelligible world.‖ It is also possible, however, that the unburied skeletons simply
indicate that in some places the epidemic left no one alive to bury the dead. 32
Over time, the epidemic‘s impact could be discerned even in the land itself. Until
1616, the natives had actively managed the southern New England forest through the
judicious application of fire. As the Puritan chronicler William Wood noted,
the custome of the Indians to burne the wood . . . consumes all the
underwood, and rubbish, which otherwise would over grow the Country,
making it unpassable, and spoile their much affected hunting: so that by
this meanes in those places where the Indians inhabit, there is scarce a
bush or bramble, or any combersome underwood to bee seene in the more
champion ground.
When the Pilgrims first explored the woods around Plymouth, they saw the effects of the
natives‘ forest management. Bradford and Winslow, for example, noted that ―though the
country be wild . . . yet the trees stand not thick, but a man may well ride a horse amongst
them.‖ This was possible not because the trees naturally grew that way, but rather, as the
environmental historian William Cronon describes, because native burnings eliminated
small woody shrubs and bushes, as well as any fallen trees. Meanwhile, the chestnut, oak,
and hickory trees that dominated southern New England forests ―suffered little more than
charred bark if subjected to ground fires of short duration.‖ Burning the undergrowth did
more than simply facilitate travel through the woods. According to Cronon, the fires also
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―increased the rate at which forest nutrients were recycled into the soil,‖ protected the
larger trees from various pests and plant diseases, and, by removing smaller trees,
allowed more sunlight to reach the ground. The ecological upshot of these changes can be
capitulated in a phenomenon called the ―edge effect‖:
By encouraging the growth of extensive regions which resembled the boundary
areas between forests and grasslands, Indians created ideal habitats for a host of
wildlife species. . . . Indian burning promoted the increase of exactly those species
whose abundance so impressed English colonists: elk, deer, beaver, hare,
porcupine, turkey, quail, ruffed grouse, and so on. When these populations
increased, so did the carnivorous eagles, hawks, lynxes, foxes, and wolves.
Summarizing the impact of the natives‘ forest management, Cronon writes, ―Indians who
hunted game animals were not just taking the ‗unplanted bounties of nature‘; in an
important sense, they were harvesting a foodstuff which they had consciously been
instrumental in creating.‖33
In the plague‘s aftermath, however, no one was left to attend to the forest. The
woods, no longer cleared by regular burnings, slowly became congested with
undergrowth. Writing in the early 1630s, Wood noted that ―where the Indians dyed of the
Plague some foureteene yeares agoe, is much underwood . . . because it hath not beene
burned,‖ and that in some areas, the forest had become ―unusefull and troublesome to
travell thorow . . . because it teares and rents the cloathes of them that passe.‖ As the
forest reverted to its natural state, it could no longer support the large animal populations
that the natives‘ husbandry had fostered. These changes were gradual, and some of the
long-term effects would not be apparent for decades. In the 1630s, Cronon notes, ―the
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animals that had relied on the Indians to maintain their edge habitats were still abundant
beyond English belief, but in many areas the edges were beginning to return to forest.‖
The loss of edge habitats, combined with the effects of overhunting and competition from
English livestock, led to the disappearance of the wild turkey from eastern Massachusetts
by the end of the seventeenth century, along with sharp reductions in the white-tailed
deer and other game animals. The loss of these fauna, in turn, reduced the natives‘ variety
of dietary protein sources and forced them to consider alternatives to animal skins for
their clothing. The natives continued to hunt, but now they did so primarily to obtain
beaver and other fur pelts that they could trade for European fabrics, which ―were lighter
and more colorful than animal skins and nearly as warm.‖ At one trading post in the
1650s, Cronon notes, ―Indian transactions for textiles outnumbered transactions for metal
goods more than fivefold.‖ Eventually, European fabrics replaced animal skins as the
principal components of native attire. For the natives, this change not only signified a
departure from their traditional cultural practices, but also demonstrated their new
reliance on European trade to provide them with the principal necessities of life, such as
clothing. Thus the loss of edge habitats, itself a consequence of the 1616 epidemic,
indirectly facilitated the integration of the New England natives into the larger economy
of the Atlantic world.34
*
Beyond its demographic, social, and economic effects, the epidemic also
portended significant political ramifications for the region‘s surviving natives. Because it
did not affect all parts of New England equally, the epidemic caused radical shifts in the
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balance of power among New England‘s indigenous nations. The plague spread along the
coast from southern Maine to the eastern and northern shores of Narragansett Bay, never
extending, in John White‘s words, ―above twenty or thirty miles up into the land.‖ Thus
while it wreaked havoc on the coastal Pawtucket, Massachusett, and Pokanoket nations, it
never penetrated the interior regions inhabited by the powerful Narragansett. As Bradford
later explained, the coastal natives, looking across Narragansett Bay from the east, could
see that ―the Narragansetts lived but on the other side of that great bay, and were a strong
people, and many in number, living compact together, and had not been at all touched
with this wasting plague.‖ The coastal nations thus not only faced the problems of death
and social disruption within their own ranks, but they also confronted an inland enemy
that had escaped the epidemic essentially unscathed. Exerting their new relative strength,
the Narragansett laid claim to Pokanoket territory at the head of Narragansett Bay and
forced the principal Pokanoket sachem, Massasoit, to humble himself before them. As
Roger Williams later reported, Massasoit acknowledged his subordinate status to the
Narragansett, but ―affirmed that he was not subjected by war . . . but God, he said,
subdued me by a plague, which swept away my people, and forced me to yield.‖ 35 Thus
the epidemic had seemingly set the stage for the Narragansett to establish political
hegemony over southern New England. But then the Mayflower arrived, and everything
changed forever.

Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 102, 105-6; Cook, ―Significance of Disease,‖ 48991; Spiess and Spiess, ―New England Pandemic,‖ 77; White, Planters' Plea, 25; Bradford, Of
Plymouth Plantation, 87; Roger Williams, ―Testimony of Roger Williams Relative to the
Purchase of Lands at Seekonk and Providence‖ (1661), in Bartlett, Letters of Roger Williams,
316-17.
35

95

Although his people had suffered mightily, Massasoit managed to emerge from
the epidemic as the single most powerful Pokanoket sachem. Now, in the spring of 1621,
he must have looked on the fifty-three surviving English colonists settling into Squanto‘s
former village of Patuxet with a certain degree of ambivalence. New England‘s natives
had long enjoyed trading with Europeans, but they had never shown much tolerance for
allowing them to settle in the region. In the wake of the 1616 epidemic, however,
everything was different. With the coast now relatively depopulated, the colony at
Plymouth stood a better chance of surviving than had previous colonial projects. Even so,
although the epidemic had severely weakened the Pokanoket, it had not destroyed them.
Rather, it was the colonists whose existence in New England hung by a slender thread in
early 1621. The Pokanoket still fumed over Hunt‘s kidnapping of twenty-seven local
natives in 1614, and they were still powerful enough to eradicate the Pilgrims‘ fledgling
settlement. The colonists, suffering from disease and starvation such that ―the living were
scarce able to bury the dead, and the well not in any measure sufficient to tend the sick,‖
could hardly have resisted a coordinated native assault. Indeed, they knew this. Cushman
wrote that ―when we came first into the country, we were few, and many of us were sick,
and many died by reason of the cold and wet.‖ While they had ―not six able persons
among us,‖ the natives ―came daily to us by hundreds . . . and might in one hour have
made a dispatch of us.‖ Winslow similarly noted that ―if God had let them loose, they
might easily have swallowed us up; scarce[ly] being a handful in comparison of those
forces they might have gathered together against us.‖ As the colonists later learned, at
least some natives strongly considered doing just this. Bradford wrote that before the
Pokanoket ―came to the English to make friendship, they got all the Powachs [medicine
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men] of the country, for three days together, in a horrid and devilish manner, to curse and
execrate [the colonists] with their conjurations, which assembly and service they held in a
dark and dismal swamp.‖ At this point, had Massasoit simply given the word, Plymouth
might well have gone the way of Sagadahoc and become just another ―lost colony,‖ a
footnote in history. 36
Massasoit had more to consider, however, than the threat posed by the Plymouth
colonists on the coast; he also faced the specter of subjugation by the Narragansett on his
western flank. In a sense, he had to decide which was the lesser of two evils: conquest by
the Narragansett or an alliance with the English. He chose the latter. Instead of
eradicating the colonists, he formed a military pact with them. Instead of allowing them
to starve, he sent Squanto to teach them how to plant corn and otherwise procure food in
the wilderness. Massasoit did not do these things purely out of a spirit of friendship, as
has often been assumed. Rather, these were calculated decisions that were intended to
optimize the Pokanoket‘s position in the new political milieu of post-epidemic New
England. The Treaty of Plymouth, signed in March 1621, benefitted both the Pokanoket
and the Plymouth colonists, at least in the short run. Both sides agreed, among other
things, to assist the other should either be attacked by a third party. Clearly, Massasoit
wanted the colonists‘ firepower on his side in the event of war with the Narragansett. The
colonists, for their part, had no illusions as to why Massasoit desired a military alliance.
As Bradford noted, ―We cannot yet conceive but that he is willing to have peace with us.
. . . And especially because he hath a potent adversary, the Narragansetts that are at war
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with him: against whom, he thinks, we may be some strength to him; for our pieces are
terrible unto them.‖37
The Pokanoket alliance with the Plymouth colonists, born out of political
expediency, achieved Massasoit‘s objective of preventing his people‘s subjugation by the
Narragansett. Canonicus, the chief sachem of the Narragansett, recognized the new
political calculus of southern New England and was less than pleased. In January 1622,
Canonicus sent a messenger to Plymouth to deliver ―a bundle of new arrows lapped in a
rattlesnake‘s skin.‖ As Squanto explained to the colonists, ―to send the rattlesnake‘s skin,
in that manner, imported enmity; and that it was no better than a challenge.‖ Bradford
was not naïve; he understood that the Narragansett wished ―to domineer and lord it over‖
the Pokanoket, and that now they ―conceived the English would be a bar in their way, and
saw that Massasoit took shelter already under [the colonists‘] wings.‖ Refusing to be
intimidated, Bradford responded in kind: he ―stuffed the skin with powder and shot; and
sent it back.‖ Canonicus was reportedly horrified by this reply, ―insomuch as he would
not touch the powder and shot, or suffer it to stay in his house or country.‖ Bradford‘s
message was unmistakable: if the Narragansett wanted war, the English would be ready
for them.38
In the short run, Massasoit‘s gambit proved successful. The Pokanoket-Plymouth
alliance allowed Massasoit to retain his sovereignty and kept the Narragansett sphere of
influence confined to the western side of Narragansett Bay. Nevertheless, Massasoit‘s
decision to ally with the colonists had disastrous long-term consequences for all of New
37
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England‘s natives, including the Pokanoket. Massasoit could have sent warriors to drive
the colonists away, or he simply could have allowed them to starve to death. Instead, he
assisted them, and in so doing, helped to ensure their survival. This was the pivotal
turning point in the colonization of New England. The epidemic of 1616 had not only
cleared space for the Mayflower’s passengers to settle, but it had also created political
conditions that facilitated their survival. After decades of failed attempts, the English
finally had a beachhead in northeastern North America. Now, there would be no turning
back.
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Chapter 4
―A land, which none useth‖:
English Expansion, Native Disease, and Smallpox in the ―City on a hill,‖ 1621-1634
[W]hen I seriously consider of things, I cannot but think that God hath a purpose
to give that land, as an inheritance, to our nation. And great pity it were, that it
should long lie in so desolate a state; considering it agreeth so well with the
constitution of our bodies: being both fertile; and so temperate, for heat and cold,
as, in that respect, one can scarce distinguish New England from Old.
—Edward Winslow1
Thanks largely to Squanto‘s assistance, the Plymouth colonists reaped a bountiful
harvest of ―Indian corn‖ in the fall of 1621. Edward Winslow described the celebration
that followed:
Our harvest being gotten in, our Governor sent four men on fowling; that so we
might, after a more special manner, rejoice together, after we had gathered the
fruit of our labours. They four, in one day, killed as much fowl as, with a little
help besides, served the Company almost a week. At which time, amongst other
recreations, we exercised our Arms; many of the Indians coming amongst us.
And, amongst the rest, their greatest King, Massasoyt, with some ninety men;
whom, for three days, we entertained and feasted. And they went out, and killed
five deer: which they brought to the Plantation; and bestowed on our Governor,
and upon the Captain, and others.
This, of course, was the festival that modern Americans now commemorate as the first
―Thanksgiving,‖ a term bestowed upon the event by later generations of Americans. As
Winslow later noted, the Plymouth colonists indeed had reason to be thankful: ―How few,
weak, and raw were we at our first beginning, and there settling; and in the midst of
barbarous enemies! Yet God wrought our peace for us.‖2
The Mayflower’s passengers would not be the only English settlers in New
England for long. Soon after their harvest feast, the English ship Fortune landed in
1

Winslow, ―Good News from New England,‖ 581.

Bradford and Winslow, ―Relation, or Journal,‖ 489; Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation,
90n8; Winslow, Good News from New England, 581.
2

100

Plymouth Bay with ―a new Supply of thirty-five persons.‖ These, however, were more of
a burden than a reinforcement, as ―they neither brought arms, nor other provisions with
them, but wholly relied on us.‖ Over the ensuing winter, while the colonists exhausted
their ―store of victuals,‖ they started to hear whispers that several native villages were
conspiring to strike against them. By the summer of 1622, Winslow noted, ―The Indians
began again to cast forth many insulting speeches; glorying in our weakness, and giving
out how easy it would be ere long to cut us off.‖ Thus the colonists set to work fortifying
their town.3
In late June, Plymouth‘s situation was further undermined by the arrival of two
English ships with ―some fifty or sixty men‖ sent over by Thomas Weston. These men
were of no help to the Plymouth colonists; instead, as Winslow noted, ―The little store of
corn we had, was exceedingly wasted by the unjust and dishonest walking of these
strangers.‖ Weston‘s men sailed on and established their own colony at Wessagusset, in
Massachusetts Bay. Before long, relations between the new settlement and the local
natives soured. According to Winslow, ―They had not been long gone from us, ere the
Indians filled our ears with clamours against them; for stealing their corn, and other
abuses conceived by them.‖4
As the English established themselves in Masachusetts, epidemic diseases
continued to sporadically erupt among the remaining coastal natives. Phineas Pratt, one
of the Wessagusset settlers, noted that even while Weston‘s men ―made haste to settle our
plantation . . . . there was a great plague among the savages, and . . . half their people
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died thereof.‖ The Plymouth colonists made similar observations as they traversed the
region trading for corn. In November 1622, Winslow remarked that in the villages around
Massachusetts Bay, ―they found a great sickness to be amongst the Indians; not unlike the
plague, if not the same.‖ Later that winter, the colonists saw that disease had struck the
native village of Nemasket. This was notable chiefly for the inconvenience it caused, for
the corn purchased at Nemasket ―was brought home partly by Indian women: but a great
sickness arising amongst them, our own men were inforced to fetch home the rest.‖ But
while the widespread disease was remarkable, the illnesses of two individual Pokanoket
natives were particularly important to Plymouth. The first of these was Squanto, who in
November 1622 ―fell sick of an Indian fever, bleeding much at the nose . . . and within a
few days died . . . of whom we had a great loss.‖5 The other was the chief Pokanoket
sachem, Massasoit.
In March 1623, Plymouth‘s leaders learned that Massasoit had fallen dangerously
ill and ―was like[ly] to die.‖ Immediately, Winslow organized a party of colonists to
travel to the sachem‘s village of Sowams. There they found that Massasoit was indeed
very sick; Winslow noted that he had ―understanding left, but his sight was wholly gone.‖
Though he confessed to ―being unaccustomed and unacquainted in such business,‖
Winslow proceeded to nurse Massasoit back to health. First, he served the sachem ―a
confection of many comfortable conserves,‖ which, on his knife, he ―could scarce get
through his teeth.‖ This was the first substance Massasoit had swallowed in two days.
Then Winslow ―washed his mouth, and scraped his tongue; and got abundance of
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corruption out of the same‖ and then ―gave him more of the confection; which he
swallowed with more readiness.‖ Massasoit responded nicely: ―Within half an hour, this
wrought a great alteration in him, in the eyes of all that beheld him. Presently after, his
sight began to come to him: which gave him and us good encouragement.‖ Winslow then
served the sachem a broth of ―broken corn,‖ strawberry leaves, and sassafras root ―which
he drank; and liked very well. After this, his sight mended more and more: also he had
three moderate stools; and took some rest.‖ While the sachem recovered, Winslow then
went ―amongst those that were sick in the town‖ to wash their mouths and serve them
broth, as he had done for Massasoit. The success of these ministrations duly impressed
the Pokanoket. While Winslow ―blessed God, for giving his blessing to such raw and
ignorant means: making no doubt of [Massasoit‘s] recovery,‖ the sachem acknowledged
the colonists as ―the Instruments of his preservation.‖ Upon regaining his health,
Massasoit declared, ―Now I see the English are my friends, and love me: and whilst I
live, I will never forget this kindness they have shewed me.‖ 6
Winslow‘s efforts on behalf of Massasoit further cemented the alliance between
Plymouth and the Pokanoket—a development which, in turn, portended further political
consequences for the region. For as Massasoit recuperated from his illness, he also
confirmed the colonists‘ fears of a ―plot of the Massachusetts . . . against Master
Weston‘s colony; and so against us.‖ Massasoit told Winslow that native bands across
New England, including ―the people of Nauset, Paomet, Succonet, Mattachiest,
Agowayam, and the Isle of Capawack were joined‖ with the Massachusett in a scheme to
eradicate the English settlements at Plymouth and Wessagusett. For his part, Massasoit
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claimed that although he had been ―earnestly solicited‖ to join the conspiracy, he had
refused to participate. The Pokanoket sachem now advised the colonists ―to kill the men
of Massachusett; who were the authors of this intended mischief.‖ 7
Winslow returned to Plymouth to discuss Massasoit‘s revelations with the other
colonial leaders. As it turned out, Bradford had also heard rumors of the impending
native conspiracy from another local sachem. Plymouth‘s leaders realized that Weston‘s
men had brought trouble upon themselves, for by the end of February 1623, ―they had
spent all their bread and corn, not leaving any for seed,‖ and they had taken to robbing
natives‘ corn stores to satisfy their immediate needs. Bradford had previously cautioned
the Wessagusett men against using violence to obtain corn from the natives, noting that
the Plymouth settlers ―were enforced to live on groundnuts, clams, mussels, and such
other things as naturally the country afforded, and which did, and would, maintain
strength, and were easy to be gotten.‖ Apparently, this advice had been ignored, and now
the Massachusett natives had ―concluded to ruinate Master Weston‘s Colony: and
thought themselves, being about thirty or forty men, strong enough to execute the same.‖
But the Massachusetts‘ principal sachem, Wituwamat, had delayed his strike against
Wessagusset
till such time as they had gathered more strength to themselves, to make their
party good against us at Plymouth; concluding that if we remained, (though they
had no other arguments to use against us), yet we would never leave the death of
our countrymen unrevenged; and therefore their safety could not be, without the
overthrow of both Plantations.
Wituwamat was, in Winslow‘s words, ―a notable and insulting villain,‖ but he was
absolutely correct in this regard. Their low opinions of the Wessagusset settlers
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notwithstanding, Plymouth‘s leaders would not leave them to whatever fate Wituwamat
might design for them. As Winslow grimly concluded, ―we knew no means to deliver our
countrymen and preserve ourselves, than by returning [the natives‘] malicious and cruel
purposes upon their own heads.‖ And that was precisely what the colonists did. 8
Miles Standish, Plymouth‘s military commander, organized a party of eight
Englishmen to ―to take [the natives] in such traps as they lay for others.‖ At Wessagusset,
Standish and three other colonists managed to trap four Massachusett natives, including
Wituwamat, in a room. The colonists killed three of the natives with knives and had the
fourth, Wituwamat‘s brother, hanged. Standish then ―sent word to another Company, that
had intelligence of things, to kill those Indian men that were amongst them. These killed
two more.‖ The colonists then ―went to another place; where they killed another.‖ Thus,
in less than a day, Standish had killed or ordered the deaths of seven Massachusett
natives. Weston‘s colony was disbanded; some of the settlers traveled to Monhegan to
gain passage back to England, while some others were taken to Plymouth. Standish and
his men returned to Plymouth with Wituwamat‘s head, which they posted outside the fort
―that it might be a warning and terror to all of that disposition.‖ Upon viewing the
sachem‘s head, a Massachusett native who had been held captive at Plymouth ―confessed
the plot.‖ Standish then sent the captive to Obtakiest, another truculent Massachusett
sachem, to deliver this message:
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That, for our parts, it never entered into our hearts to take such a course with [the
Massachusett], till their own treachery enforced us thereunto; and therefore [they]
might thank themselves for their own overthrow. Yet, since he had begun; if
again, by any [of] the like courses, [Obtakiest] did provoke him, his country
should not hold him; for [Standish] would never suffer him, or his, to rest in
peace, till he had utterly consumed them; and therefore [Obtakiest] should take
this as a warning.
Standish‘s brazen attack, and his warning of additional violence should the Massachusett
further ―provoke him,‖ sent shock waves through the region. Local natives were horrified
to see how the colonists lashed out violently, not to mention preemptively, in response to
a perceived threat to their countrymen, even those that they didn‘t particularly like. The
―sudden and unexpected execution‖ of Wituwamat and his confederates left the natives
―so terrified and amazed,‖ Winslow wrote, that ―they forsook their houses, running to and
fro like men distracted, living in swamps and other desert places.‖ 9
Compounding the natives‘ difficulties, the raid on Wessagusset was immediately
followed by a new round of disease outbreaks in native villages around Massachusetts
Bay. As Winslow put it, the natives had ―brought manifold diseases amongst themselves,
whereof very many are dead . . . . And certainly it is strange to hear how many of late
have [died], and still daily die amongst them.‖ Among the dead, significantly, were the
sachems of Manomet, Nauset, and Mattachiest. To the natives, it must have seemed as
though the English had the ability to unleash epidemic diseases upon opponents at their
will. In fact, Squanto had already convinced many local natives that this was indeed the
case, having told them that the Plymouth colonists ―had the plague buried in our
Storehouse: which, at our pleasure, we could send forth to what place or people we
would, and destroy them therewith, though we stirred not from home.‖ When
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Hobbamock, one of Squanto‘s confederates, later asked whether this was true, Winslow
answered, ―No. But the God of the English had it in store: and could send it at his
pleasure; to the destruction of his and our enemies.‖ If anything, this explanation may
have been even more unsettling to Hobbamock, for certainly it must have seemed as if
the colonists were drawing assistance from a powerful supernatural force. Before he died,
the sachem of Mattachiest reportedly said that the ―God of the English was offended with
[the natives]; and would destroy them in his anger.‖ The continued disease epidemics
seemingly proved that this English god could severely punish natives who opposed the
colonists‘ presence in New England—even while he spared the life of their friend and
supporter, Massasoit. As the dying sachem‘s comment indicates, epidemic diseases
continued to transform the spiritual landscape of New England in the years following
Plymouth‘s establishment.10
The continued effects of epidemic diseases also contributed to fundamental
changes in the natives‘ economic world in the years following Standish‘s raid. In 1623,
Winslow noted that the natives around Massachusetts Bay had been so weakened that
they ―set little or no corn, which is the staff of life; and without which, they cannot long
preserve health and strength.‖ The colonists, meanwhile, were becoming more adept at
growing corn and began to enjoy bountiful harvests. By 1624, they had, Bradford wrote,
―with a great deal of patience overcome hunger and famine.‖ By the middle of the
decade, Plymouth was growing so much corn that it was not only self-sufficient, but had
begun exporting it to regional native groups. In 1625, for example, they traded ―a boat‘s
load of corn‖ to the Abenaki in exchange for ―700 pounds of beaver, besides some other
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furs.‖ Squanto was gone, but his assistance had paid a sizeable dividend. Plymouth,
which had once depended on native corn supplies to avoid starvation, was now a net food
exporter.11
Seeking to extend its economic hegemony over the region, Plymouth opened a
trading post to its south, at the native village of Manomet (on the Manomet River, near
the entrance to Buzzard‘s Bay), and another to its north, at the mouth of the Kennebec
River (at the site of present-day Augusta, Maine). With the post at Manomet, the
colonists gained direct access to Narragansett Bay, and the rest of the southern coast of
New England, without the need to sail over the dangerous shoals off Cape Cod. In
seeking to expand their influence into this region, the Plymouth colonists inevitably came
into contact with the Dutch of New Netherland, who from their base at Fort Orange on
the Hudson sought to control trade along both coasts of Long Island Sound. From the
Dutch, the Plymouth colonists first learned of wampum, strings of small beads made
from the purple and white seashells that the southern coast offered in abundance.
Wampum had long been used by natives throughout the northeast for a variety of
ceremonial purposes, but after the influx of Dutch traders into the Hudson River region in
the preceding decade it had evolved into a commodity of exchange. Specifically,
wampum provided the Pequot and Narragansett with a currency that could be traded for
furs from inland natives or for European goods from Dutch traders. As Neal Salisbury
explains, Dutch intervention in native exchange networks in and around the Hudson
River valley eventually precipitated a ―wampum revolution,‖ which by the late 1620s had
spread into the northeastern interior:
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By the end of the decade [the Dutch] were purchasing large quantities of
wampum, which they exchanged for furs at Fort Orange, their post on the
Hudson. By offering it among their trade items, they drew Indians form as far
away as the St. Lawrence, whose French traders had no access to the treasured
beads. The wampum revolution pervaded native culture to the extent that, by the
late 1620s, Indians on both sides of Long Island Sound had made the manufacture
of wampum their principal winter activity.
The opportunistic Plymouth colonists realized that they could extend this ―wampum
revolution‖ to areas within their own trading sphere, where it had not yet penetrated. At
first, the process was slow; Bradford reported that after the colonists first purchased £50
worth of wampum, ―it was two years before they could put off this small quantity.‖ But
once it caught on, the natives ―could scarce ever get enough for them, for many years
together.‖ As wampum became the preferred medium of exchange along the
Massachusetts coast, Plymouth was able to ―cut off [the natives‘] trade quite from the
fishermen, and in great part from other of the straggling planters‖ who had recently
arrived in New England. Thus Plymouth‘s ability to acquire and control the flow of
wampum in its trading sphere enhanced its status as the region‘s economic juggernaut. 12
The 1620s, then, were a decade of ascendancy for Plymouth. Thanks to
immigration and natural increase, the colony had grown from a struggling band of fiftythree settlers in 1621 to a thriving community of nearly fifteen hundred inhabitants in
1630. Throughout this decade, the English failed to exert any significant influence in the
interior and coastal regions west of Narragansett Bay, where the Dutch-allied
Narragansett and Pequot held sway. But to Plymouth‘s north, in the area around
Massachusetts Bay, things unfolded differently. There, as early as 1623 it became
12
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apparent to the natives that Plymouth was willing to intervene, using military force if
necessary, to protect its perceived regional interests. And while the English grew in
strength and numbers, epidemic diseases continued to wreak havoc upon the natives
around Massachusetts Bay. Consequently, during the 1620s Plymouth came to dominate
the politics, culture, and economy of the New England coast from Cape Cod to the
Kennebec River. Moreover, English migrants to the region kept coming, and those who
did not settle in Plymouth built homes and planted fields elsewhere within the colony‘s
zone of influence. By the middle of the decade there were, according to Salisbury, ―about
a hundred English residents scattered along the coast between the colony and its
Kennebec outpost,‖ and nascent communities had been established at the present-day
locations of Quincy, Salem, and Portsmouth.13 By this time, it must have been abundantly
clear to the natives that the English, and their dreadful diseases, were not going away. In
fact, they were just getting started.
*
For many people living in Great Britain, the prospect of migration to America
looked more promising than ever at the end of the 1620s. This had been a difficult decade
in England, one marked by poor harvests, economic depression, and periodic resurgences
of bubonic plague. Conditions were particularly hard in Kent and East Anglia, where
small producers, tradesmen, artisans, and tenants found themselves increasingly unable to
achieve financial independence for themselves and their families in the unstable market
economy of early modern Europe. Many of these people, in the southeast and elsewhere
in England, found a spiritual outlet for their frustrations in the burgeoning Puritan
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movement. As Salisbury has noted, those attracted to Puritanism tended to view their
tenuous economic status ―in terms of a profound sense of sin in the world[,] which they
sought to separate themselves from and to contain.‖ Indeed, when English Puritans
looked at the state of their country in the 1620s, they saw a nation doomed by its spiritual
transgressions. They particularly objected to the persistence of apparently Catholic rites
and ceremonies in the Anglican Church, which they saw as both corrupt and morally
bankrupt. Moreover, as historian Alan Taylor explains, the Puritans ―depicted England as
awash in thieves, drunks, idlers, prostitutes, and blasphemers,‖ and they ―blamed the
unruly and the indolent—and indulgent authorities—for all the social and economic
troubles of the realm.‖ For these sins, the Puritan leader John Winthrop was convinced
that ―God will bringe some heavye Affliction upon this lande, and that speedylye.‖
Indeed, Winthrop seemed ready to welcome God‘s impending punishment, which would
―be a meanes to mortifie this bodye of corruption, which is a thousand tymes more
dangerous to us then any outward tribulation.‖ At the same time, however, he held out a
ray of hope for his fellow Puritans, noting that ―[i]f the Lord seeth it wilbe good for us, he
will provide a shelter and a hidinge place for us and others, as a Zoar for Lott, Sarephtah
for his prophet, etc.: if not, yet he will not forsake us.‖14
There could not have been much question that New England offered the ―shelter
and hiding place‖ that Winthrop envisioned for his fellow Puritans. In New England the
saints would be free to practice their brand of strict Calvinism, unfettered by the
harassment of blaspheming Anglican clergymen and politicians. Indeed, they could build
14
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upon the spiritual groundwork that had already been laid, in large measure, by their
Pilgrim brethren who had migrated there a decade earlier. Perhaps equally important,
New England offered land in abundance, and thus economic opportunity, to those who
were willing to work for it. John White, a Dorchester clergyman and chief architect of the
Puritan emigration to America, argued that this land would have a spiritually cleansing
effect upon his followers. For White considered it
evident to any man . . . that the husbanding of unmanured grounds, and shifting
into empty Lands, enforceth men to frugalitie, and quickneth invention . . . and
the taking of large Countreys presents a natural remedy against covetousnesse,
fraud, and violence; when every man may enjoy enough without wrong or injury
to his neighbour.
Furthermore, the saints‘ religious mission justified, at least in their minds, their taking of
this land from its native inhabitants. For example, Robert Cushman had invoked Biblical
references in asserting English claims to this ―spacious land, the way to which is through
the sea‖:
Their land is spacious and void, and there are few [natives]: and [they] do but run
over the grass, as do also the foxes and wild beasts. They are not industrious:
neither have art, science, skill, or faculty to use either the land, or the
commodities of it; but all spoils, rots, and is marred, for want of manuring,
gathering, ordering, etc. . . . [S]o is it lawful now to take a land, which none useth;
and [to] make use of it.
Cushman did not mention that the paucity of native inhabitants, and their consequent
inability to use the land, were the results of their decimation by infectious diseases. His
point of emphasis was simply that ―the land lay idle and waste,‖ and that therefore the
English were acting within their natural rights to ―take a land, which none useth.‖ 15
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Thus to many Puritans, the contrast in circumstances on either side of the Atlantic
could not have been sharper. England was overcrowded, economically depressed, and,
owing to the sinful behavior of its populace, doomed to suffer God‘s wrath. New
England, on the other hand, offered abundant land that was theirs for the taking. Viewing
matters in this context, it is not surprising that many English Puritans came to view
emigration to New England as an ideal solution to their economic and spiritual troubles.
The process started in 1628, when White secured a charter from Charles I granting his
Massachusetts Bay Company rights to establish settlements and govern territories in New
England. That same year, White sent John Endecott to assume the governorship of Salem,
which was then a small community of ―not much above fiftie or sixtie persons.‖ The next
year, the first wave of Puritan settlers arrived in Salem, in five ships carrying ―about three
hundred persons . . . with a convenient proportion of other Beasts.‖ Then the floodgates
opened. In1630, nearly a thousand Puritans emigrated to Massachusetts Bay. Over the
next three years, three thousand more arrived. The Great Migration, which would bring
more than twenty thousand English settlers to New England by the end of the 1630s, had
begun. 16
The massive influx of Puritan immigrants in the early 1630s transformed the
region around Massachusetts Bay in several important ways. For one thing, the thriving
new city of Boston eclipsed Plymouth as the epicenter of political, cultural, and economic
activity in New England. Meanwhile, the few hundred or so remaining Massachusett and
Pawtucket natives, who had already been drawn into the Plymouth‘s economic sphere in
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the 1620s, now found themselves vastly outnumbered by the English settlers who started
building homes and planting fields on what had once been their land. The region‘s
spiritual landscape also changed, as English Calvinism supplanted the ancient native
religions to become the dominant belief system around Massachusetts Bay. John
Winthrop, the longtime governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, articulated his vision
of the godly community the saints would build in New England in his sermon, ―A Modell
of Christian Charity‖:
Thus stands the case between God and us. We are entered into a Covenant with
Him for this work. . . . For this end, we must be knit together, in this work, as one
man. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply
of other‘s necessities. . . . So shall we keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of
peace. . . . For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a hill. The eyes of
all people are upon us.
In their quest to realize Winthrop‘s vision of building ―a City upon a hill,‖ the Puritans
brought more than their Calvinist faith to New England; they also brought their families.
The Great Migration differed from previous European relocations to North America not
only in its sheer magnitude, but in the large number of young children that were involved.
Before the 1630s, most immigrants to the New World were over seven years old and
therefore had probably already survived bouts with smallpox and several other European
childhood infections. But the Puritans brought vast numbers of young children to New
England—and in so doing, they inadvertently launched another wave of infection across
the Northeast.17
*
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The Great Migration provided smallpox with an unparalleled opportunity to travel
from Europe to New England. With so many families crossing the Atlantic
simultaneously, large numbers of susceptible children were clustered together aboard
ships. Thus if smallpox broke out in just one child during the crossing, it could readily
spread to any of several other previously uninfected children on board. This marked a
stark contrast with the earlier period, when virtually everyone aboard ships crossing the
Atlantic had experienced smallpox as a child and was therefore immune to the disease.
Then, the survival of the smallpox virus on a transatlantic voyage depended on the
unlikely occurrence of it finding multiple susceptible shipboard persons or, more
probably, on its ability to remain viable on the clothes or linens of infected persons who
survived. Now, with so many young, previously uninfected children aboard ships, the
odds of the virus surviving the crossing dramatically improved. Another factor that
favored smallpox‘s transmission to the New World was the faster speed with which ships
crossed the Atlantic by the end of the 1620s. Whereas the Mayflower had made the
passage from England to Cape Cod in sixty-five days, a voyage in 1630 required only
―six weeks and three days,‖ a reduction of over 30 percent. Thus in the 1630s smallpox
had more susceptible hosts available to infect aboard ships that could cross the Atlantic in
roughly two-thirds the time the Mayflower did. 18
Sure enough, smallpox broke out among Puritan migrants to New England from
the first years of the Great Migration. On May 17, 1629, Francis Higginson, aboard the
Talbot, reported that ―my two children, Samuel and Mary, began to be sick of the small
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pox . . . which was brought into the ship by one Mr. Browne, which was sick of the same
at Gravesend; whom it pleased God to make the first occasion of bringing that contagious
sickness among us, wherewith many were after afflicted.‖ Mary died two days later. On
June 1, Higginson further reported that ―some of our men fell sick of the scurvy, and
others of the small pox, which more and more increased; yet, thanks be to God, none died
of it but my own child.‖ Another migrant, writing to his father in England, described his
harrowing voyage in 1630: ―We were wonderful sick, as we came at sea, with the small
pox. No man thought that I and my little child would have lived. My boy is lame and my
girl too, and there died in the ship that I came in 14 persons.‖ When these and other
disease-stricken vessels arrived in Massachusetts Bay, infection rapidly spread among
persons on shore. Describing conditions in Salem in 1629, Bradford wrote that ―by
infection that grew amonge the passengers at sea, it spread also among them ashore, of
which many died, some of the scurvy, other of an infectious fever which continued some
time amongst them, though our people [in Plymouth] through God‘s goodness escaped
it.‖ During the summer of 1630, Plymouth received further word of pestilence among the
Massachusetts Bay colonists. One letter, ―from the Governor Mr. John Winthrop,‖
reported ―the hand of God to be upon them and against them at Charlestown, in visiting
them with sickness, and taking divers from amongst them, not sparing the righteous but
partaking with the wicked in these bodily judgments.‖ In another letter, Samuel Fuller
reported, ―The sad news here is that many are sick and many are dead, the Lord in mercy
look upon them.‖19
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Despite the importation of European diseases, the English population in
Massachusetts Bay exploded in the 1630s. By 1634, the Bay Colony had grown to
include some 4,000 inhabitants; in 1638, its population numbered 11,000.20 The
occasional intrusion of smallpox was ―sad news,‖ to be sure, but for the colonists it was
of only trivial demographic significance. For the natives, however, it was a different
story.
*
As we have seen, from 1616 to 1623 repeated waves of epidemic disease afflicted
native populations along the New England coast from Cape Cod to Maine. Then, after
1623, the natives seem to have been largely spared further devastation from infectious
disease for the ensuing ten years. Doubtless occasional outbreaks must have occurred in
some native villages during this period, just as they did among the colonists, but none
were deemed significant enough to deserve mention in the journals of Bradford,
Winslow, or Winthrop. Considering the biology of infectious diseases, the absence of
large-scale native epidemics in coastal New England for most of the 1620s is not
surprising. Epidemics cannot be sustained without large numbers of susceptible
individuals, and by 1624 most coastal natives had either been killed in the epidemics of
1616-23 or had suffered disease and recovered. Of course, this did not mean that the
native population was permanently immune to further disease outbreaks. After enough
new susceptible individuals were added, either through birth or immigration, the coastal
natives would again be ripe for widespread destruction by a European pathogen. Even
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more significantly, areas of New England west of the English colonies were densely
inhabited with natives who had not been affected in the epidemic waves of 1616-23.
Despite their occasional contacts with the English and frequent interactions with Dutch
traders, the Narragansett and Pequot had managed to remain free from the effects of
European diseases for two decades. Thus by the early 1630s, southern New England
contained a recovering coastal native population, which was increasingly susceptible to
new disease outbreaks, and a thriving inland population that had no prior experience with
European diseases. Taken as a whole, the New England native population was more
vulnerable than ever to the devastating effects of European diseases. With so many
English children coming into the region, it was only a matter of time before smallpox
would spread to the natives. When that finally happened in 1633, it ran through them like
wildfire.
During the summer of 1633, Bradford wrote, ―an infectious fever‖ broke out
among the Plymouth colonists, ―of which many fell very sick and upward of 20 persons
died,‖ including their physician, Samuel Fuller. Though Bradford did not specify the
cause of the colonists‘ illness, both its considerable death toll and subsequent events
strongly suggest that it was smallpox. In any event, ―towards winter it pleased the Lord
the sickness ceased.‖ At least, it ceased for the colonists; the natives were not so
fortunate. Bradford specifically linked the illness in Plymouth to the calamitous epidemic
that subsequently broke out among the region‘s natives, stating, ―This disease also swept
away many of the Indians from all the places near adjoining.‖ The pestilence quickly
spread through the natives along the coast, recapitulating the disaster of 1616. In a
November journal entry, Winthrop tersely summarized the natives‘ situation: ―A great
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mortality among the Indians. Chickatobot, the sagamore of Naponsett, died, and many of
his people. The disease was the smallpox.‖ He subsequently noted that ―[t]his infectious
disease spread to Pascataquack [the Piscataqua River, near modern Portsmouth], where
all the Indians (except one or two) died.‖ In a December entry Winthrop noted that two
Pawtucket sachems, who were friendly toward the colonists and had adopted English
names, had died in the epidemic: ―John Sagamore died of the small pox, and almost all
his people; (above thirty buried by Mr. Maverick of Winesemett in one day). . . . James
Sagamore of Sagus died also, and most of his folks.‖21
By winter smallpox had spread to the interior of New England, where the
pestilence flourished among the immunologically naïve Narragansett. A party of
Massachusetts Bay colonists, dispatched to the Connecticut valley in November, returned
in January with this report:
They informed us, that the small pox was gone as far as any Indian plantation was
known to the west, and much people dead of it, by reason whereof they could
have no trade. At Narragansett, by the Indians‘ report, there died seven hundred;
but, beyond Pascataquack, none to the eastward.
As was true in the 1616-19 epidemic, not all of these native deaths were directly
attributable to smallpox itself; for starvation, dehydration, and cold also contributed to the
natives‘ mortality. As Bradford noted:
The condition of this people was so lamentable and they fell down so generally of
this disease as they were in the end not able to help one another; no not to make a
fire nor to fetch a little water to drink, nor any to bury the dead. But would strive
as long as they could, and when they could procure no other means to make fire,
they would burn the wooden trays and dishes they ate their meat in, and their very
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bows and arrows. And some would crawl out on all fours to get a little water, and
sometimes die by the way and not be able to get in again.22
Struck by the natives‘ suffering, many colonists were moved to offer what
assistance they could. According to Bradford,
those of the English house, though at first they were afraid of the infection, yet
seeing their woeful and sad condition and hearing their pitiful cries and
lamentations, they had compassion of them, and daily fetched them wood and
water and made them fires, got them victuals whilst they lived; and buried them
when they died.
Winthrop claimed that some natives ―were cured by such means as they had from us.‖
Usually, however, the colonists‘ ministrations were futile. As Bradford noted, ―very few
of [the natives] escaped, notwithstanding [the English] did what they could for them to
the hazard of themselves.‖ Many colonists also intervened on the natives‘ behalf by
taking in children whose parents had died in the epidemic. Unfortunately, as Winthrop
noted, these orphans were far from safe in English homes: ―Such of the Indians‘ children
as were left alive were taken by the English, most whereof did die of the small pox soon
after.‖ Though their actions were usually ineffective, Bradford believed that the natives
appreciated the colonists‘ attempts to render assistance. As he put it, ―this mercy which
[the colonists] showed them was kindly taken, and thankfully acknowledged of all the
Indians that knew or heard of the same.‖23
If the natives were impressed by the colonists‘ generosity on their behalf, they
must have been amazed by their apparent lack of vulnerability to smallpox. While the
natives perished in droves, the disease was far less damaging to the colonists. Bradford
claimed that ―not one of the English was so much as sick or in the least measure tainted
22
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with this disease,‖ despite their frequent close contact with the ill natives ―for many
weeks together.‖ The true extent of disease among the English was certainly greater than
Bradford claimed, especially if the twenty deaths at Plymouth in 1633 are included. In
addition, Winthrop reported that a young boy had ―died of the small pox which are very
rife at Newtowne.‖ Nonetheless, Bradford‘s overly sanguine assessment reflected a larger
point that was obvious to anyone living in New England at the time: compared to the
natives, the English were largely spared from the disastrous consequences of smallpox.
Bradford‘s explanation of this phenomenon was, not surprisingly, that the colonists were
protected ―by the marvelous goodness and providence of God.‖ Indeed, the colonists‘
relative immunity to disease, along with their good works on behalf of the natives,
underscored the apparent omnipotence of the English God, who was clearly in control of
events in New England. This was enough to lead some natives to cast their spiritual lots
with the English. For example, Winthrop reported that when the Pawtucket sachem John
Sagamore became ill, he ―desired to be brought among the English, (so he was;) and
promised (if he recovered) to live with the English and serve their God.‖ Sagamore did
not recover, but he ―died in a persuasion that he should go to the Englishmen‘s God.‖
And in the epidemic‘s wake, Sagamore‘s conversion was just one of many among the
region‘s natives:
Divers of them, in their sickness, confessed that the Englishmen‘s God was a
good God; and that, if they recovered, they would serve him. It wrought much
with them, that when their own people forsook them, yet the English came daily
and ministered to them; and yet few, only two families, took any infection by it.
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Thus the 1633-34 smallpox epidemic contributed to the larger spiritual trend, underway
in New England since the early 1620s, toward the dominance of English Puritanism over
traditional native beliefs.24
Just as Puritanism was the ascendant spiritual power in New England in the
1630s, so smallpox was the region‘s dominant biological force. The 1633-34 epidemic
decimated natives throughout New England, erasing any population recovery along the
coast and depleting heretofore unscathed populations in the interior. The precise
demographic impact of the 1633-34 epidemic is difficult to quantify, but it was certainly
a major component of the overall native population collapse in the first half of the
seventeenth century. According to Snow‘s estimates, the total New England native
population fell from 126,700 persons in the first decade of the seventeenth century to just
12,570 by the middle decade of that century—a decline of 90 percent. Impressive as this
might seem, it was only part of a much larger story, for in the 1630s smallpox did not
remain confined to New England. Within a year it had spread west of the Hudson River.
In December 1634, a Dutch trader reported that in the Mohawk fortress at Onekagoncka,
―a good many of the savages here in the castle died of smallpox.‖ At another Mohawk
village in January 1635, this same reporter noted that ―more than forty fathoms of seawan
[money] were divided among [the natives] as the last will of the savages that died of the
smallpox.‖ Smallpox was no less destructive to the Mohawk than it had been to the New
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England natives. Snow‘s analysis of archaeological evidence, for example, ―indicates that
the Mohawk population declined by 63% in less than a year.‖25
After decimating the Mohawk, smallpox subsequently broke out among the other
nations of the Iroquois confederacy and then spread to the Huron, Ottawa, and other
tribes across throughout the Northeast in a series of destructive outbreaks that lasted until
the early 1640s. In describing the situation at Huronia in 1637, a Jesuit correspondent
wrote that ―hardly one of the savages escaped last year the infection of a certain plague,
by which very many were destroyed.‖ Similar scenes of devastation doubtless littered the
landscape in a vast triangle stretching from New England to the Great Lakes and the St.
Lawrence River. Whether all of these outbreaks can be directly linked to the 1633-34
epidemic in New England is unclear, for it is possible that smallpox was introduced to the
Northeast on multiple occasions in the 1630s. As Sherburne F. Cook has noted,
Intercommunication between New England and both the Hudson and St.
Lawrence River valleys was sufficiently free and copious to account for the rapid
extension of the disease. On the other hand it is very difficult to find the necessary
documentation for a point-to-point dating of the spread of the epidemic. 26
In the final analysis, determining the exact sequence by which smallpox spread across
northeastern North America is less important than assessing the impact of the disease.
What is clear is that by the middle of the seventeenth century, European epidemic
diseases had transformed the Northeast, winnowing the land of native inhabitants and
preparing it for subsequent invasion and colonization by English, Dutch, and French
Snow and Lanphear, ―European Contact and Indian Depopulation,‖ 24; ―Narrative of a
Journey into the Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-1635,‖ in Narratives of New Netherland,
1609-1664, ed. J. Franklin Jameson (New York: Scribner‘s Sons, 1909), 141, 156; Dean R.
Snow, ―Michrochronology and Demographic Evidence Relating to the Size of Pre-Columbian
North American Indian Populations,‖ Science 268 (June 16, 1995): 1601-4.
25

26

Jean de Brébeuf to Mutius Vitelleschi, 1636, in Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 11:9; Cook,
―Significance of Disease,‖ 492-93.

123

settlers. Throughout the region, no native groups were spared. But perhaps none were so
gravely affected as the Pequot.
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Chapter 5
―They die like rotten sheep‖: Pox, Puritans, and Pequot, 1633-1637
Sometimes the scripture declareth women and children must perish with their
parents. Sometimes the case alters; but we will not dispute it now. We had
sufficient light from the word of God for our proceedings.
—Captain John Underhill1
Throughout the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the Pequot were firmly
established as the dominant political and economic entity in what is now the state of
Connecticut. The epidemics that caused so much death from Cape Cod to the Kennebec
River between 1616 and 1623 never reached the southern coast of New England, perhaps
because the Pequot, like the Narragansett to their east, did not participate in the trade
networks that ostensibly spread disease among the Pokanoket, Massachusett, Pawtucket,
and Abenaki. And just as the Narragansett sought to dominate the region around
Massachusetts Bay, the Pequot extended their own control over neighboring native
groups, including wampum-producing natives on both shores of Long Island Sound. By
the 1620s, wampum had become the key to the Pequots‘ dominance: they extracted it
from coastal natives as tribute and traded it to agents of the Dutch West India Company
(WIC) in exchange for European goods, including the metal drills that enabled mass
wampum production and the metal arrowheads that facilitated the Pequots‘ subjugation
of their neighbors. The Dutch, in turn, traded this wampum to other northeastern natives,
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including those of the Iroquois confederacy, for the prized furs that European markets
demanded. 2
Backed by their trading alliance with the Dutch, and facing no substantial
opposition from surrounding native groups, the Pequot were the economic and political
juggernaut of the southern coast of New England in the 1620s. The growth of Plymouth
was of some concern, but the English colonists did not pose any real threat at the time. In
the 1620s, Plymouth‘s zone of influence was limited to areas where natives had been
winnowed by epidemic disease; it certainly did not extend to the region now known as
Connecticut. For one thing, the English could not effectively challenge the far more
numerous Pequot. Furthermore, the English were powerless to restrict the activities of
Dutch traders and settlers on and east of the Hudson, in part because James I ―needed [the
Netherlands] as an independent power in mainland Europe to occupy the more dangerous
Spanish.‖ Indeed, relations between Plymouth and New Netherland were cordial, if not
downright friendly, during this early period. It was the Dutch, for example, who
introduced wampum to the English in 1627. 3
The political and economic stability of Pequot-dominated southern New England,
which characterized the 1620s, began to unravel in the early 1630s. For one thing, the
rapid growth of the Massachusetts Bay colony represented a threat far beyond that posed
by Plymouth in the preceding decade. The arrival of so many Puritan families placed
immense pressure upon the agriculturally useful land around the bay, and consequently
2
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English families sought to build their homes and plow their fields increasingly further
inland. In particular, they came to covet the fertile land of the Connecticut River valley,
which lay in the heart of territory controlled by the Pequot. Some of this valley‘s native
inhabitants, displeased with their subjugation by the Pequot, recognized that the growing
English population presented an opportunity to undermine the Pequots‘ hegemony over
the region. Bradford noted that ―a company of banished Indians, that were driven out
from [the Connecticut] by the potency of the Pequots . . . often solicited [the English] to
go thither and they should have much trade.‖ Winthrop‘s journal provides details of one
proposed native scheme—and also of the colonists‘ skeptical response. In 1631,
Wahginnacut, a sagamore upon the River Quonehtacut . . . brought a letter to the
governor from Mr. Endecott to this effect: That the said Wahginnacut was very
desirous to have some Englishmen come plant in his country, and offered to find
them corn, and give them yearly eighty skins of beaver, and that the country was
very fruitful, etc., and wished that there might be two men sent with him to see
the country. The governor entertained them at dinner, but would send none with
him. He discovered after, that the said sagamore is a very treacherous man, and at
war with the Pekoath (a far greater sagamore).
Also in the early 1630s, the Pequot faced an insurrection from the Mohegan, a closely
related people that ―grew so great and proud that upon hunting they quarelled with the
Pequots.‖ The Pequot responded to the Mohegan challenge by driving the leading
Mohegan sachems into exile; they found refuge with the Narragansett. Meanwhile the
Narragansett sensed an opportunity to expand their own trade prospects at the expense of
the Pequot. Acting quickly, the Narragansett made peace with the Massachusett natives
and English, then launched their own war against the Pequot.4
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By the early 1630s, then, the Pequot found themselves in a precarious political
and military situation. Not only were they at war with the Narragansett, but they also had
to suppress uprisings by the Mohegan and other tributaries, even while they sought to
keep the land-hungry English out of the Connecticut valley. To make matters worse, they
soon learned that their alliance with the Dutch, while useful for purposes of trade, did
nothing to enhance their security. For one thing, the total Dutch population in the region
was rather small, numbering only around three hundred individuals, for New Netherland
had not experienced anything resembling the population growth of the English in
Plymouth or Massachusetts Bay. Emigration from the Netherlands had been slow, and
many Dutch emigrants became disenchanted with the colony‘s governance and returned
to their homeland in the early 1630s. Furthermore, as subsequent events would show, the
Dutch were less interested in promoting Pequot ambitions than they were in expanding
their own trade prospects. This became evident after the WIC, with Pequot approval,
opened a fortified trading house on the Connecticut River (near present-day Hartford) in
June 1633. The Dutch named their post Good Hope—a rather ironic choice, as it turned
out, for Dutch hopes conflicted with those of the Pequot. The WIC envisioned Good
Hope as a place where the Dutch could trade freely with various native groups, including
not only the Pequot, but the Narragansett and their tributaries as well. 5 The Pequot,
meanwhile, sought to maintain their monopoly on the Dutch trade, and they were willing
to use violence to enforce it.
Soon after Good Hope opened, Pequot warriors attacked and killed a group of
natives coming to trade at the fort. Just who the victims were is uncertain, but they
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certainly did not belong to the Pequot or any of their tributaries. The Dutch traders at
Good Hope were furious, and they resolved to punish the Pequot. Accordingly, a
contingent of WIC personnel kidnapped the Pequot principal sachem, Tatobem, and
demanded a bushel of wampum in exchange for his release. After the ransom was paid,
they killed Tatobem anyway. In retaliation, the Pequot might have launched an all-out
assault on the Dutch and eradicated Good Hope, but they did not; in keeping with native
custom, their reprisal was limited. To avenge Tatobem‘s death, a group of Pequot
warriors attacked and killed the crew of a trading vessel on the Connecticut River.
Apparently the warriors did not realize that the captain of the vessel, John Stone, and his
crew were not Dutch, but English. The Pequot may have believed that Stone‘s murder
was justified, given his history of kidnapping two natives on the Connecticut, despite
their mistake in assessing his national identity. Nor does it seem that the loss of Stone, a
noted smuggler and privateer, prompted any substantial mourning among the English.
Still, this murder did nothing to enhance the Pequot‘s standing with the English—or the
Dutch, for that matter. Indeed, by this point relations with the WIC had soured
completely. Bradford reported that when a party of Pequot attempted to reopen trade at
Good Hope, ―it was not long before a quarrel fell between the Dutch and them.‖
Subsequently, the fort‘s inhabitants ―slew the chief sachem with the shot of a murderer
[cannon].‖ Now the Dutch, erstwhile allies of the Pequot, were responsible for the deaths
of two Pequot sachems. Amazingly, in the space of just a few years the Pequot had
managed to alienate not only their own tributaries, including the Mohegan, but also the
Narragansett and both European powers in New England. 6
Cave, Pequot War, 58-60; Meuwese, ―Dutch Connection,‖ 313-15; Bradford, Of
Plymouth Plantation, 269-70.
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Faced by hostile adversaries on multiple fronts, and having lost their valued
European trading partner, the Pequot were in an unenviable position in late 1633. Still,
they remained a powerful and proud people, and their problems, though appreciable,
probably did not seem insurmountable. In their internecine wars, they sought to obtain
and maintain control over tribute-paying villages and to expand opportunities to trade
with other natives and Europeans. These were important objectives, but it was not as
though their very existence was at stake. But then smallpox struck, and suddenly the
Pequots‘ world began falling apart.
*
In September 1633, Plymouth opened its own trading post on the Connecticut
River, upstream from Good Hope. From this vantage point the colonists had a firsthand
view of the devastation smallpox wrought upon the Pequot nation during the winter and
spring of 1633-34. In relating ―some strange and remarkable passages . . . in the River of
Connecticut,‖ Bradford described in gruesome detail how the natives ―died most
miserably‖:
For usually they that have this disease have them in abundance, and for want of
bedding and linen and other helps they fall into a lamentable condition, as they lie
on their hard mats, the pox breaking and mattering and running one into another,
their skin cleaving by reason thereof to the matts they lie on. When they turn
them, a whole side will flay off at once as it were, and they will be all of a gore
blood, most fearful to behold. And then being very sore, what with cold and other
distempers, they die like rotten sheep.
At one village, Bradford reported, ―it pleased God to visit these Indians with a great
sickness and such a mortality that of a thousand, above nine and a half hundred of them
died, and many of them did rot above ground for want of burial.‖ Indeed, with so many
natives dying ―like rotten sheep,‖ the Connecticut Valley must have resembled a
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slaughterhouse. As it spread across southern New England, smallpox decimated the
Pequot. By the spring of 1634, they had lost between 80 and 90 percent of their
population.7
In the wake of the epidemic, the Pequots‘ political and diplomatic tribulations
took on new dimensions. The Narragansett, despite having suffered greatly in the
epidemic themselves, continued their war against the Pequot. By 1634, the Pequot had
lost control over much of the Connecticut Valley, as several villages once in their orbit
defected to the Narragansett sphere. As Neal Salisbury notes, ―while Tatobem had
alienated many of the Pequot allies, his son and successor, Sassacus, was unable to hold
together even those that were nominally Pequot.‖ Sassacus was not his father‘s equal, but
poor leadership was only part of the reason for the Pequots‘ loss of dominance in the
valley. Devastated by smallpox, the Pequot‘s military strength was only a fraction of
what it had been in the summer of 1633. Given this circumstance, even a strong leader
would have been hard pressed to keep the Pequot tributaries under control. 8
Sassacus was in a difficult position. He knew that if he could not maintain order
in what was nominally Pequot territory and provide his remaining people with access to
European goods, he would likely be deposed from his position as their principal sachem.
Even worse, the Pequot nation itself faced the prospect of subjugation by the
Narragansett. In this regard, the Pequot‘s situation was remarkably similar to that of the
Pokanoket following the epidemic of 1616-19. And like Massasoit a dozen years earlier,
Sassacus turned to the one party in New England powerful enough to protect his people
7
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from the Narragansett: the English. In November 1634, Pequot envoys arrived in
Massachusetts Bay bearing a gift of wampum and seeking to establish an alliance with
the colonists. The English, for their part, understood the Pequots‘ situation perfectly. As
Winthrop noted,
The reason why they desired our friendship was, because they were now in war
with the Narragansetts . . . and likewise with the Dutch, who had killed their old
sachem and some other of their men . . . and by these occasions, they could not
trade safe any where. Therefore they desired us to send a pinnace with cloth, and
we should have all their trade.
Sassacus wanted more than just a trade partnership with the Puritans, however.
According to Winthrop, his ambassadors ―offered us also all their right at Connecticut,
and to further us what they could, if we would settle a plantation there.‖ Such an offer
would have been inconceivable just a year earlier. Now, with the Pequot destabilized by
the epidemic and weighed down by internecine struggles, Sassacus saw English
intervention as his last, best hope for defending his nation. 9
Unlike Massasoit in 1621, however, Sassacus could not negotiate from a position
of relative strength in 1634, for the English did not need the Pequot as much as the
Pequot needed the English. The Puritans sensed weakness in the Pequots‘ offer of
friendship, and they accordingly drove a hard bargain. The English demanded that the
Pequot ―deliver us the two men, who were guilty of Capt. Stone‘s death . . . ; to yield up
Connecticut; to give us four hundred fathom of wampompeage, and forty beaver and otter
skins.‖ If the Pequot would do these things, the colonists ―should presently send a
pinnace with cloth to trade with them, and so should be at peace with them, and as friends
to trade with them, but not to defend them, etc.‖ This last clause is important, for it
9
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indicates that while the Massachusetts Bay colonists were willing to trade with the
Pequot, they had no intention of intervening in their military struggles against the
Narragansett, Mohegan, or Dutch. In any event, the Pequot leadership viewed the English
terms for establishing a trade agreement as egregiously high. Sassacus had wanted a
strategic partnership with the English; what he received instead was, in essence, an
invitation to become a tributary to Massachusetts Bay. This he would not accept, any
more than he would tolerate subjugation by the Narragansett. In March 1635, the Bay
colony, intending to keep its end of the agreement, sent a pinnace up the Connecticut to
trade with the Pequot. Once there, however, the colonists ―put off but little commodity,
and found [the Pequot] a very false people, so as they mean to have no more to do with
them.‖ The Pequot would have neither a military alliance nor a trade partnership with the
English. Sassacus and his beleaguered people were on their own.10
With no European ally to lean upon, and beset with their own problems, the
Pequot were now powerless to keep the land-hungry English colonists out of the
Connecticut River valley. As Bradford noted, the Bay colonists, ―hearing of the fame of
the Connecticut River, had a hankering mind after it . . . [;] and now understanding that
the Indians were swept away with the late great mortality . . . they began to prosecute it
with great eagerness.‖ Residents of Newton, Roxbury, Watertown, and Dorchester were
particularly dissatisfied with their agricultural prospects in the Bay colony and
desperately sought access to the valley‘s fertile meadows. Winthrop was disinclined to
allow his colonists to migrate westward, as he feared that such a move ―should expose
them to evident peril, both from the Dutch . . . and from the Indians.‖ Winthrop also
Winthrop, Journal, 1:140; Meuwese, ―Dutch Connection,‖ 317; Cave, Pequot War, 7172; Winthrop to Bradford, March 12, 1635, in Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 291-92.
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believed that those who would move to Connecticut ―ought not to depart from us, being
knit to us in one body, and bound by oath to seek the welfare of this commonwealth,‖ for,
as he put it, ―The removing of a candlestick is a great judgment, which is to be avoided.‖
But the lure of the valley‘s rich soil proved ineluctable, and in the spring of 1635 the
Massachusetts General Court reluctantly authorized emigration into the valley. Soon
thereafter, a contingent of Dorchester families packed up and settled on the land around
Plymouth‘s trading house on the Connecticut River. In July, Jonathan Brewster, the fort‘s
commander noted, ―The Massachusetts men are coming almost daily, some by water and
some by land.‖ These colonists, who had purchased their titles to the land from Mohegan
and other former Pequot tributary sachems, organized themselves into the town of
Windsor. Similarly, residents of Watertown purchased titles to their Connecticut River
settlement, which became the town of Wethersfield, from another disaffected River
Indian sachem. Further upriver, in what is now southern Massachusetts, a group of
Roxbury inhabitants founded the town of Springfield in 1635. Then, in May 1636,
Winthrop noted in his journal that ―Mr. Hooker, pastor of the church at Newton, and most
of his congregation, went to Connecticut. His wife was carried in a horse litter; and they
drove one hundred and sixty cattle, and fed of their milk by the way.‖ Hooker and his
flock settled between Wethersfield and Windsor, establishing the town of Hartford. 11
While migrants from the Bay colony occupied portions of the upper Connecticut
River valley, another party of Puritan settlers from England built a coastal settlement,
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which they called Fort Saybrook, at the river‘s mouth on Long Island Sound. Led by John
Winthrop, Jr., son of the Bay colony‘s governor, the Saybrook colonists came equipped
with a patent from the earl of Warwick granting them sovereignty over the Connecticut
river and adjoining territories. Indeed, Saybrook‘s jurisdiction extended northward to
include the upriver communities at Wethersfield, Hartford, and Windsor. To gain legal
title to their lands, the upriver settlers accepted Winthrop, Jr. as governor of all of
Connecticut. In exchange, the younger Winthrop agreed to allow the Massachusetts Bay
emigrants to settle on lands included within the Warwick patent. This agreement received
legal sanction from the Massachusetts General Court, which on March 3, 1636 granted
commission ―to severall persons, to govern the people at Connecticutt.‖ In reality,
however, the governor at Fort Saybrook had little control over events upstream. As
Francis Jennings has wryly noted, Connecticut thus ―presented the curious spectacle of a
substantial colony upriver, pretending to have a governor, and a fortified governor
downstream, pretending to have a colony.‖ 12
Intricacies of colonial politics notwithstanding, the burgeoning English presence
throughout the Connecticut River valley increased pressure on both the Dutch and the
Pequot. By 1636, the small contingent of Dutch traders at Good Hope was encircled by a
vastly larger number of English settlers. But the biggest losers in the struggle for control
over Connecticut were unquestionably the Pequot, who found themselves increasingly
constrained in a vise between English interlopers and their native rivals. The Mohegan
sachem Uncas, for example, aroused English anxieties by spreading rumors of an
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impending Pequot attack on English settlements in Connecticut. Such reports received
serious attention from colonial authorities, for given the Pequots‘ precarious situation in
1636, it certainly seemed plausible that they might ―out of desperate madnesse . . . sett
both upon Indians and Englishmen jointly.‖ Nonetheless, there is no credible evidence
that the Pequot actually planned to launch a preemptive strike against the English in
1636. As historian Alfred A. Cave has noted,
Despite Uncas‘s story, there were no verified incidents of Pequot aggression
against the English after their visit to Boston in 1634. They took no advantage of
the many opportunities they had to strike at English trading parties and settlers on
the isolated trails leading into the Connecticut valley, nor did they actually
interfere with commerce on the river. . . . If one discounts rumors and stories
spread by nervous Englishmen and by Indians hostile to Sassacus, it would appear
that the Pequots had honored fully their promise concerning English occupation
of Connecticut.
Uncas further undermined Pequot-English relations by reporting to Puritan authorities
that the murder of John Stone had not been a case of mistaken nationality, as Pequot
leaders had claimed, but an organized plot engineered by none other than Sassacus
himself. Like his warnings of an imminent Pequot attack, it is impossible to know
whether Uncas‘s claims regarding Stone‘s murder were actually true. It seems clear,
however, that in relaying these reports to the English, Uncas sought primarily to advance
his own people‘s drive for independence from Pequot hegemony. 13
Uncas‘s machinations contributed to a steady decline in relations between the
Pequot and English throughout 1636. In July, Henry Vane, governor of the Bay colony,
ordered Winthrop, Jr. to meet with Pequot leaders to demand that they turn over Stone‘s
murderers and the wampum payment specified in the 1634 Boston agreement. Winthrop,
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Jr. was also instructed to ask the Pequot what role, if any, they played in the murder of
two Englishmen on Long Island and in an allegedly planned attack on a Plymouth trading
bark. ―Of all these things,‖ Vane wrote,
we desire you to take the relation from their owne mouths, and to informe us
particularly of their severall answers: giving them to understand that it is not the
manner of the English to take revenge of injury untill the partys that are guilty
have beene called to answer fairely for themselves.
Finally, Vane concluded, if the Pequot ―shall not give you satisfaction according to these
our instructions, or shall bee found guilty of any of the sayd murthers, and will not
delivver the actours in them into our hands,‖ then Winthrop should ―declare to them that
we hold ourselves free from any league or peace with them, and shall revenge the blood
of our countrymen as occasion shall serve.‖ In other words, the Pequot were to comply or
face the prospect of an English war. Pequot representatives did meet with colonial leaders
at Saybrook in July, but little is known of what was concluded there. What is known is
that shortly after this meeting, the younger Winthrop fled Saybrook, leaving Lieutenant
Lion Gardener to deal with the colony‘s increasingly deteriorating situation with regard
to the Pequot. A subsequent trade mission, led by the younger John Winthrop‘s brother
Stephen, ended abortively when the Saybrook colonists suspected that they were being
drawn into a Pequot ambush. Reflecting on this latest development, Gardener ―saw [the
Pequot] plotted our destruction‖ and concluded ―I durst not trust them.‖ Doubtless many
of his compatriots harbored similar feelings. 14
*
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It was against this backdrop of deteriorating English-Pequot relations that the
murder of another Englishman brought matters to a crisis. The body of John Oldham, ―a
member of Watertown congregation, who had been long out a trading,‖ was discovered
in his trading bark off Block Island ―stark naked, his head cleft to the brains, and his
hands and legs cut off.‖ Colonial leaders quickly ascertained that Oldham‘s killers were
Narragansett, not Pequot. Upon questioning a native captured on Oldham‘s bark, ―we
found that all the sachems of the Narragansett, except [principal sachems] Canonicus and
Miantunnomoh, were the contrivers of Mr. Oldham‘s death; and the occasion was,
because he went to make peace with the Pekods last year.‖ Subsequently, Roger Williams
wrote to Vane that his own investigations had revealed that at least three natives involved
in the killing were Narragansett sachems, while at least two others ―were hired by the
sachem of Niantick,‖ a Narragansett tributary. Gardener, moreover, reported seeing
physical evidence linking the Narragansett to Oldham‘s murder:
The Narragansets that were at Block-Island killed him, and had £50 of gold of his,
for I saw it when he had five pieces of me, and put it up into a clout and tied it up
all together, when he went away from me to Block Island; but the Narragansets
had it and punched holes into it, and put it about their necks for jewels; and
afterwards I saw the Dutch have some of it, which they had of the Narragansets at
a small rate. 15
Given their obvious culpability in Oldham‘s death, one might have expected the
English to have vented their wrath upon the Narragansett; but instead, the colonists‘
response was measured. In August, the Bay colony sent envoys Edward Gibbons and
John Higginson, along with the principal Massachusett sachem, Cutshamekin, to meet
with Canonicus ―to treat with him about the murder of John Oldham.‖ As Winthrop
noted, the meeting was anything but acrimonious:
15
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They [Gibbons and Higginson] returned, being very well accepted, and good
succes in their business. They observed in the sachem much state, great command
over his men, and marvellous wisdom in his answers and his carriage of the whole
treaty, clearing himself and his neighbors of the murder, and offering assistance
for the revenge of it.
Thus it would seem that the elderly Narragansett sachem had somehow managed to
persuade the colonial emissaries to excuse his people‘s involvement in Oldham‘s murder.
It is possible that the envoys came away from the meeting believing, as Bradford
reported, that ―some of the murderers of Oldham fled to the Pequots,‖ and that the Pequot
were therefore complicit in his killing. In actual fact, however, the issue of who was
responsible for the murder was probably of secondary importance to the colonists, for this
question apparently served as a mere pretext for the diplomatic mission to Canonicus.
According to Edward Johnson, ―The English sought by all meanes to keepe [the
Narragansett] from confederating with the Pequods, and understanding by intelligence,
that the Pequods would send for them to that end, endeavored to prevent them.‖
Apparently, the prospect of a Pequot-Narragansett alliance was frightening enough to
cause the English to overlook the relatively trivial matter of Oldham‘s murder. The real
purpose of the colonists‘ visit to Canonicus, then, was to shore up relations with the
Narragansett. In this they were successful. As Johnson reported, Canonicus told the
envoys ―that he did willingly embrace peace with the English,‖ while he also ―was well
advised of the Peaquods cruell disposition and aptnesse to make War.‖ Thus Gibbons and
Higginson returned to Boston, ―having gained the old Kings [Canonicus‘s] favour so
farre, as rather to favour them [the English] then the Pequods.‖ Ironically, the Pequot
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were destined to bear the brunt of the colonists‘ vengeance for a murder commissioned
by the Narragansett.16
Officials in Massachusetts Bay were determined to make sure that the murder of
Englishmen did not go unanswered. As Captain John Underhill wrote, ―The blood of the
innocent called for vengeance.‖ Accordingly, Governor Vane sent forth ―a hundred well
appointed soldiers,‖ under the command of John Endecott, to conduct a punitive raid
against the natives. On August 22, Endecott‘s men reached Block Island, landing on the
shore with ―arrows flying thick about us.‖ But the natives subsequently proved elusive, as
they ―retired into swamps, so as we could not find them.‖ Unable to kill or capture any of
the island‘s natives, the colonists ―burnt and spoiled both houses and corn in great
abundance‖ and ―destroyed some of their dogs‖ before returning to their ships. Then
Endecott turned his attention to the Pequot.17
Endecott brought his small army to Saybrook, and, in Gardener‘s words, ―made
that place their rendezvous or seat of war.‖ Gardener was less than pleased with this
development, for he told Endecott ―you come hither to raise these wasps about my ears,
and then you will take wing and fly away.‖ Ignoring Gardener‘s protestations, Endecott
led his force up what is now the Thames River, into the heart of Pequot territory. Upon
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seeing the arriving colonists, the Pequot quickly ascertained that this was no trading
mission. According to Underhill, the natives on the shore called out, ―What, Englishmen,
what cheer, what cheer, are you hoggery, will you cram us? That is, are you angry, will
you kills us, and do you come to fight?‖ Endecott subsequently informed a Pequot envoy
―that the governors of the Bay sent us to demand the heads of those persons that had slain
Captain Norton and Captain Stone, and the rest of their company‖ and that ―if they
desired their own peace and welfare, they will peaceably answer our expectation, and
give us the heads of the murderers.‖ But instead of answering the English demands, the
Pequots stalled for time. Endecott‘s men landed on the shore and prepared for battle. As
Underhill noted, ―Marching into a champaign field we displayed our colors; but none
would come near us, but standing remotely off did laugh at us for our patience.‖ The
English, suspecting they were being drawn into a trap, ―suddenly set upon our march, and
gave fire to as many as we could come near, firing their wigwams, spoiling their corn,
and many other necessaries that they had buried in the ground we raked up, which the
soldiers had for booty. Thus we spent the day burning and spoiling the country.‖ The
following day, Endecott‘s forces landed on the other side of the river, in the territory of
the western Niantic—who were themselves subjects of the Pequot. There they found that
―no Indians would come near us, but run from us, as the deer from the dogs.‖ Once again
the English satisfied themselves with destroying native homes and corn, and then ―having
burnt and spoiled what we could light on, we embarked our men, and set sail for the
Bay.‖ In the course of Endecott‘s raids on the Pequot and western Niantic, the English
suffered but one casualty, ―one man wounded in the leg,‖ whereas the Narragansett
reported to Winthrop ―that thirteen of the Pequods were killed, and forty wounded.‖ By
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this point, as Gardener noted, English-Pequot relations had deteriorated beyond repair,
―and thus began the war between the Indians and us in these parts.‖18
*
If Endecott‘s goal was to terrify the Pequot and their tributaries into submission,
then his campaign of destruction failed to achieve this objective. Instead, Gardener‘s fear
that the Bay colonists‘ raid would only ―raise these wasps about my ears‖ was confirmed.
Shortly after Endecott departed the scene, a party of Saybrook men went upriver to gather
hay from a meadow in Pequot territory. As Gardener reported, ―the Indians presently rose
out of the long grass, and killed three, and took the brother of Mr. Mitchell, who is the
minister of Cambridge, and roasted him alive.‖ A couple of weeks later, Pequot warriors
ambushed a group of colonists who had gone out fowling ―and shot them all three; one of
them escaped through the corn, shot through the leg, the other two they tormented.‖
Alarmed, Gardener sent letters to request reinforcements from the Bay colony and to
warn the towns upriver that Pequot attacks were imminent. He also cautioned that
unarmed ships should stay out of the Connecticut River. The English trader John Tilley,
ignoring Gardener‘s advice, went ashore a few miles upstream of Saybrook, ―not
suspecting the bloody-mindedness of those persons.‖ According to Underhill, the Pequot
fell upon him and a man with him, whom they wickedly and barbarously slew;
and, by relation, brought him home, tied him to a stake, flayed his skin off, put
hot embers between the flesh and the skin, cut off his fingers and toes, and made
hatbands of them; thus barbarous was their cruelty!
Cave, Pequot War, 113-19; Gardener, ―Relation of the Pequot War,‖ 126-27;
Underhill, ―Newes from America,‖ 55-60; Winthrop, Journal, 1:189-90. A subplot of Endecott‘s
raid against the Pequot involved the Massachusett sachem Cutshamekin, who participated in the
attack. As Winthrop noted, Cutshamekin ―had crept into a swamp and killed a Pequot, and having
flayed off the skin of his head, he sent it to Canonicus.‖ This delighted the Narragansett sachem,
who showed the scalp ―to all the sachems about him, and returned many thanks to the English,
and sent four fathom of wampum to Cutshamekin.‖ Winthrop, Journal, 1:189.
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Through these and similar incidents, the Pequot made it clear that they would now
violently resist the incursion of the English into their territory. 19
Shortly after Endecott‘s raid, Roger Williams, the banished Puritan nonconformist
who remained friendly with various native groups, wrote to Winthrop that the Pequot and
their western Niantic allies had resolved ―to live and die together, and not yeald one up‖
to the English. But despite their determination to disrupt the colonists‘ presence in
Connecticut, the epidemic of 1633-34 had reduced the Pequots‘ military strength to the
point where they could no longer dictate the course of events in the Connecticut valley.
Running out of options, Sassacus did what could only have been heretofore unthinkable:
he sought an alliance with the Narragansett. As Bradford noted, the Pequot ―sought to
make peace with the Narragansetts, and used very pernicious arguments to move them
thereunto: as that the English were strangers and began to overspread the country, and
would deprive them thereof in time, if they were suffered to grow and increase.‖ Upon
learning of the Pequots‘ entreaties to the Narragansett, Williams again wrote to Winthrop,
reporting ―that the Pequods and Naragansetts were at truce, and that Miantunnomoh told
him, that the Pequods had labored to persuade them, that the English were minded to
destroy all Indians.‖ Now, colonists across New England were confronted with the
menancing prospect of a Narragansett-Pequot alliance. Realizing that such an alliance
could endanger their very existence, the Bay colony‘s leaders resolved to disrupt it. First
they implored Williams to employ his ―utmost and Speediest Endeavors to breake and
hinder the league labored for by [the Pequot].‖ Accordingly, Williams met with both
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Canonicus and his nephew Miantonomi, who would soon succeed Canonicus as principal
sachem of the Narragansett. Williams was, among other things, a skilled negotiator; and,
after consulting with him, the Narragansett leaders declared their neutrality in the
expanding English-Pequot conflict. Then Governor Vane sent for Miantonomi, who came
to Boston in October with a host of other Narragansett leaders and the Massachusett
sachem Cutshamekin. The negotiations that followed resulted in a diplomatic victory for
the colonists. As Winthrop noted, Miantonomi declared
That [the Narragansett] had always loved the English, and desired firm peace with
us: That they would continue in war with the Pequods and their confederates, till
they were subdued; and desired we should do so: They would deliver our enemies
to us, or kill them . . . : That they would now make a firm peace, and two months
hence they would send us a present.
In the treaty of friendship that emerged from this meeting, the English and Narragansett
agreed, among other things, to ―free trade between us,‖ and that neither party would
―make peace with the Pequods without the other‘s consent.‖ Moreover, the English
promised to notify the Narragansett ―when we go against the Pequods,‖ at which time the
Narragansett would ―send us some guides.‖ 20
Now completely isolated and outnumbered by hostile rivals, the Pequot continued
their campaign of small-scale assaults on colonists in and around Saybrook. In February
1637, four colonists were killed when a party of Saybrook men were ambushed by fifty
natives. Later that spring, Gardener reported that Pequot warriors attacked an English
shallop in the Connecticut river and killed two men, ―one whereof they killed at Six-mile
Island, the other came down drowned to us at our doors, with an arrow shot into his eye
20
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and through his head.‖ Cogently summarizing the colonists‘ situation in early 1637,
Bradford wrote: ―the Pequots fell openly upon the English at Connecticut, in the lower
parts of the river, and slew sundry of them as they were at work in the fields, both men
and women, to the great terrour of the rest.‖ Despite the growing restlessness of colonists
on the frontier, the Bay colony was slow in responding to Gardener‘s requests for
assistance. Finally, on April 10, Winthrop noted that ―Capt. Underhill was sent to
Saybrook, with twenty men, to keep the fort . . . for fear any advantage should be taken
by the adverse party, through the weakness of the place.‖ 21
On April 23, 1637, the Pequot launched on attack on the town of Wethersfield.
Accounts of the English casualties vary, but according to Winthrop, the natives ―killed
six men, being at their work, and twenty cows and a mare, and had killed three women,
and carried away two maids.‖ This event, more than any other, galvanized the river towns
and the Bay colony to escalate the war against the Pequot. The Bay colony sent Captain
John Mason and forty men to join Miantonomi in a planned raid on a Pequot island, then
commissioned ―one hundred and sixty more after them to prosecute the war.‖ Hartford,
Windsor, and Wethersfield, together comprising a total of some 250 inhabitants,
organized an army of ninety men to wage war against the Pequot. On May 22, Winthrop
received word from Miantonomi ―that Capt. Mason, with a company of English on the
river, had surprised and slain eight Pequods, and taken seven squaws.‖ Two days later, a
letter from Roger Williams indicated ―that Capt. Mason was come to Saybrook with
eighty English and one hundred Indians; and that the Indians had gone out there, and met
with seven Pequods; five they killed; one they took alive, whom the English put to
Winthrop, Journal, 1:192, 1:208, 1:212; Gardener, ―Relation of the Pequot War,‖ 129;
Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 294.
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torture; and set all their heads upon the fort.‖ 22 But these losses paled by comparison to
what the Pequot were about to suffer.
*
In May 1637, Mason led a force of seventy-seven Englishmen, sixty Mohegan,
and roughly two hundred Narragansett warriors to the Thames River and surrounded the
fortified Pequot village of Mystic. Shortly after daybreak on May 26, the colonists
attacked the fort, whereupon they encountered spirited resistance from its inhabitants.
Perturbed by the slow pace of the battle, Mason concluded, ―We must burn them.‖ He
then ―brought out a Firebrand‖ from one of the natives‘ wigwams, ―and putting it into the
Matts with which they were covered, set the Wigwams on Fire.‖ The colonists withdrew
and once again surrounded the fort. Within minutes, the entire village was ablaze. As
Mason later recounted, the flames ―did swiftly over-run the Fort, to the extream
Amazement of the Enemy, and great Rejoycing of our selves.‖ From within the burning
village, native warriors fired a barrage of arrows at the besieging colonists; in turn, the
English ―repayed them with our small Shot.‖ About forty ―of the Stoutest‖ natives made
it out of the fort, whereupon they ―perished by the Sword.‖ Thus in less than two hours,
Mystic was transformed from a fortified village teeming with native inhabitants to a
grisly inferno of death. Mason estimated that some ―six or seven Hundred‖ Pequots were
killed in the blaze, while ―only seven [were] taken captive, and about seven escaped.‖
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Winthrop reported a somewhat lower overall death toll, which included ―two chief
sachems, and one hundred and fifty fighting men, and about one hundred and fifty old
men, women and children.‖ English losses at Mystic, in contrast, amounted to two men
killed and twenty wounded.23
The willingness of the English to employ total warfare against the Pequot,
slaughtering not only combatants but also women, children, and the aged and infirm, left
a deep impression on the region‘s other native groups. As Underhill recorded, the
colonists‘ native allies ―much rejoiced at our victories, and greatly, admired the manner
of Englishmen‘s fight, but cried Mach it, mach it; that is, It is naught, it is naught,
because it is too furious, and slays too many men.‖ The Puritans, meanwhile, viewed
matters differently. For his part, Mason saw the burning of the village at Mystic not as an
act of genocide, but as a manifestation of divine Providence:
Thus was God seen in the Mount, Crushing his proud Enemies and the Enemies
of his People: . . . burning them up in the fire of his Wrath, and dunging the
Ground with their Flesh: It was the Lord‘s Doings, and it is marvellous in our
eyes! It is He that hath made his Work wonderful, and therefore ought to be
remembered.
Apparently, Mason‘s attitude toward the wholesale destruction of the Pequot was shared
by many of his contemporaries. For on June 15, Winthrop noted, ―There was a day of
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thanksgiving kept in all the churches for the victory obtained against the Pequods, and for
other mercies.‖24
The Pequots‘ world, which had been teetering on the brink of collapse since 1634,
utterly disintegrated after the massacre at Mystic. According to Mason, Sassacus‘s
counselors ―concluded there was no abiding any longer in their Country, and so resolved
to fly into several Parts.‖ Desultory fighting continued for several months, but eventually
most of the remaining Pequot were killed or captured by the English—or by other
natives. As Mason noted, ―The Pequots now became a Prey to all Indians. Happy were
they that could bring in their Heads to the English: Of which there came almost daily to
Windsor, or Hartford.‖ Those Pequot that escaped decapitation were sent into servitude in
various places: many went to the Narragansett or Mohegan, some were sent to
Massachusetts Bay, and a few were sent to the West Indies. One Pequot slave was given
to a ―Mr. Cutting to carry into England.‖ Winthrop commented that some Pequot slaves,
who had been sent to Boston ―ran away and were brought again by the Indians our
neighbours, and those we branded on the shoulder.‖ In late July, Winthrop reported that
―we have slain 13 [Pequot] sachems,‖ though Sassacus remained alive and had ―fled to
the Mohawks.‖ Then on August 5, Winthrop reported receiving ―a part of the skin and
lock of hair of Sassacus and his brother and five other Pequod sachems,‖ who had been
―surprised and slain, with twenty of their best men‖ by their Mohawk hosts. As to why
the Mohawk decided to execute the Pequot chief sachem, Bradford confessed his
uncertainty: ―whether to satisfy the English or rather the Narragansetts (who, as I have
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since heard, hired them to do it) or for their own advantage, I well know not.‖ Whatever
their motive, Bradford continued, ―thus this war took end.‖ 25
With Sassacus dead and his people all but vanquished, the English quickly
consolidated their control over southern New England. The region‘s remaining native
tribes pledged alliegance to Massachusetts Bay, proving their loyalty by supplying both
wampum payments and the body parts of slain Pequots. In August, Winthrop noted that
the sachems of Long Island had sent in ―many Pequods‘ heads and hands,‖ along with a
substantial tribute of wampum. Later that month, the English received from the
Narragansett ―the hands of three Pequods,—one the chief of those who murdered Capt.
Stone.‖ In November, Winthrop wrote that Miantonomi had come to Boston and
―acknowledged that all the Pequod country and Block Island were ours, and promised
that he would not meddle with them but by our leave.‖ The Mohegan, recognizing the
power of the English juggernaut, cultivated particularly close ties with their new
overlords. In April 1638, a Mohegan sachem ―brought a present of eighteen skins of
beaver‖ to the Bay colony, and then in June, Uncas came to Boston bearing ―a present of
twenty fathom of wampom.‖ During his visit, Uncas promised ―to submit to the order of
the English‖ and pledged his fealty, telling his hosts,
This heart (laying his hand upon his breast) is not mine, but yours; I have no men;
they are all yours; command me any difficult thing, I will do it; I will not believe
any Indians‘ words against the English; if any man shall kill an Englishman, I will
put him to death, were he never so dear to me.
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In November 1638, leaders of the English, Narragansett, and Mohegan concluded the
Treaty of Hartford, which proclaimed that the Pequot nation no longer existed and
provided legal sanction for the colonists‘ occupation of their former territory. The treaty
divided the roughly two hundred remaining Pequots between Miantonomi and Uncas and
declared they ―shall no more be called Peaquots but Narragansetts and Mohegans.‖
Moreover, the Mohegan and Narragansett agreed that they would neither ―suffer [the
Pequot] to live in the country that was formerly theirs but is now the Englishes by
conquest‖ nor ―possess any part of the Peaquot country without leave from the English.‖
For practical purposes, the treaty simply codified what was already apparent on the
ground: by 1638, the English were the undisputed masters of New England. 26
*
The Pequot War is the subject of a vast historiography, which Alfred A. Cave has
characterized as ―often more polemical than substantive.‖ Too frequently, modern
analyses of the conflict have focused on the question of whether the colonists or the
natives were primarily responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. 27 In actual fact, the
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Pequot War resulted from a complex interplay of factors, and no one group bears sole
responsibility for the conflict. Before 1637, both natives and colonists declined
opportunities to defuse tensions and forestall the coming confrontation. The Pequot could
have delivered the killers of John Stone to Boston and acceded to the colonists‘ demands
for wampum and furs, but these were terms they were unwilling to accept. By the same
token, the colonists could have pursued a mutually beneficial trade relationship with the
Pequot, but instead they sought to humiliate the natives—first by asking them to pay
tribute to the English, and then by sending an armed force to burn and pillage their homes
and fields. Thus it is fair to say that both sides demonstrated more intransigence than
flexibility. But it also seems likely that concessions, by either party, would have
accomplished little more than postponing the conflict. Eventually, land-hungry emigrants
from Massachusetts Bay were going to seek to settle on lands the Pequot were
determined to protect. Given this, and considering that both parties wished to control
trade on the Connecticut River, it seems likely that conflict between the English and the
Pequot was, eventually, inevitable.
While concentrating on the question of which party should be blamed for the
Pequot War, scholars have devoted considerably less attention to another important factor
in the conflict‘s genesis: the smallpox epidemic of 1633-34. Before 1633, the Pequot
were a thriving, populous people who controlled an extensive (if disgruntled) network of
this debate has been Alden T. Vaughan, who in the first edition of New England Frontier (1965)
described the war as ―the attempt by the Puritan colonies—supported by the bulk of the Indians—
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tributary native villages. They dominated southern New England politically, culturally
and economically. Had the English tried to attack them at that time, the Pequot could
have responded by bringing hundreds, if not thousands of warriors into the theater of
battle, launching reprisals from Plymouth to the Bay colony. However much the Puritans
might have desired access to the Connecticut River and its surrounding valley, they could
not have attempted to displace the Pequot without endangering their own existence in the
region. And even as the English grew stronger, the Pequot could have responded by
negotiating with them from a position of relative strength—like Massasoit did with
Plymouth in 1621—and thereby retained some semblance of sovereignty, at least for a
while. But that was not how it happened. When smallpox struck in 1633 and 1634, it
ruined the Pequot, depleting their ranks of warriors, women, and children. It was in this
weakened state that the Pequot had to face revolts from their erstwhile tributaries and allout war with the Narragansett and Mohegan. Thus when the Pequot turned to the English
for assistance in 1634, they were but a mere shadow of the powerful nation they had once
been. They were unable to negotiate an acceptable agreement with the Bay colony, and
they could not keep English colonists from migrating to the Connecticut valley. It was in
this state of affairs that the murders of various Englishmen, including Stone and Oldham,
prompted Massachusetts Bay officials to issue humiliating demands to the Pequot
leadership, then to launch a full-scale war upon the Pequot in an effort to bring order to
the Connecticut River valley.
To say that the 1633-34 smallpox epidemic caused the Pequot War would be to
oversimplify matters, in much the same way as assigning the lion‘s share of blame to
either the colonists or the Pequot misses the point. But it is quite reasonable to assume
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that had the epidemic not occurred when it did, then the history of the English conquest
of Connecticut would have unfolded very differently than it did.
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Conclusion: Providence and Pestilence
Thus out of small beginnings greater things have been produced by His hand that
made all things of nothing, and gives being to all things that are; and as one small
candle may light a thousand, so the light here kindled hath shone to many, yea in
some sort to our whole nation; let the glorious name of Jehovah have all the
praise.
—William Bradford1
To the New England Puritans, the English triumph in the Pequot War was a sure
sign of God‘s Providence. John Mason, who helped secure the Pequots‘ defeat by
burning several hundred of them alive at Mystic, exemplified the Puritans‘ providential
view of native mortality. Mason ascribed the English victory not to his own exploits, but
to divine will:
Thus the Lord was pleased to smite our Enemies in the hinder Parts, and to give
us their Land for an Inheritance: Who remembered us in our low Estate, and
redeemed us out of our Enemies Hands: Let us therefore praise the Lord for his
Goodness and his wonderful Works to the Children of Men!‖
Furthermore, Mason‘s comment about the Puritans‘ receipt of the Pequots‘ ―Land for an
Inheritance‖ is telling. Indeed, from the earliest days of English settlement at Plymouth,
the colonists interpreted the natives‘ widespread demise as an indication that God
approved of their occupation of formerly native lands. Assessing the effects of the 1616
epidemic, John Smith wrote that ―it seems God hath provided this Country for our
Nation, destroying the natives by the plague, it not touching one Englishman.‖ Similarly,
Daniel Gookin noted that through the epidemic ―divine providence made way for the
quiet and peaceable settlement of the English‖ in what had been the territory of the
Pokanoket. Edward Johnson, providing a more nuanced explanation, wrote that by
sending this ―sore Consumption‖ among the natives, ―Christ . . . not only made roome for
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his people to plant; but also tamed the hard and cruel hearts of these barbarous Indians
insomuch that halfe a handfull of his people landing not long after in Plimoth-Plantation,
found little resistance.‖ Gorges asserted that the epidemic left the land ―without any
[people] to disturb or appease our free and peaceable possession thereof, from when we
may justly conclude, that GOD made the way toe effect his work.‖ To Winslow, the
conclusion was obvious: ―when I seriously consider of things, I cannot but think that God
hath a purpose to give that land, as an inheritance, to our nation.‖2
When smallpox struck the New England natives in 1633, Puritan commentators
again saw divine Providence at work. Winthrop was particularly adamant in arguing that
disease among the natives indicated God‘s support for the Puritans‘ mission in America.
As he wrote to John Endecott, ―if God were not pleased with our inheritinge these parts,
why did he drive out the natives before us? and why does he still make roome for us, by
diminishinge them as we increase?‖ Later that year, Winthrop stated the case even more
succinctly: ―For the natives, they are all near dead of the small-pox, so as the Lord hath
cleared our title to what we possess.‖ Such sentiments must have been widely shared by
the Puritan migrants who, in the wake of native epidemics, moved in and seized the land.
A pamphlet, published in 1643, exemplified the prevailing Puritan attitude by attributing
English control of New England to ―the good hand of God,‖ which had ―favored our
beginnings . . . [by] sweeping away great multitudes of the natives . . . that he might make
room for us.‖3

Mason, ―Brief History,‖ 44; Smith, Advertisements, 20; Gookin, Historical Collections,
8; Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 41-42; Gorges, ―Briefe Narration,‖ 2:77; Winslow,
―Good News from New England,‖ 581.
2

3

Winthrop to John Endecott, January 3, 1634, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1871-1873 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1873), 345; Winthrop

155

It is hardly surprising that the English Puritans saw the natives‘ suffering, and
their own resulting success in New England, as events ordained and sanctioned by God,
for this belief was entirely consistent with their providential worldview. Scholars of more
recent generations, on the other hand, have looked at these events through the lens of
post-Enlightenment scientific understanding, which tends to discredit explanations that
depend on divine intervention. Nevertheless, modern scholars would agree that the
English colonists did receive assistance from a powerful but invisible ally. Indeed,
throughout the early colonial period, a potent cadre of inadvertently imported pathogenic
microorganisms facilitated the English conquest by removing thousands of natives and
profoundly altering the cultural and political worlds of those who survived.
*
Before the arrival of Old World epidemic diseases, the English were unable to
establish permanent settlements in New England. This was not because of any inherent
shortcomings of the land or climate, but rather because the continent‘s indigenous
inhabitants, while happy to trade with Europeans, would not allow them to stay too long
on the shore. In this regard, the Viking Thorvald Eiriksson surely spoke for many
prospective European settlers in northeastern North America when he said of the Vinland
colony: ―There is fat around my belly! We have won a fine and fruitful country, but will
hardly be allowed to enjoy it.‖ According to Norse oral tradition, these were Eiriksson‘s
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last words, uttered just before he died with a Skræling arrow protruding from his belly. 4
Native resistance also spelled disaster for the Cartier-Roberval settlement venture on the
St. Lawrence in 1542, just as it did for the well-financed English colonizing expeditions
to New England in the first decade of the seventeenth century. So long as the northeastern
natives remained largely unaffected by European epidemic diseases, they would be
powerful enough to essentially preclude European colonization of their lands. But even
though European diseases did not make substantial inroads into northeastern North
America during the sixteenth century—the experience of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians
notwithstanding—the northeastern natives‘ luck could not hold out forever. By the early
seventeenth century, smallpox, measles, and influenza had already been ravaging native
populations in Spanish America for decades. When these and other diseases began
infiltrating the Northeast, the natives found that their capacity to resist European
colonization, along with so many other aspects of their economy and culture, was
destroyed.
Even before the Pilgrims contemplated emigrating to the New World, an
infectious disease began preparing the ground for their arrival by decimating the
Pokanoket, Massachusett, and Pawtucket natives that had previously occupied the coast
of present-day Massachusetts. As we have seen, the responsible disease was almost
certainly smallpox, for no other malady would have been as likely to cause such
devastating disease, even among a previously unexposed population, after a transatlantic
voyage to New England in the early seventeenth century. But whatever its cause, the
disease was essential to the Pilgrims‘ survival, and eventual success, in New England.
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Their settlement, Plymouth, was built on the ruins of what had been the native village of
Patuxet. Beyond that, the epidemic changed the political balance of power among the
regional native nations, creating conditions in which the Pokanoket found it in their
interests to ally with the colonists, rather than driving them away. As Plymouth extended
its zone of influence northward, sporadic epidemics continued to break out among the
natives around Massachusetts Bay. These outbreaks, occurring among populations still
reeling from the 1616 plague, enhanced both the colonists‘ economic control over the
region and the natives‘ impression that they were defenseless before the powerful and
capricious English god. And this was just the beginning.
When Puritan migrants began pouring into communities around Massachusetts
Bay in the 1630s, they brought unprecedented numbers of young children with them.
These children, many of whom had not yet experienced smallpox, provided that most
dreaded scourge of Native Americans with an extraordinary opportunity to travel to
North America. Not surprisingly, smallpox began breaking out among the Puritans in
Massachusetts from the earliest days of the Great Migration. When Variola inevitably
spread to the natives in 1633, it did so with devastating effects, particularly among the
thriving Narragansett and Pequot nations that had been unaffected by the epidemic of
1616. Besides killing thousands of natives across New England, the social disruptions
that attended the epidemic of 1633-34 accounted for such seemingly unlikely scenes as
the Puritan conversion of a Pawtucket sachem and the adoptions of orphaned native
children by well-meaning colonists. Moreover, as was true of the 1616 epidemic, the
1633-34 smallpox outbreak inaugurated a wave of political implications for the region‘s
surviving natives. Things went especially badly for the Pequot, who even before the
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epidemic found themselves overburdened by insurrections from the Mohegan and other
discontented tributaries and at war with the Narragansett over access to European trade.
Then, after the Pequot lost most of their population in 1634, their world imploded. As
Puritan families moved into Connecticut, the Pequot tried to reach a negotiated
agreement with the English in Massachusetts Bay. When that failed, they reached out, in
desperation, to the hated Narragansett—only to see that nation, along with the Mohegan,
join with the English in a powerful anti-Pequot alliance. From that point, the Pequots‘
fate was sealed. The consumption of hundreds of Pequot souls in the inferno at Mystic,
and the codification of the Pequot nation‘s elimination in the Treaty of Hartford,
represented culminations of a process that had been made inexorable by the 1633-34
smallpox epidemic.
*
Smallpox remained an omnipresent force in New England throughout the
seventeenth century. Even after the 1633-34 epidemic subsided, the English colonies
were never entirely free from disease. Major outbreaks killed dozens, and sometimes
hundreds, of colonists and caused serious social disruptions in 1636-38, 1648-49, 166668, 1677-78, 1688-91, and 1697-1702. As one author has written, ―For 180 years
smallpox was responsible for more deaths than any other one cause. Almost always
sporadically present, coming in epidemic form every few years, few indeed escaped its
ravages.‖ Epidemics in Boston forced the Bay colony to move its General Court to
Cambridge (and then to Roxbury) in 1636 and to Charleston in 1659. In the midst of
particularly severe epidemics, authorities proclaimed days of fasting in hopes of averting
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further punishment from a seemingly wrathful God. But despite their divine
supplications, the danger of smallpox remained unavoidable. 5
The colonists were not the only people in New England who sought the English
God‘s assistance in delivering them from smallpox. As the missionary John Eliot wrote
of his ―Praying Indians‖ during the 1649-50 outbreak, ―it please God to work
wonderfully for the [Christian] Indians who call upon God in preserving them from the
small pox, when their prophane neighbors were cut off by it.‖ For most northeastern
Native Americans populations, however, smallpox exerted disastrous demographic
consequences that far exceeded its impact on colonial populations. The Huron, as we
have seen, were devastated by smallpox during the late 1630s; one author estimates that
by 1640, the epidemic had reduced their population by 50 percent. Over the ensuing
decade, the continued effects of disease and repeated attacks by the Iroquois combined to
drive the Huron to the brink of extinction. Smallpox was no less a scourge for the nations
of the Iroquois confederacy than it was for the Huron, however. Writing of an outbreak
among the Iroquois in 1662-63, a Jesuit scholar noted that smallpox ―has wrought sad
havoc in their Villages and has carried off many men, besides great numbers of women
and children; and as a result their Villages are nearly deserted, and their fields only halftilled.‖ European infections also attacked native inhabitants of the islands off the southern
New England coast, as in 1658 when half the Montauk population on Long Island died in
an outbreak. By examining native population losses on Martha‘s Vineyard and
Nantucket, Sherburne F. Cook has determined that ―introduced diseases‖ reduced native
populations on these islands by about 80 percent between the early seventeenth and early
Samuel Bayard Woodward, ―The Story of Smallpox in Massachusetts,‖ New England
Journal of Medicine 23 (June 9, 1932): 1182-83; Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 44-48.
5
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eighteenth centuries. Many additional examples could be cited. In all, northeastern North
America was struck by at least two dozen separate epidemics of European diseases, most
of them caused by smallpox, during the seventeenth century. 6
The cumulative impact of these recurrent epidemics on native population levels
was devastating. As one Anglican missionary in New York wrote in 1705, the natives
―wast away and have done so ever since our first arrival amongst them (as they
themselves say) like Snow against the Sun.‖ Considering ―that very probably forty years
hence there will scarce be seen an Indian in our America,‖ the missionary concluded that
―God‘s Providence in this matter seems very wonderful.‖ 7 Anglicans and Puritans
disagreed on many things, to be sure; but even the most steadfast Calvinist in New
England would have concurred with this assessment of the natives‘ demise.
*
Each November, citizens of the United States pay homage to the intrepid
Plymouth colonists with a national day of thanksgiving. On this holiday, many
Americans are likely to pause, at least briefly, to reflect on the hardship and suffering the
Pilgrims endured, first during their transatlantic voyage, and then during their miserable
first winter in the New World. It is safe to assume that far fewer Americans spend any
John Eliot, ―Manifestation of the Further Progress of the Gospel among the Indians in
New England‖ (1651), Massachusetts Historical Society Collections 3rd ser., 4 (1864): 165-68;
Donald R. Hopkins, Princes and Peasants: Smallpox in History (Chicago: University Press,
1983), 235; Hierosme Lalemant, ―Relation of what occurred in the Mission of the Fathers of the
Society of Jesus in the country of New France, from the Summer of the year 1662 to the Summer
of the year 1663,‖ in Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 48:79; Sherburne F. Cook, ―Significance of
Disease,‖ 493, 501-5; Noble David Cook, Born to Die, 198.
6

Mr. Moor to the Secretary, New York, November 13, 1705, quoted in Duffy, ―Smallpox
and the Indians in the American Colonies,‖ Bulletin of the History of Medicine 25 (1951): 330.
Sherburne F. Cook calculated the annual average native population losses at 1.59 percent for
Martha‘s Vineyard from 1642 to 1764, and 1.45 percent for Nantucket from 1659 to 1792. On
native losses from measles, typhus, and dysentery, see Cook, ―Significance of Disease,‖ 494-95.
7
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appreciable time considering what the natives of coastal New England had already
experienced by the time the Pilgrims settled in Squanto‘s depopulated village of Patuxet,
let alone the holocaust that would befall natives across the region in the ensuing decades.
Clearly, such a tale of death and devastation does not resonate with the optimistic tone of
the Pilgrim myth, at least as it has been absorbed by generations of American
schoolchildren. Moreover, it is difficult to mentally juxtapose the image of Squanto, the
quintessential ―friendly Indian,‖ teaching the colonists to plant corn, alongside that of the
Mystic inhabitants ―burning . . . in the fire of [God‘s] Wrath, and dunging the Ground
with their Flesh.‖8 Yet both pictures represent crucial stages in the evolution of Englishnative relations in early colonial New England, and neither scene could have occurred as
it did if not for the effects of epidemic diseases.
Epidemic diseases, particularly smallpox, played a central role in the English
conquest of New England. Disease cleared space in which the colonists could land and
build their initial settlements; altered indigenous political conditions to facilitate their
survival; and enhanced their military, political, economic, and spiritual dominion over the
region. Even so, the natives were not simply passive participants in the colonization
process. Indeed, it is only by considering the devastating effects of infectious diseases on
native populations that agency is restored to the ―friendly Indians‖ of New England.
When native decisions are examined in this context, it becomes clear that Massasoit,
Canonicus, Sassacus, and Uncas, among others, acted in their own perceived interests.
Indeed, the natives frequently sought to draw the English into their own games of power
politics, with varying degrees of success. Infectious disease was not the only factor

8

Mason, ―Brief History,‖ 35.
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determining the nature of English-native relations in New England, to be sure, but it was
the most important one. Throughout the early colonial period, the interactions of ―saints‖
and ―savages‖ were shaped, above all else, by smallpox.
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